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HISTORY OF THE WAR



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THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR

INCLUDING A DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS IN THE DIFFERENT CAPITALS, THE TEXTS OF THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, THE PUBLIC SPEECHES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS, AN ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND ORIGINAL MATTER ❧ ❧

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PREFACE

THIS War is by universal consent the greatest catastrophe of modern times. To dwell upon its social ravages and economic ruin is not my present purpose. While we are engaged in a struggle for national existence the responsibility for the mischief may be hidden or disguised by passion, excitement, Press censorship, and martial law. But the time will come when the record of historical facts which led all Europe to this fate will have to be examined and the blame apportioned. A duty is therefore imposed upon some of us to collect these records before they are covered with the cobwebs of time, to co-ordinate them, and to set them forth for the judgment of a wider public.

Meanwhile, as we wait upon the course of military events and economic exhaustion, we may with profit study the work of the great European diplomats whose skill and competence have hatched Armageddon out of the Serajevo egg.

Personally, I believe that the judgment of mankind on the War will depend more on its consequences than on its origins, and that in this way the truth of the Greek philosopher's words, "By suffering we learn," will be realized in due course of time. Nevertheless, in the recollections of the past we can always find a guide to the future, and therefore it seems to me a duty to collect and collate such diplomatic and political facts about the causes of the War as have already come to light.

I have therefore sought in a preliminary chapter to go back and examine why this conflagration has spread from Eastern Europe, and to uncover the methods by which the diplomacy in the different capitals has worked, leading Europe to the inevitable and disastrous end. For this purpose I have first glanced at the history of the relations of the European Powers to each other for the last twenty years, in order to bring before our minds the state of affairs in Europe at the time when this crisis developed. Then I have given as complete an account as I have been able of the course of the negotiations and the events that took place each day in the important capitals in Europe for the fourteen days before the outbreak of war. For this purpose I have dissected the English White Paper and placed all the facts related therein in chronological order. With this I have fitted in similar material from the German Denkschrift, the Russian Orange Book (from my own translation of the Russian text), the Belgian Grey Book, the Austrian White Paper, and other material. Thus a record is obtained of all the relevant events in chronological order. There is included also an account of the military preparations and mobilizations in the countries concerned, largely based on the reports of Press correspondents.

From the above material I think the reader will be able to see concisely and consecutively what was passing through the minds of the diplomats of the now belligerent Powers, and what efforts they made for peace. It will be possible also to see how the guardians of the peace of Europe were being daily frightened and stampeded by fear and distrust of each other or by anxiety for their own prestige, and how they were finally overborne by the military party in each country. In the running comments which I have added I have taken it upon myself to indicate where blame or praise seems justly to be deserved.

In some later chapters I have added a number of

official documents which do not appear in any of the Government publications hitherto issued ; also texts of the Treaties bearing upon certain points of importance, Parliamentary speeches, and some of the more important Press correspondence, the sources of which have been duly acknowledged. Amongst the Parliamentary speeches I have myself made or have obtained translations of the declarations on the outbreak of war by the statesmen and public leaders in France, Germany, and Russia. The similarity of the sentiments in all these speeches is almost as noteworthy as the support which has been obtained by all from the official exponents of Christianity, art, science, philosophy, and letters. Each Foreign Minister or spokesman of his Government claimed that his country worked for peace, but was forced to take the sword through envious and hostile neighbours who were attacking it. Each said the War was only in self-defence and asked for national unity, while the Sovereigns appealed to the Deity to bless their arms, and the Churches, under the inspiration of State policy, have declared it to be a "Holy War." On the other hand, the Social Democrats or advanced Left parties of all countries declared that they had no quarrel with the workers of other lands, and denounced the War as a war of capitalists and bureaucrats ; but, when once the die was cast, they agreed to follow their Governments in the defence of their national existence. With such irony as this the history of the last few days of peace is filled.

My special thanks are due to my friend Mr. Dudley Ward, who afforded me great assistance in compiling and arranging the material, and whose knowledge of the course of diplomatic proceedings in Berlin was of the utmost value to me.

M. PHILIPS PRICE.

TIBBERTON COURT, GLOUCESTER,
October 19, 1914.

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THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

IT had long been regarded as a possibility that the internal affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire might lead to a European war. The task of balancing the interests of the three principal races that comprise Austria-Hungary, Teuton, Magyar and Slav, has been one of the great political problems of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, while in Europe, had one feature between them in common. Both possessed within their borders hostile racial elements, whose whole social and political aims gravitated towards neighbouring States. Austria, as inheritor of the Holy Roman Empire, has struggled to maintain her temporal leadership of Latin Catholicism against the Orthodox Slavs, who have inherited the traditions of Greek Christianity and of the Eastern Empire at Constantinople. Russia, upon whom fell the mantle of political leadership of Orthodox Slavdom, became thus the arch-enemy of Austria, and the rivalry of each for political influence in the Balkans has been one of the chief sources of unrest in Europe. For Russia it was a great religious duty to protect and secure the development of the Southern Slavs. Her ignorant and superstitious but intensely religious peasantry were easily influenced by Pan-Slav ideals and dreams of a Slav Empire from the Arctic to the Adriatic. But Russia's foreign policy is always unstable. During the last half of last century her attention in the Balkans was confined chiefly to Bulgaria, while she allowed, under the Treaty

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of Berlin, the Servians to fall under the influence of Austria. But Bulgaria refused to remain a protégé of the great Slav Power in the North, and on the rise of the "Stambolovists" Russia's relations with Bulgaria became less cordial.

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 and the German threat of "shining armour," Serbia came again into favour with Russian diplomacy. Austria, on the other hand, dreaded the rise of the political power of the Southern Slavs, which inevitably drew many of her people away from Vienna and Budapest towards Belgrade and thus threatened her very existence. Indeed, the Balkan Alliance is said to have been founded at the instance of Russia, and to have aimed originally at Austria. It was to have included Turkey in a great Serb-Bulgar-Græco-Turk confederation. (See articles in the *Times* on the Origin of the Balkan War, June, 1913.) But Turkey would not come in, and so the Balkan States had to settle accounts with her first. Thus came the Balkan War of 1912 and the first obstacle to Slav dominion was removed. In the following year the Balkan Alliance broke in a fratricidal strife. For the disruption of the Alliance the cause is still obscure. Russia accuses Austria of having sown seeds of dissension among the Allies (see M. Sazonof's speech in the Duma, August 8, 1914¹), while on the other hand Germany accuses Russia of having done the same (see Chancellor's speech in Reichstag²). Serbia was now greatly increased in power. She had waged two successful wars and had recovered her old kingdom in Macedonia. According to some authorities³ she was looking eagerly forward to the coming trial of strength with the Austrian power in the North. These ideas were fostered by societies in Serbia who had ramifications in the Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary, and some of their activities are set forth in the Austrian White Paper (see p. 197). Although this document is doubtless highly

¹ Parliamentary Speeches (*d*).

² Ibid. (*b*).

³ See Mr. G. M. Trevelyan's letter in the *Times*, September 18th.

coloured, there is enough to prove the existence of a political movement highly prejudicial to the Dual Monarchy.

Meanwhile in Austria there had been for some years past a school of political thought, headed by the Archduke Franz-Joseph, which aimed at reconciling the Southern Slavs of the Dual Monarchy by creating an independent Slav political element within the Empire to counterbalance the Magyars, and thus form a Trial Monarchy. This naturally aroused on the one hand the hostility of the Magyars, who regarded the South Slav Provinces as within their own exclusive sphere of influence, and on the other hand the bitterest hatred among the Servians of the kingdom beyond the Danube, who realized in the reconciliation of the Southern Slavs to the Austrian Empire the end of their aspirations for expansion northwards. At the hand of one of these two forces the Archduke fell a victim. The official Austrian view is that the murder was the result of Pan-Serb political propaganda in Bosnia and Croatia, inspired from Belgrade.¹ From other sources it is suggested that the instigators to the murder came from within the Monarchy itself.² Be that as it may, the death of the Heir to the Hapsburg Throne at the hands of a Bosnian assassin was Austria's excuse for settling accounts with Serbia. This she proceeded to do in drastic fashion.

During the weeks that elapsed between the Serajevo murder and the presentation of the Austrian Note on July 23rd, Europe waited in suspense to know what Austria would do. Matters had come to a pass, and she was bound to act at last. Ominous hints from the Austrian Press during the first few days of July warned observers that she would probably act drastically. The first signs of the coming storm were to be seen in the scarcely veiled threats of Austria which were issued in an official communiqué published in the *Pester-Lloyd* for July 5th. In it Serbia was reproved for lack of courtesy to her neighbour, and the hint was thrown out that she had better be reasonable

¹ See Austrian White Paper, p. 199.

² Leading article in *Temps*, July 25th, and White Paper 30. See Press Correspondence (i).

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in the coming discussion with the Austrian Government about her relations with the Dual Monarchy. A firm attitude was meanwhile taken by Count Tisza in his speeches in the Hungarian Chamber on July 9th and 15th, which pointed to the "clearing up" of Austria's relations with Serbia, and to a determination to combat the Pan-Serb propaganda. From July 20th onwards the diplomatic and Press campaign against Serbia increased in intensity, and caused considerable unrest and anxiety in Berlin, which was not allayed till the day before the issue of the Note.

On the evening of July 23rd the Austrian Note was presented by the Minister at Belgrade to the Servian Government.¹ Briefly, it demanded an official apology from Serbia for the Pan-Serb propaganda which had been going on within the Empire, the suppression of certain newspapers and societies, the dismissal and punishment of certain officers concerned in the murder, and lastly, the collaboration of Austrian along with Servian officials in executing these demands. A time limit was fixed, giving this *démarche* the character of an ultimatum.

The Austrian official attitude is explained in the *Fremdenblatt* for July 24th.² It dwelt upon the danger of the "system of mines which had been laid from Serbia outwards into the heart of Austria's southern Slav provinces." It described the influence of the great Servian propaganda from Servian sources outside the Empire which was covering Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia with a network of societies subversive of Austrian political unity. This, it was said, could not continue, and the time had come to settle accounts. Dr. Dillon, in his telegram to the *Daily Telegraph* on July 24th, viewed the situation somewhat in this light, when he described it as the first symptom of a "gigantic struggle, which is bound to make itself felt throughout Europe, between Slavs and Teutons, between the nations who are content with the territory they possess and those whose aim it is to annex the possessions of neighbours."

¹ See English White Paper 4.

² See German Denkschrift.

This was the position on July 23rd, when Austria made a stroke on the success of which her very existence depended. It is reasonable to ask, however, how this action on the part of Austria affected her partner Germany and what were the circumstances in which the latter was placed by the action of her ally. To understand the relationship between the two countries it is necessary to go back to the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance which was concluded in 1874, but not published till 1888.¹ The two important clauses of this Treaty bind either country to go to the assistance of the other in the event of an attack by Russia. If the attacking party should be a Power other than Russia, the country which is not attacked is bound at least to maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and if the attacking party be assisted by Russia the first part of the Treaty comes into force, binding the one to assist the other.

Now, as I explained above, Russia has, as part of her traditional foreign policy, assumed the rôle of protector of the southern Slavs, and in their cause has more than once in the course of history taken up arms.

This fact must be considered in realizing the situation in which Germany is placed and the causes of her foreign policy. For since Russian policy is always bound up with the southern Slav, there is always the possibility of Russian intervention to prevent what it might rightly or wrongly consider to be an infringement of the independence and liberty of a southern Slav State. Austria, as champion of the Teutonic races in the South of Europe, and Russia as protector of the Slavs, might easily pick a quarrel over a country like Servia, which lies within the fringe of the influence of both Empires. This quarrel might, by the terms of the Triple Alliance, involve Germany, and for just the same reason that Russia would refuse to allow a southern Slav State to be crushed, so Germany, for motives of pure self-interest, would refuse to see Austria crushed. Germany's position was explained by the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Paris in his telegram for July 28th, when he said that in a "Russian invasion of Galicia Germany

¹ See Treaties (f).

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would be compelled, not only by Treaty but in self-defence, to take up arms on behalf of Austria." ¹

Now, Germany's strategical position places her at no inconsiderable disadvantage to her neighbour Russia, who, with vast resources of raw human material, can menace her eastern frontiers and wear down in course of time the more highly trained but limited forces of the German Empire. Moreover, the vast size of Russia makes her virtually invincible. But that is not all, for another factor in the situation would arise as soon as a Russo-German quarrel found its military expression. The terms of the Dual Alliance are not publicly known, but it is an open secret that in a Russo-German conflict France is bound to co-operate with her ally and engage the attention of Germany on the western frontiers until the slow-moving armies of Russia are able to move in the east. There is thus a complete link in the chain. Austria's life-and-death struggle with the forces of Slavism in the Balkans forms the first link. Russia's religious sympathy for her southern Slav brothers is the second. Germany's political self-interest, embodied in the terms of the Triple Alliance, in maintaining the Teutonic Power against a circle of hostile Slav States is the third. France's unknown, but apparently unlimited obligation to Russia is the fourth.

Thus it would appear that so far from Germany's interests lying in the direction of instigating an Austro-Russian quarrel, her safety depended upon preventing such a situation arising. A large number of statements have been made, however, that Germany was the instigator of this quarrel, and these views find expression in certain telegrams between the Chancelleries of St. Petersburg, London, and Paris between July 24th and 31st, and also various telegrams from Press correspondents in Paris and St. Petersburg during that time. All these sources represent Germany as the power standing behind Austria, uncompromising in her attitude, preventing a peaceful solution.² On the other

¹ See Press Correspondence (xiv).

² See English White Paper 6 and 95, and *Times* correspondent in Berlin. Press Correspondence (xv), (xviii), also (v).

hand, there is evidence to the effect that during the negotiations after the Austrian Note to Servia, Germany, however stupidly and supinely she handled the Austro-Servian dispute, was fully alive to the danger to Europe of a Russo-Austrian conflict. Thus the telegrams passing between the London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Paris Foreign Offices show that although Germany refused Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of a Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London, nevertheless she supported the mediation of Four Powers not immediately concerned at Vienna and St. Petersburg, with a view to inducing Austria and Russia to come to terms with each other. Indeed, Germany was on more than one occasion the means of conveying to Austria proposals concerning the need of moderation in Vienna and about the guarantees which Servia could reasonably be expected to give.¹ The pressure brought to bear on Austria by Germany during the last few days of negotiations is also seen in the German Denkschrift and in the *Westminster Gazette* correspondent's telegram of August 1st.² In addition to these, numerous British Press correspondents in Berlin and St. Petersburg, between July 25th and 30th, show that Germany, so far from being an instigator, was doing all she could, having regard to the difficult position in which she was placed, to make her ally come to terms with Russia.³

Germany's great initial blunder was that she refused to regard the Austro-Servian dispute as one that concerned any other but those two countries, and would not recognize the claim of Russia to be consulted about the fate of Servia. Hence her interpretation of Four Power mediation was not the same as Russia's. She wanted mediation to aim at securing for Austria a "free hand." Russia wanted mediation which would give her a chance of settling the Servian question according to her ideas.

Thus we see from the above how the European Powers

¹ English White Paper 18, 95, and 98.

² See Documents (a).

³ See Press Correspondence (ii), (iii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (xii), (xvi), (xix).

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would automatically group themselves as soon as a Teuto-Slav crisis in South-eastern Europe arose. It was part of the tragic necessity which arose out of the nature of politics in Eastern Europe and which caused the Powers on the Continent to form themselves into two opposing groups, through a network of alliances and counter-alliances.

But what was the position of England in relation to these Powers? To understand this it is first necessary to trace roughly the history of her foreign policy for the last twenty years. During the last decade of the nineteenth century England stood in splendid isolation. It was the policy of Lord Salisbury to keep England free from all Continental alliances, whether open or secret, to create no special friendships, to contract no partnerships which implied hostility to a third State, and to avoid the European system of Power-balances. At the close of the century new ideas began to appear, and the speech of Mr. Chamberlain in 1899 was the forecast of a change in British foreign policy. But the Fashoda incident was still fresh in people's minds, and the Russian danger in the East was still formidable to the British Empire in Asia. Friendships were sought in other directions, and in 1899 Mr. Chamberlain, reflecting no doubt the feeling of the Government, proposed the alliance of England with her next-of-kin upon the Continent, Germany. But Germany was at that time in no mood for alliances. She was gradually consolidating her position as a Great Power, her industries were making rapid strides, her navy had begun to show the world that she meant to protect her over-sea commerce and also to gain for herself a legitimate voice in the councils of Europe. England was at this time engaged in the Boer War, and feeling against her on the Continent was hostile. Moreover, her relations with Russia in the Far East were strained. Germany, at the outset of her career as a European Power, felt that she could not afford to jeopardize her position by becoming drawn into the orbit of England's policy and by running the risk thereby of losing her independence and perhaps of bringing down upon her the hostility of other powerful

Continental neighbours. Nor would she join in a Continental alliance against England in the Boer War for similar reasons. Germany's position at that time can be studied in Bulow's "Imperial Germany."¹ In the part dealing with foreign policy, he explains that Germany "could not be guided in her decisions and acts by a policy directed against England, nor could she for the sake of England's friendship become dependent upon her; in her development as a sea power, Germany would not reach her goal either as England's satellite or as her antagonist." This short-sighted policy of Prince Bulow was to a large extent responsible for the ill-feeling which soon after developed between the two countries. It was perhaps explicable on the grounds that a young industrial nation, when it is expanding and growing, is jealous of its position and fears being brought under the tutelage of others. It had nevertheless a most injurious effect upon the subsequent relations of the two countries.

England had meanwhile broken her traditional policy and had entered into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a view to preserving the *status quo* in the Far East, maintaining the integrity of China and opposing Russian designs. The recent revelations in the "Memoirs of Count Hayashi," the Japanese statesman who was Ambassador in London at the time, showed that while the negotiations for the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were in progress there was a proposal for the participation of Germany in a new kind of Triple Alliance for the maintenance of the above-mentioned objects in the Far East. The proposal failed, the alliance was concluded *à deux*, and the circumstances which prevented the participation of Germany are still shrouded in mystery. It may be that the responsibility rested in Berlin, and that Germany thought she saw designs on her diplomatic independence; it may have lain in London, owing to the fear of the German navy, or it may have been thwarted in Tokio by the young Eastern Power, who feared that she would be unable to use as much influence on two European Powers as on one.²

¹ Bulow's "Imperial Germany," p. 30. ² "Memoirs of Count Hayashi."

England, having broken her policy of splendid isolation by the Japanese Alliance, and finding Germany disinclined to respond to any further overtures, turned to France. The relative naval and military strength of France as compared with Germany was declining, and France was therefore more open to negotiations with England than she had ever been before. There had been long-standing friction between the two countries. Some of the causes of this friction, such as the Newfoundland Fisheries, Siam, Madagascar, and the Hebrides, had already been partly settled during the 80's and 90's. But the problem of Egypt and Morocco was untouched, till in 1904 the Anglo-French Convention¹ cleared up all these outstanding questions and laid the seeds of what ultimately developed into a general diplomatic alliance. The understanding over Egypt and Morocco was as follows: In the Convention England declared she had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt, and France declared that she would not ask for a time limit to be placed upon the British occupation. France also declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Morocco, while England recognized France's right to preserve order and exercise influence over the internal affairs of Morocco. The equality of commercial facilities was guaranteed in both countries, and a number of other minor matters were disposed of. In addition to this, however, a number of secret articles were added, which never appeared till 1911. These articles allowed England and France, if they were "strained by force of circumstances, to modify their policies in Egypt and Morocco," and they agreed that if it became "desirable to introduce reforms tending to assimilate the legislative systems" of Egypt and Morocco respectively, neither country would set any obstacles in the way of the other.² But the Convention ignored Germany's growing and not inconsiderable economic interests in Morocco, some of which carried with them also a semi-political character. England notified Germany about the Convention, but France failed to do so, and when, in

¹ See Treaties (g).

² See "Morocco in Diplomacy," by E. D. Morel.

addition to this, it became known to Germany that there were secret clauses to the agreement, the latter felt that she had not been consulted about the future of a country in which she had large economic interests. With customary clumsiness she forthwith intervened in Paris in 1905 and demanded a conference on the affairs of Morocco. This conference resulted in the Act of Algeciras in 1906, and set up a system of internal organization for Morocco, in which the French and Spanish obtained special rights over some of the public services, while International control was introduced into others and the integrity and independence of the Sultan of Morocco was affirmed and recognized. During the diplomatic negotiations which resulted in the Act of Algeciras, British diplomacy, bound by the clause in the Convention, worked side by side with France, and thus the Morocco question was settled for a period of five years.

In the following year, 1907, England made another move, which was to some extent a corollary of the Anglo-French Convention. She settled her great outstanding disputes with France's ally, Russia. By the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention¹ Great Britain and Russia agreed to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. In the last two countries the *status quo* was to be maintained, but in Persia the country was divided into a Russian, a neutral, and a British sphere. In the Russian sphere Russia was allowed to have the preference for all economic works of a public nature, such as railways, roads, banks, telegraphs, etc., and a similar privilege was given to England in the English sphere. In the neutral sphere the two countries were to have equal rights. In none of the three spheres was the right given to either country to interfere with the internal affairs of Persia or to meddle with its system of government.

Thus we see that neither the Anglo-French nor the Anglo-Russian Convention assumed the form of a definite alliance, but both were rather of the nature of agreements on special points of colonial policy which had divided hitherto the three Empires. Indeed, actual diplomatic support was

¹ See Treaties (g).

only entailed in the case of the Anglo-French Convention. It was this, however, which largely led to the crisis of 1911. In the spring of that year France had sent a military expedition to Fez to put down disorder and rebellion. The expedition, necessary no doubt, was nevertheless, on the basis of the Algeciras Act, illegal without the participation of Germany. Germany, after saying nothing for some months, acted clumsily again when all Europe thought she was going to say nothing; the *Panther* was sent to Agadir, and the second Morocco crisis arose. In the resulting Convention the whole of the public law of Europe relating to Morocco was altered and finally settled, but not without considerable friction and misunderstanding between England and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, which during August of that year nearly led to war. In November, 1911, the Franco-German Convention was signed, which turned Morocco into a French Protectorate. France added over 20,000 square miles to her colonial Empire, giving in return a guarantee to Germany for equality of commercial opportunity in Morocco and exchanging the large slice of territory in the French Congo for a similar piece in the German Cameroons. Thus a difficult problem which had caused much friction between England, France, and Germany, and in the settlement of which the Anglo-French Convention played no small part, was solved. Throughout both Morocco crises England and France rendered mutual diplomatic support to each other, but beyond this diplomatic support no other liability on the part of England was at that time made public.

Sir Edward Grey's speech^{*} in the House of Commons on August 3rd, however, threw fresh light on England's liability to France during these years of the Morocco controversy. It now transpires that during the first Morocco crisis of 1905-6 Sir Edward Grey was asked by the French Government whether England could give armed support to France in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Sir Edward Grey replied that he would not bind England in

^{*} Sir Edward Grey's speech, August 3rd, Hansard, and 1d. edition of White Paper.

advance, but that if France were forced into a war through a dispute with Germany which arose out of the Anglo-French Convention, public opinion in England would probably rally to the material support of France. Thereupon the French Government proposed that if that was the case it would be as well that French and English naval and military experts should consult about the best means for taking measures in co-operation if needed. Sir Edward Grey agreed to this on the understanding that these conversations did not bind the British Government to decide its course of action. In the second Morocco crisis the same situation arose, and the attitude of England to France remained the same as in the first crisis of 1905-6. It was not until 1912, however, that the attitude of England became more clearly defined. The question of the naval and military conversations was then brought before the Cabinet, and it was decided that there should be a definite understanding in writing. This was effected in November of that year, when in an unofficial letter to the French Ambassador Sir Edward Grey agreed that in the event of an attack on France by a third Power threatening European peace, the British and French Governments should at once discuss what measures they would take in common. Not long after this unofficial understanding the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, leaving the northern shores of France undefended. It was to this fact that Sir Edward Grey appealed in his great speech in the House on August 3rd, when he held that England was morally bound to support France because, after the unofficial understanding contained in that letter, England had tacitly acquiesced in the concentration of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. For Sir Edward Grey's public statements on the point prior to the crisis of last July, a study of Hansard is interesting.¹

Thus we trace the development of the Anglo-French Entente. Arising out of a Convention for the settlement of Colonial affairs, it developed through naval and military conversations into a strategic understanding, which though

¹ See Treaties (i) and (j).

unofficial in character and unknown to Parliament, was held to carry with it a moral obligation to support the Dual Alliance.

It still remains to refer to the alleged naval agreement which was said to have been carried out between England and France's ally, Russia. Early in 1914 the Berlin newspapers published information from Paris and St. Petersburg sources to the effect that naval conversations were in progress between England and Russia. Some excitement was caused in Berlin at this announcement. In England it was felt that the close relations existing between England and France made it quite conceivable that conversations of this nature were going on with France's ally. No definite information on this point, however, is at present obtainable. A statement, however, was made by Sir Edward Grey in answer to a question by Mr. King on June 11th in the House of Commons as to whether a naval agreement had been concluded between England and Russia.¹ In reply, Sir Edward Grey denied the existence of any such agreement and said that none was likely to be entered upon so far as he could judge. This statement, as the *Manchester Guardian* pointed out a few days later, did not preclude the possibility of conversations having taken place of a similar nature to those which had gone on between England and France in 1906, and which may have carried with them similar moral obligations.

Meanwhile Anglo-German relations, which had been embittered by diplomatic tension during the 1911 Morocco crisis and by naval rivalry, improved after the Balkan crisis of 1913, when the two countries worked together for the settlement of the Albanian problem. An Anglo-German agreement over the economic spheres of interest in Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf was, moreover, being prepared and was to have been signed in the autumn of 1914. Such an agreement would have settled all outstanding difficulties between the two countries in the East and might have laid the foundation for a closer understanding still. But the antagonism between Teuton and Slav in Eastern Europe

¹ See Treaties (k).

dominated European politics. In the Balkans the rivalry between Russia and Austria grew ever keener, while in Poland, Russia and Germany were rapidly arming against each other. Russia had during the last year increased her standing army and improved her lines of communication, while Germany made a special levy after the Balkan War of 1912 to strengthen her fortresses on the East Prussian frontier. In the spring of 1914 there was a war scare based on an article by a St. Petersburg correspondent in the *Cologne Gazette* about Russian preparations, and although the storm did not burst till the autumn the tension between the two Empires remained almost at breaking point.

Thus we see how England became involved in this great European conflict, and how by a series of alliances and secret obligations the quarrel between Slav and Teuton in Eastern Europe was allowed to grow till it came to involve British support for Slav influence in the Balkans.

DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS IN THE EUROPEAN CAPITALS

WITH SUMMARY

JULY 23

AUSTRIA

AT 6 p.m. on July 23rd the Austrian Minister at Belgrade presented a Note containing the demands of his Government concerning the Pan-Serb agitation in Austria. The text is given in full in the English White Paper ¹ and also summarized in the Introduction to this book, p. 4.

ENGLAND

On the same day the Austrian Minister in London had a conversation ² with Sir Edward Grey, in which he explained privately to the latter the nature of the Austrian demands. In the absence of the text of the Note Sir Edward Grey was only able to comment upon the time limit, the first and most obvious point, namely, the limited time given for the Servian reply, which, as he pointed out, might seriously inflame public opinion in Russia and lead to serious complications. Count Mensdorff, of course, tried to excuse the time limit by suggesting that on Serbia rested the responsibility for not having instituted the inquiry into the causes of the murder on her own territory. In view of the fact that the murder took place on Austrian soil, it is difficult to understand how it could be expected that the Servian Government could trace the causes of the murder to their source. This attitude of the Austrian Government representatives, as indeed is suggested in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch ³ to Sir Edward Grey, points to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Government neither expected nor desired

¹ White Paper 4.

² Ibid. 3.

³ Cd. 7596,

the acceptance by Serbia of the Austrian demands. At the conclusion of the interview¹ with Count Mensdorff, Sir Edward Grey said he hoped that if there were difficulties Austria and Russia would discuss them directly with each other. This was the first proposal of an informal nature made by Sir E. Grey that the matter should become the subject of negotiations for other countries besides Austria and Serbia.

On the same day² also the Servian Minister saw Sir Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office, and told him that his Government were very disquieted at the Austrian demands. He said that Serbia was willing to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction, but could not abandon "certain political ideals," or be dictated to by Austria. He added that both the assassins of the Arch duke were Austrian subjects, and that one of them had been the subject of complaint by the Servian authorities, who had desired to expel him from Serbia. The Austrian Government, however, had protected him.

JULY 24

AUSTRIA

On the day following³ the presentation of the Austrian Note to Serbia Count Berchtold received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Kudashef, and passed the remark that Austria felt her very existence to be at stake.

From German sources⁴ it also appears that M. Kudashef declared at the same interview that Austria had determined to put a stop to Serb intrigues within the Monarchy; that she had no desire for conquest; and that she was far from intending to bring about a change in the balance of power in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, who left for Russia that morning, is reported in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram⁵ to Sir Edward Grey to have said that if Austria intended to humiliate Serbia, Russia would not remain indifferent.

¹ White Paper 3.

² Ibid. 30.

³ Ibid. 7.

⁴ German Denkschrift, Exhibit 3.

⁵ White Paper 7.

GERMANY

The German Government meanwhile was acquiescing, at any rate officially, in the policy of the Austrian Government.

The statement in the official Denkschrift,¹ that "we gave Austria an entirely free hand as against Serbia but did not participate in her preparations," shows that Germany felt at one with her ally in the necessity of putting a stop to a political movement which, as it seemed, threatened the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Germany, in fact, was ready to allow Austria to do as she liked in the settlement of her quarrel with Serbia at this stage of the crisis.

This attitude is further explained in the official communiqué of the German Government through its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

The communiqué² said that Serbia was responsible for having allowed the propaganda to go on, knowing that it would have dangerous consequences to Austria. It held that Austria should be allowed the choice of means to deal with the problem, and that it must be settled between Austria and Serbia alone. The interference of another Power, it added, may lead to "incalculable consequences." This Note—the tone of it was apparently understood in London and St. Petersburg—was the subject of considerable comment in Paris. According to official telegrams and Press correspondence in Paris, the German Ambassador in this capital is described as having used threatening language to France.³

It is evident, of course, that in taking this extreme *non possumus* attitude Germany was running grave risks of precipitating a European war. That her diplomats were not aware of the danger they were running is evident, as we see later from the desperate attempt they made to force Austria to recognize the necessity of consulting Russia over her dispute with Serbia.

¹ See German Denkschrift, p. 117.

² White Paper 9.

³ Press Correspondence (iv) and (v).

BELGIUM

The Belgian Foreign Minister to-day ¹ sent to the Belgian Ministers in the different capitals a Note, saying that the international situation was grave; that the possibilities of an international conflict had to be reckoned with, and measures had been taken to ensure the observation of Belgian neutrality.

SERVIA

On the receipt of the Austrian Note Servian thoughts were at once turned to Russia, the guardian of the Orthodox Slav States of South-east Europe.² The Crown Prince telegraphed to the Tsar of Russia complaining that the Austrian demands were not consistent with Servian independence; that some of the demands would mean the change in the legal system; that while she was willing to accept those demands consistent with Servian integrity she could not accept them *in toto*, and she finally appealed to Russia for help and advice.

The British Minister in Belgrade also informed Sir Edward Grey to-day ³ that the Servian Government found it impossible to accept the Austrian demands, and hoped that England would make Austria moderate them.

The same story is told by the Russian Minister in Belgrade to M. Sazonof.⁴ M. Pashitch, he says, proposed to answer the Austrian Note and also to appeal to the Powers. After that, he says, if war is inevitable Servia will fight.

RUSSIA

On the morning of the 24th M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked Sir George Buchanan to meet him and the French Ambassador and discuss the terms of the Austrian Note and the situation that arose therefrom.⁵ He began by expressing the opinion that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral, and suggested that Germany was at the back of Austria, instigating her to make this

¹ Belgian Grey Book.

² Orange Book 6.

³ White Paper 8.

⁴ Orange Book 9.

⁵ White Paper 6.

attack. He foreshadowed an early mobilization of the Russian army, and then along with the French Ambassador made a bid for England's support, attempting to tie her down unconditionally to back the Dual against the Triple Alliance. He hoped, in fact, before anything was done in the way of mediation and negotiations among the Powers that England would declare her solidarity with France and Russia, and so overcome the force of the Triple Alliance.¹ Sir George Buchanan, however, said he saw no reason to suppose that Great Britain would declare solidarity. This action was approved of by Sir Edward Grey in a telegram ² on the following day. The attitude of England in St. Petersburg, therefore, was undefined and vague during this stage of the crisis. It is possible indeed that if at this stage England had either given her unconditional support to France and Russia, or else had absolutely refused everything except strict neutrality, the dispute would never have gone beyond this stage.

That afternoon, according to Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, a Cabinet Council was held which lasted four hours. Reuter's correspondent also adds that "Russia will immediately intervene in the Austro-Servian crisis, and will ask Austria to prolong the period allowed in the ultimatum for Serbia's reply."

After this Council meeting M. Sazonof sent a telegram to the Russian Embassy in Vienna asking Austria for an extension of time limit to Serbia, while to the Russian Embassies in England, Germany, Italy, and France he wired asking them to support in these countries Russia's step in Vienna.³

The Russian Government attitude is further reflected in the German Denkschrift,⁴ where, in a telegram from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the German Chancellor, M. Sazonof is said to have used "unmeasured complaints" against Austria's action, and said in definite terms that Russia could not allow this dispute to be decided between Austria and Serbia alone.

¹ Compare also Orange Book 17.

² White Paper 24.

³ Orange Book 4 and 5, White Paper 13.

⁴ Denkschrift, Exhibit 4.

FRANCE

On the 24th two Notes were communicated to the French Government. The one from the Russian Government¹ asked France to support Russia's step in Vienna, while the one from the German Government² was presented by Baron von Shoen, and communicated the contents of the Austrian Note, saying that Austria might have to use pressure or even military measures against Servia. He added that the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Servia must be localized.

According to the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in St. Petersburg,³ however, the German Ambassador is said to have added that "dangerous friction" might arise between the Triple Alliance if the struggle were not localized. Moreover, the communication of the Ambassador was interpreted in Paris as a threat to France, although the reasons for regarding it as this are obscure, since similar language was used in London and St. Petersburg.

The words used in the communication⁴ to the British Government were "incalculable consequences," and their use created no sensation in London.

ENGLAND

On the 24th a copy of the Austrian Note was handed by Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey.⁵ The latter expressed his regret that the time limit should have been insisted upon in the Note, and pointed out that Article 5 of the demands was quite out of keeping with the independent sovereignty of Servia. Count Mensdorff, however, stated that if Servia had held out her hand to Austria after the murder the present situation would not have arisen.

Sir Edward Grey then had a conversation⁶ with the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, in which he told him what he was going to say to the German Ambassador later

¹ Orange Book 5.

³ Press Correspondence (v).

⁵ Ibid. 5.

² Ibid. 8.

⁴ White Paper 9.

⁶ Ibid. 10.

in the day. He would say that if Russia took the view which any Power interested in Serbia would be expected to take of the Austrian ultimatum he was powerless to exercise a moderating influence. He then expressed the opinion that the only chance of mediation was that France, Italy, and Great Britain should act simultaneously in St. Petersburg, but that it was essential for any such proposal that Germany should join in. This was the first definite proposal for the settlement of the dispute in the South-east of Europe along the lines of a European concert. M. Cambon expressed his doubts whether this plan was feasible if once Austria had moved into Serbia. He thought the best thing was to gain time by mediating in Vienna.

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw Prince Lichnowsky,¹ who communicated to him the German Note (White Paper 9). Sir Edward Grey said he feared the attitude of Russia towards this dispute, and made the above-mentioned suggestion, namely, that the *Four Powers not directly interested in the dispute should work together for moderation in Vienna and St. Petersburg*. But the German Ambassador gave no definite answer to this proposal. He had received no instructions, and apparently Germany's attitude was still that no one should interfere in the private affairs of her ally.

Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey telegraphed² to the British Legation in Belgrade, saying that Serbia should express regret for the murder and promise the fullest satisfaction if Servian officials were proved accomplices.

Thus England on the first day showed her anxiety to localize the dispute by creating a form of European concert. It was met at first by poor response from Germany, and, moreover, as the sequel shows, the system of European Alliance and Ententes based on opposing Power-balances, had become such a feature of European diplomacy that, when this crisis arose, it was exceedingly difficult to form an effective concert.

¹ White Paper 11.

² Ibid. 12.

JULY 25

AUSTRIA

On receipt of instructions to-day from M. Sazonof asking for an extension of time limit to Servia, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna saw Baron Macchio,¹ in the absence of Count Berchtold, who had gone to Ischl. M. Kudashef communicated M. Sazonof's request, but was refused.

The request was backed by Sir Edward Grey,² who had given Sir Maurice de Bunsen permission to support the Russian demand in Vienna. Austria thus remained implacable and would not recognize Russia's right to take interest in the fate of Servia.

SERVIA

Meanwhile the British Minister in Belgrade informed Sir Edward Grey³ that the Servian reply was going to be couched in the most conciliatory terms, and that Austria could not but be content unless she definitely wanted war.

The Servian Government⁴ then communicated its reply to the Austrian Note to the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade. The reply commenced by saying that Servia had always tried to live on good terms with her neighbour and discountenanced these movements, which injured Austrian prestige. On the other hand, she could not be responsible, she said, for articles in the Press, manifestations of a private character, or the peaceful work of societies. She was pained and surprised to hear that officials of the Servian Government were implicated in the murder of Serajevo, and was ready to hand over for trial any officials against whom evidence could be brought. She disapproved of and repudiated all attempts to prejudice the internal affairs of the Dual Monarchy. The Servian Government, moreover, undertook to introduce into the first

¹ Orange Book 12.

² White Paper 26.

³ Ibid. 21.

⁴ Ibid. 39.

sitting of the Skuptchina a provision of the Press law providing punishment for all incitements to hatred and contempt of Austria, and to alter the articles in the constitution which would enable them to do so. It was agreed to dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana," in spite of the fact that as yet no proof of its complicity in the attack on Austria was given. They further undertook to remove from the military service all who had taken part in an anti-Austrian propaganda, provided that the Austrian Government would communicate their names. The Servian Government would allow Austrian officials to collaborate with Servian officials in the execution of these objects, in so far as such collaboration agreed with international law. Finally they would enforce and extend measures for preventing the illicit traffic of arms or explosives across the frontier.

Thus Serbia had practically accepted the whole of the Austrian Note except one or two points, and even these they had accepted with reservations.

It was obvious, however, that no matter how considerate the answer of Serbia was, the Austro-Hungarian Government was determined on a coup against its neighbour, for at 6.30 that evening the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade, Baron Giesl, gave out that the Servian reply was unsatisfactory, and said that he would withdraw at once from Belgrade with his whole diplomatic corps.¹

GERMANY

On the morning of the 25th the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin had an interview² with the Foreign Secretary, who began by promising to pass on to Austria the British proposal for the time limit to Serbia. The Foreign Secretary said he knew that Serbia could not accept all the demands, but admitted that Austria meant to give Serbia a lesson and proceed to military measures. At the same time he privately confessed that he knew nothing about the contents of the Note till it was presented, and he thought the

¹ Orange Book 21.

² White Paper 18.

Note was a bad diplomatic document. He added, that if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening he would be ready to fall in with the suggestion that the *four disinterested Powers should work together for peace at Vienna and St. Petersburg.*

This attitude is confirmed in a telegram from the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London,¹ in which he says he agrees with Sir Edward Grey in drawing a distinction between an Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict. The dispute, he thought, might be localized by virtue of all the Powers refraining from intervention. He hoped Russia would keep quiet, but said that if an Austro-Russian controversy arose, *Germany would, quite apart from her duty to her ally, mediate between Austria and Russia with the other Powers.*

It appears, therefore, that as early as the 25th Germany accepted the principle of Four Power mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg for any Austro-Russian dispute which might arise. She would not, however, allow this to apply to the Austro-Servian dispute, and a conflict of interest between Germany and Russia arose when the latter insisted that the Austro-Servian dispute was one which concerned Russia. It is not easy to see what was the point of Germany's refusal to allow from the first mediation over the Austro-Servian dispute. If she would admit of mediation over any Austro-Russian dispute that might arise, she must have known that it would only arise out of the difficulties created by the Austrian Note to Servia. She was therefore playing with words.

RUSSIA

The attitude of the Russian Government is explained to-day in a telegram from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.² In it M. Sazonof says that he wished to see the Austro-Servian question placed upon an international footing. He pointed out that Servia's obligations in 1908 were to the Powers and not to Austria. *If Servia appealed to the Powers, Russia would stand aside and leave*

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 13.

² White Paper 17.

the question to the Four Powers—England, France, Germany, and Italy. Russia would take no action until it was forced upon her, but he felt that Austria was striking at Russia through Servia, and that she aimed at upsetting the balance of power in the Balkans. Then he repeated his bid to secure for Russia the solid support of England as he had done on the previous day (see Russia, July 24th, and White Paper 6).

This attitude of M. Sazonof is also reported in a passage in the Russian Orange Book,¹ describing how on the same day the Russian Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador in London, expressing the hope that England would take a definite stand by Russia and France, if all the European Powers were involved in the dispute, in order to preserve the equilibrium of Europe. This equilibrium, he added, would be destroyed if Austria triumphed over Servia.

Russia was therefore willing to agree to the principle of a European concert to settle the trouble in South-east Europe. If, however, this should fail and Servia should be crushed, then, according to Russia, the whole of the European balance of power would be altered, and Russia should gather round herself the forces of France, and if possible England, to overpower the Triple Alliance. Such, apparently, was the clear and straightforward attitude of Russia at this moment. Moreover, she was prepared to back her words by deeds, for at a second meeting of the Council of Ministers which took place on the afternoon of the 25th at Krasnoe Selo, the Tsar signed the order for the mobilization of fourteen Russian army corps on the Austrian frontier. (See Mobilization Chapter, Russia, July 25th.)

FRANCE

On the 25th the French Government gave the Servian Minister in Paris the same advice² about the need for conciliation with Austria.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris then describes³ how the German Ambassador visited the chief of the

¹ Orange Book 17.

² White Paper 15.

³ Orange Book 19.

Political Department of the Foreign Office and informed him that his statement of the previous day (White Paper 9) was not threatening; that the statements in the French Press emphasizing the menacing tone of his statement to M. Bienvenu-Martin on the previous day were not correct. He said, moreover, what the German Foreign Secretary said on the previous day to the British Ambassador at Berlin (see White Paper 18), namely, that Austria presented her Note without Germany's knowledge; that Germany sympathized with Austria's standpoint, but once the "shot was fired" Germany could only follow her obligations to her ally.

According to *Times* and *Daily Chronicle* correspondents at Paris, an informal Cabinet Council was held on the night of the 25th, followed by "much activity at the Ministry of War," while M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, arrived in Paris on the same night.

ENGLAND

On the 25th the Russian Ambassador communicated to Sir Edward Grey the Russian Note,¹ saying that Russia had asked for an extension of the time limit and asking England to take similar steps in Vienna.

The Austrian Ambassador also saw Sir Edward Grey,² and explained to him that the Austrian Note was not an ultimatum but a "*démarche* with a time limit," and that rejection would be followed by military preparations, not operations.

Sir Edward Grey then telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen in Vienna,³ instructing him to support in general terms Russia's demands for an extension of the time limit; he added that he hoped that, even if the Austrian Government considered it too late to prolong the time limit, they would at any rate give time to prevent any irretrievable steps being taken.

The same sense in a more definite form was conveyed in

¹ White Paper 13.

² Ibid. 14, and Orange Book 16.

³ White Paper 26.

a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in England to M. Sazonof,¹ in which Sir Edward Grey was described as having suggested to Sir Maurice de Bunsen that, if it was too late to discuss the prolongation of the time limit, the question of the arrest of Austria's military operations might at any rate be raised.

Sir Edward Grey then received the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky,² to whom he pointed out what a short time there was between the presentation of Austria's Note and the break-off of her diplomatic relations with Servia. The best method, he thought, was for *England, France, Germany, and Italy to join together in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier until it was possible to arrange matters*. The German Ambassador then informed Sir Edward Grey that his Government had not known how stiff the Austrian Note would be, but that once the Note had been launched Austria could not draw back. He said, however, that Austria might with dignity accept the Four Power mediation between Austria and Russia. He personally favoured it. This confirms the statement of the German Foreign Secretary on the same day. (See Germany, July 25th, and White Paper 18.)

This part of the conversation is reported also in a telegram in the Russian Orange Book, in which the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg is reported to have said that Germany did not know the contents of the Austrian Note, but supports her action.

In this interview between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky to-day Sir Edward Grey also expressed the opinion that so long as the question lay between Austria and Servia, England would not intervene, but as soon as it became one in which Russia and Austria were interested the peace of Europe was affected, and all the Powers must join in the settlement.

This is also reported from a Russian source. According to the Orange Book, Sir Edward Grey was of opinion that British interests are only indirectly affected by the Austro-Servian dispute; that if Austria mobilized, Russia would

¹ Orange Book 16. ² White Paper 25 and Orange Book 20.

mobilize, and that from that moment all the Powers would be interested; in that event England would preserve for herself full freedom of activity.

At the same time as this was going on, Sir Edward Grey had telegraphed ¹ to Sir George Buchanan telling him that public opinion in England would not sanction war with Servia, but that a development of other issues might bring England in.

Sir Edward Grey's attitude apparently on the 25th was this: He would not interfere in the dispute as an Austro-Servian one, but as soon as the dispute became an Austro-Russian one, as it was sooner or later bound to do, he would interfere. But having practically agreed, therefore, that Russia might take this question out of the hands of Austria and make it a European question, he was not then prepared to say whether England would stand by Russia and back her up under these circumstances to the full. He would only say that "England must preserve for herself full freedom of activity," and "that England might be drawn in."

Two other points must be recorded in the Diary for the 25th. Sir Edward Grey had an interview ² during the day with the Italian Ambassador, who said that he approved of what Sir Edward Grey had said to Prince Lichnowsky. He also told the Ambassadors in France, Germany, and Russia ³ that he had told the German Ambassador that he hoped the German Government would influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of the Servian reply.

JULY 26

AUSTRIA

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna returned from St. Petersburg on the 26th, and at once had an interview ⁴ with the British and French Ambassadors there, in which he expressed the opinion that Austria was determined

¹ White Paper 24.

³ Ibid. 27.

² Ibid. 29.

⁴ Ibid. 40.

on war, and that he did not propose to press any further for an extension of the time limit.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen also had an interview¹ with the German Ambassador in Vienna during the day, when the latter expressed the opinion that Russia would keep quiet, and that she had no desire to interfere in Balkan affairs. This expression of opinion shows a considerable miscalculation as to the real intentions of Russia in the mind of the German Ambassador. On the other hand, the view of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna about the desire of Austria to precipitate war between herself and Servia was borne out by subsequent events.

GERMANY

During the day the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr Jagow, and the British Chargé d'Affaires had a conversation together,² in which the former expressed the opinion that Russia would remain quiet so long as Austria did not annex territory.

He did not apparently see any danger in the event of Austria taking steps to assail the independent sovereignty of Servia and reducing her to a vassal State. This, indeed, Austria might easily do, while at the same time leaving her territorial integrity intact.

But the Under Secretary would only say³ that he had passed on to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's hope that Austria would take a favourable view of the Servian reply.

The German Chancellor meanwhile telegraphed to the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, expressing the view that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Servia.

To the London Embassy he wired⁴ that Germany was working to localize the conflict and preserve peace, and he asked England to use her influence for moderation in St. Petersburg.

To the Paris Embassy he said⁵ that on Russia rested the

¹ White Paper 32.

² Ibid. 33.

³ Ibid. 34.

⁴ Denkschrift, Exhibit 10.

⁵ Ibid., Exhibit 10A.

responsibility of avoiding war, and he hoped that France would influence St. Petersburg for moderation.

To the St. Petersburg Embassy he expressed ¹ the hope that Russia would take no steps to endanger the peace of Europe.

The Kaiser returned suddenly from his cruise in the Baltic on the night of this day. He reached Potsdam early on the morning of the following (July 27th).

RUSSIA

At St. Petersburg on the 26th the Foreign Minister, M. Sazonof, had a long conversation ² with the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szapary, in which the former pointed out that whilst some of the Austrian demands were reasonable, others were impossible for Servia to accept as a whole. He suggested that England and Italy should co-operate with Austria to allay the present situation. This new proposal was in effect that France and Germany should fall out of the mediation scheme, and that the good offices of two Powers only, England and Italy, should be used.

Why Italy should have been specially selected is not quite clear, but some light is thrown on this move on the part of Russia in a passage in the Orange Book.³ According to this source M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador in Rome asking him to say that Russia would not be indifferent in an Austro-Servian dispute, and that Italy could play an important rôle by remaining neutral. This seems to mean that Russia was attempting to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance, and then use her as a mediator along with England.

The above interview between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary is also reported in a telegram ⁴ to Sir Edward Grey from Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who had heard of it from the Russian Ambassador in Vienna. It is described there as very satisfactory. M. Sazonof, it says, had agreed that much of the Note was reasonable, and that he had practically come to terms with Count Szapary about its form.

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 10B.

³ Orange Book 23.

² White Paper 44.

⁴ White Paper 56.

This is also confirmed in a telegram¹ from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, to the German Chancellor. He refers here to the reassuring impression which this interview made both on M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador. The Russian Foreign Minister is described as having been obviously calmed by Count Szapary's assurance that Austria had no plan of aggrandisement.

This interview is also described in the Orange Book in a telegram² from M. Sazonof to the Russian Minister in Austria. The Russian Foreign Minister said that he pointed out the impossibility for Serbia to accept some of the Austrian demands. On the other hand he thought that on other points a basis of agreement could be found, provided that Servian subjects' complicity in the murder were established. He concluded by proposing that conversations and exchanges of views between himself and the Austrian Ambassador should continue.

Meanwhile, in Russia military preparations were about to be taken. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia, July 26th.) A degree of special protection also was issued to-day, and mobilization warnings were sent to all the frontier districts.

FRANCE

Through the Orange Book³ we learn that in Paris on the 26th the German Ambassador, acting under the instructions he had received from Berlin earlier in the day, again explained the attitude of Germany. (See also Germany, July 26th, Denkschrift, Exhibit 10A.)

He said that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement, and did not threaten Serbia; that on Russia rested the responsibility for war, and he hoped that France would influence St. Petersburg for moderation. Germany, he added, could not influence Austria in a purely Austro-Servian dispute.

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 5.

² Orange Book 25.

³ Ibid. 28.

ENGLAND

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey made a fresh proposal¹ for the settlement of the crisis which had arisen. He asked the Ambassadors in *France, Germany, and Italy, if their Governments would agree to allow them to meet in London in a conference and together with him discuss an issue which would prevent complications.* This was a modification of his proposal on the 25th. (See Germany, July 25th and White Paper 18.) Instead of working directly through the Ambassadors in Vienna and St. Petersburg, as was first suggested, it was proposed to constitute a circle of Ambassadors in London who might propound some scheme or formula which might then be submitted to the different Governments concerned. The object was the same in both cases, but the method of procedure different.

To this proposal the Italian reply² was already made on the 26th, accepting the principle of an ambassadorial conference in London.

JULY 27

AUSTRIA

The morning of the 27th in Vienna commences with an expression of opinion³ by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who said, in a talk with some of his diplomatic colleagues, that Austria appeared to him to be determined on war.

This was followed by an interview between the Russian Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. According to the English White Paper⁴ the Russian Ambassador said that if Austria attacked Servia the quarrel could not be localized. The Under Secretary, however, retorted that Servia had herself attacked Austria. The Russian Ambassador then said that Russia would hold Servia back, and referred to the conversation which was held on the previous day between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary in St. Petersburg. He urged that the latter should be given full powers to continue these conversations.

¹ White Paper 36.² Ibid. 35.³ Ibid. 41.⁴ Ibid. 56.

This conversation between the Russian Ambassador in Vienna and the Austrian Under Secretary is reported also from a Russian source.¹ The Russian Ambassador, in reporting the conversation to his chief in St. Petersburg, states that the Austrian demands had caused an unfavourable impression in Russia, and might give rise to grave complications. For this Germany, he thought, was responsible, having instigated Austria to send the Note and stiffen her back. This is the first occasion on which Germany is accused of deliberately intriguing to upset the *status quo* in the Balkans. No evidence, however, of this is forthcoming, at any rate at this stage.

On the same day as the above the Austrian Government issued an official communiqué in which they declared that the Servian reply was neither satisfactory nor honest; that Servia refused to allow Austrian officials to assist in the investigations for the suppression of the forces hostile to Austria within her kingdom; it refers also to Servian mobilization, and declares that Servia never intended to conciliate Austria.

GERMANY

On the morning of the 27th the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr Jagow,² had a conversation, in which Sir Edward Grey's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London was discussed. (See England, July 26th, White Paper 36.) Herr Jagow said that such a conference practically amounted to a court of arbitration and could not be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He said he had heard from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof wished for an exchange of views between himself and Count Berchtold, and thought that this was a better proposal than Sir Edward Grey's.

This attitude of Herr Jagow's is confirmed from Russian sources,³ where in the Orange Book the Russian Ambassador in Berlin informed M. Sazonof in a telegram that

¹ Orange Book 41.

² White Paper 43.

³ Orange Book 38.

the German Government approves of the proposal that Austrian and Russian representatives in St. Petersburg should negotiate to find a settlement of Austria's demands.

In another telegram¹ to M. Sazonof the Russian Ambassador in Berlin described how the French Ambassador pressed Herr Jagow to accept Sir Edward Grey's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, with the provision that Austria should abstain meanwhile from all acts which prejudiced the *status quo*. Herr Jagow, however, again refused, although the French Ambassador pointed out that the proposal had the advantage of combining the two groups of Powers into which Europe was divided, thereby forming the nucleus of a concert. But on this point Germany was quite obdurate. She still refused to recognize Russia's right to interest herself in the affairs of Servia.

The same attitude is reflected in a communication² from the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London, in which he said that Germany could not bring her ally before a European tribunal, and that her action must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

In a later wire,³ however, the Chancellor said that he had started active intervention in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had communicated to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof to exchange views with the Austrian representative in St. Petersburg.

Germany's attitude was therefore clear. She would not accept the Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London because she thought it would be derogatory to Austria's dignity, but she thought that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were most likely to lead to fruitful results. In this sense she acted through her representatives in Vienna. That she had sincerely pacific intentions is also confirmed by the Press correspondents in Berlin for this same day. The *Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, and *Daily Chronicle* correspondents all agree that Germany was working for peace and putting pressure on Austria.⁴

¹ Orange Book 39.

² Ibid., Exhibit 15.

³ Denkschrift, Exhibit 12.

⁴ Press Correspondence (vii), (viii), (ix).

The *Times* even goes so far as to say that "Germany is certainly and no doubt sincerely working for peace," and that she will "give as good advice in Vienna as France is giving in St. Petersburg."

An interesting sidelight is thrown upon the proceedings in Berlin relating to the Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in a telegram¹ from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 27th. In describing the Four Power proposal of Sir Edward Grey it remarks that Germany has not yet answered and that the "*Emperor is to decide.*"

RUSSIA

In an interview² to-day between M. Sazonof and Sir George Buchanan, the former again suggested that England should declare solidarity with Russia and France. Sir George Buchanan, however, held to his previous position, and said that he did not think the cause of peace would be promoted by England taking this action. In this attitude he had been confirmed by Sir Edward Grey on the previous day. (See Russia, July 24th and White Paper 24.) The British Ambassador also added that he hoped Russia would not mobilize or let her troops cross the frontier just yet.

In a second telegram³ Sir George Buchanan informed Sir Edward Grey of a suggestion by M. Sazonof that the modification proposed to be introduced into the Austrian Note should be the subject of negotiation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In yet a third telegram⁴ to-day Sir George Buchanan described the German Ambassador as holding that these direct exchanges of views between the two capitals would probably be agreeable to Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador went on to say that M. Sazonof had promised to use all influence to make Serbia go as far as possible in the satisfaction of Austria's demands, and that he was ready to stand aside and allow the four Powers to mediate in conference if they preferred it.

¹ Belgian Grey Book 6.

³ Ibid. 45.

² White Paper 44.

⁴ Ibid. 55.

On the same day M. Sazonof sent to the Russian Ambassador in London a formal acceptance¹ of Sir Edward Grey's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, which he was prepared to fall back on in case his direct conversations with the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg did not come to anything. He had begun these conversations already, but had not yet received the reply of the Austrian Government about his proposal to revise the Austrian Note.

Like Germany, therefore, Russia preferred direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg, but, unlike her, she was ready to agree to a Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London, if the former method failed.

Meanwhile the Tsar telegraphed a reply² to the Crown Prince of Servia, saying that he was mindful of Servia's misfortune and was trying to help her; he hoped Servia would do nothing to impair her integrity, or cause a fresh war, but said that if this failed Russia would not be indifferent to the fate of Servia.

FRANCE

In a telegram³ to-day to Sir Edward Grey, Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, said that France had formally accepted Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in London.

On the same day M. Bienvenu-Martin communicated the contents of a Note⁴ to Sir Francis Bertie, expressing the willingness of the French Government to support this conference, and stating that the French representatives in St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade had been instructed to induce the Governments of these countries to abstain from active military operations, pending the result of the conference.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires also informed⁵ his Government that his German colleague in Paris absolutely refused to consider the possibility of a conference, but added that Austria had no desire for more territory. Germany

¹ White Paper 53, Orange Book 32.

² Orange Book 40.

³ White Paper 42.

⁴ Ibid. 51, and enclosure.

⁵ Orange Book 35.

and France, he said, should use influence on Russia not to interfere in the Austro-Servian dispute. The German Ambassador in Paris, it will be observed, said nothing about the possibility of mediation by the four Powers in St. Petersburg and Vienna, although, as we see above (Germany, July 27th) this had been agreed to by his Government in Berlin, who thereby had sanctioned one method of mediation between Austria and Russia.

This attitude of the German Ambassador in Paris was to-day the subject of a further telegram¹ from the Russian Ambassador to M. Sazonof. In it he described the German Ambassador as deliberately aiming to sever the partners of the Dual Alliance by making France put pressure on Russia. This, he said, would compromise Russia in the eyes of France, take the responsibility for the crisis off Germany, and put it on Russia. According to this view, therefore, any attempt to use France to influence Russia for peace was tantamount to aiming at the Dual Alliance, a somewhat cynical admission on the part of the Russian representative in Paris.

ENGLAND

Early in the morning the British Admiralty issued orders that the fleet at Portland should not be dispersed.² England thereby acted with Russia, who began her preparations to-day. The German fleet, however, was not concentrated till the 28th. (See Chapter on Mobilizations.)

During the morning Sir Edward Grey saw Prince Lichnowsky,³ who told him that the German Government accepted the principle of Four Power mediation between Austria and Russia. This is not quite in keeping with the statement made by Herr Jagow in Berlin on the same day (see Germany, July 27th), when the latter could only suggest direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna as a means of settling the dispute. Prince Lichnowsky also added that he had been instructed to ask Sir Edward Grey to use influence in St. Petersburg

¹ Orange Book 35.

² See English Press for July 27th.

³ White Paper 46, Orange Book 42.

to keep the war localized. Sir Edward Grey answered that Servia had gone to the utmost limit of concession, and that was due to Russia's influence. Influence, he said, was needed more at Vienna, and that should be exercised by Germany.

On the same morning Sir Edward Grey also had an interview¹ with the Russian Ambassador, who told him there was an impression in Austrian and German circles that England would stand aside in all circumstances. Sir Edward Grey pointed out that this idea should be dispelled by the orders to the British fleet not to disperse, but at the same time he added this must not be taken as meaning anything more than diplomatic action. He said that he had heard from Austrian and German sources that Russia would take no action, if Austria agreed not to take Servian territory. In this case England would not be more Servian than Russia.

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw Count Mensdorff,² who gave him the official Austrian reasons for the use of force against Servia. Sir Edward Grey told him that Servia's reply had gone to the utmost limits of concession. The Austrian Ambassador, however, replied that Servia had not yielded on the one essential point, namely, the co-operation of Austrian officials and police in the execution of her demands. Sir Edward Grey then said that it looked as if Austria thought she could go to war with Servia without involving Russia, and pointed out how serious this was to Europe, adding as a warning that the British fleet was not to be dispersed.

Meanwhile the Italian Ambassador saw Sir Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office,³ and expressed the approval of his Government of the proposal for a Four Power Conference.

That afternoon Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the House of Commons, related how he had proposed Four Power mediation in St. Petersburg and Vienna after the issue of the Austrian Note.⁴

¹ White Paper 47.

² Ibid. 48.

³ Ibid. 49.

⁴ See Parliamentary Speeches (e).

JULY 28

AUSTRIA

The 28th of July began dramatically by the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. This action, which lit the European powder magazine, was announced in the Austrian *Official Gazette* for that day, and was followed by a manifesto of the Austrian Emperor to his people.

During the morning Sir Maurice de Bunsen had an interview¹ with Count Berchtold, in which the latter said that Austria could not delay her warlike operations and would refuse now to negotiate on the basis of the Servian reply.

In the special dispatch² of Sir Maurice de Bunsen relating to this interview Count Berchtold is said to have remarked that he had never had any faith in the Balkan settlement of 1913. This remark shows clearly what was in the mind of Austrian statesmen at that time.

Later in the day the Russian Ambassador in Vienna told Sir Maurice de Bunsen³ that Austria had declined Russia's suggestion for discussing the Servian question at St. Petersburg, and that all avenues for negotiation were, for the time at least, closed.

From German sources we also have the same story, and in the *Denkschrift*⁴ it is stated that on this day Count Berchtold, thanking Sir Edward Grey for his proposal to extend the time limit, regretted that he had to decline it, as it had come too late.

In a telegram⁵ from M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff an interview is described between the Russian Ambassador and Count Berchtold, in which the former proposed the initiation of conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. These were, however, declined.

Austria, therefore, after temporizing for a day, had hardened her heart and had refused to listen either to reason from St. Petersburg or advice, such as it was, from Berlin.

¹ White Paper 61 and 62.² Cd. 7596.³ White Paper 74.⁴ *Denkschrift*, Exhibit 16.⁵ White Paper 93, Enclosure No. 1.

To-day we have reports that Austria was mobilizing eight army corps. It is not certain whether mobilization actually began on the 28th, but it is certain that by that day it was in full swing. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.)

GERMANY

On the morning of the 28th the English, French, and Italian Ambassadors were discussing¹ Herr Jagow's reply of the previous day to Sir Edward Grey's Four Power proposal. It was the general opinion of the Ambassadors that if he was sincere he would only object to the form of the proposal, and that he might be induced to suggest the lines along which mediation should work.

Some time in the morning the Austrian Ambassador told² the British Ambassador that Russia neither wanted war nor was in a position to make war, indicating thereby that in the opinion of this official Austria's action was not likely to lead to serious consequences.

Later in the day the British Ambassador and the German Chancellor had a conversation³ together, in which the latter emphasized his desire to work with Sir Edward Grey for peace. He repeated that he could not accept the Four Power mediation scheme if it were like an "Areopagus" before which he would have to bring Austria. He said he was doing his best both in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and had great hopes of a good result.

He had, however, news of a Russian mobilization, which he said was serious and would hamper his operations. He was evidently referring here to the partial Russian mobilization which was begun in Russia about this time. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.)

In a telegram⁴ to Count Pourtalès in St. Petersburg the German Chancellor repeated again that he was putting pressure on Vienna.

Meanwhile the Kaiser, who was beginning to take an active part in the crisis, telegraphed⁵ to the Tsar, saying

¹ White Paper 60.

² Ibid. 71.

³ Ibid. 71.

⁴ Denkschrift, Exhibit 14.

Ibid., Exhibit 20.

that he was trying to induce Austria to come to an understanding with Russia.

At this point the information of the Press correspondents in Paris and Berlin is interesting, for they bear out to some extent the action which Germany was said to have taken in Vienna on this day.

Thus the *Times* correspondent in Berlin of this day wires¹ that "it is reasonable to hope that Germany is doing more than she can afford to admit."

The *Times* correspondent in Paris says² that "he has reason to believe that Germany has given more proof of desire for peace than has been known to the French."

The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Berlin also says that Sir Edward Grey's proposal "is determined only by fear that it is unworkable."

The *Matin* correspondent in Berlin also says "Germany does not want war; she has refused Sir Edward Grey's proposal because she could not take her ally before a European tribunal, but she is anxious for mediation of other Powers."

However stupid Germany may have been not to have accepted the conference, there is no reason to doubt the evidence of official documents and of the *Times* correspondent in Berlin that she was working for mediation, though in a different form from that proposed by Sir Edward Grey.

FRANCE

Early in the day the German Ambassador saw M. Bienvenu-Martin,³ and said that Austria would respect Servian integrity, but he would not give a guarantee about her sovereignty.

In the afternoon Sir Francis Bertie saw M. Bienvenu-Martin.⁴ The latter, referring to the conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky (White Paper 46), said that it would have a good effect for peace. He also agreed that Sir Edward Grey could not declare complete solidarity with Russia.

¹ Press Correspondence (xii).

³ White Paper 59.

² Ibid. (xiii).

⁴ Ibid. 58 and 59.

ENGLAND

The only record of diplomatic activity in London on the 28th are two telegrams¹ from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, saying that he approved of direct negotiations between St. Petersburg and Vienna, and thought that the best method of procedure. He proposed, however, that Germany should suggest lines along which mediation of the four Powers between Austria and Russia should proceed, to run parallel with the direct conversations between the capitals.

JULY 29

BELGIUM

According to a letter² from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers abroad, the Belgian army on this day was placed upon an advanced peace footing.

AUSTRIA

On the 29th hostilities had begun on the Danube, and Austria stood thus committed to a policy of force.

The British, French, and Italian Ambassadors, who met in conversation³ during the day, agreed that no steps could now be taken to stop the war with Serbia.

The Italian Ambassador, however, thought that Russia might be induced to stay quiet if Austria would agree not to attack Servian independence and integrity.

Meanwhile news arrived⁴ of Russia's partial mobilization, conveyed by the Russian Ambassador to the British Ambassador.

The German Ambassador, who also interviewed the Russian Ambassador,⁵ affected surprise that Russia should take such an interest in Serbia. He added, however, that if the proper proposals were put forward Germany might consent to act with the other Powers.

According to M. Sazonof⁶ it appears that the Russian

¹ White Paper 67 and 68.

² Belgian Grey Book 8.

³ White Paper 79. ⁴ Ibid. 94 ; also Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.

⁵ White Paper 94.

⁶ Orange Book 50.

Ambassador had been told by the Austrian Government that there could be no more exchange of views between Austria and Russia.

GERMANY

On the morning of the 29th the Crown Prince returned to Berlin from Zorpat, where he had been staying. About this time activity in military circles in Berlin began to be manifested. In this connection the remark of the *Times* correspondent in Berlin of this date is significant. "The development of military opinion," he says, "which is now making itself felt, may be difficult to control."¹

Disturbing news had come from Russia about mobilization in that country, and was affecting the equanimity of diplomatic circles in Berlin. This was remarked upon by Sir Edward Goschen when he visited Herr Jagow in the morning.² Referring to the Austrian attitude the Under Secretary said that care was needed in pressing Austria too openly, or else she might only hasten to present a *fait accompli* before anything could be done to stop her.

This remark of Herr Jagow is confirmed in a passage in the Russian Orange Book,³ in which Herr Jagow tells the Russian Ambassador in Berlin that "it is extremely difficult to put pressure on Vienna openly," and that "if too strong pressure were put upon Austria she might hasten to set before Germany a *fait accompli*." It is reasonable to suppose that this was one of the difficulties which confronted Germany in making her opinion felt in Vienna.

Sir Edward Goschen also saw the Chancellor during the morning,⁴ and the latter said he had told the Austrian Government that if she had no territorial designs on Servia and sought only guarantees, she should "speak openly" in this sense.

During the afternoon a War Council was held at Potsdam.

On returning from this Council the Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him.⁵ He began

¹ Press Correspondence (xv).

² White Paper 76.

³ Orange Book 51.

⁴ White Paper 75.

⁵ Ibid. 85.

by saying that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany might, under her treaty of alliance, become involved. This, according to the Austro-German Treaty, brought on Germany a serious liability which was referred to above. (See Historical Introduction.)

Seeing the danger ahead, therefore, the Chancellor in this interview with Sir Edward Goschen sounded him to see if England would remain neutral in the event of such a war. He said he understood that Great Britain would not allow France to be crushed, but Germany, he said, did not aim at this. If Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give an assurance that she aimed at no territorial gain at the expense of France in Europe. He would not, however, on being questioned, give a similar undertaking about the French Colonies. He added, however, that Germany would respect Dutch neutrality, but he could not give a definite assurance about Belgium, as that must depend upon the action of France.

According to a telegram ¹ on the following day, the 30th, from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, the Chancellor also stated at this interview that he had had no time yet to reply to Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that Germany should formulate a new Four Power mediation scheme. He added that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could in Vienna, and indeed was afraid he might, as a result, have caused Austria to precipitate matters (cf. above).

At 6.30 p.m. the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar ² saying that he could not share the Tsar's view that the action of Austria was shameful. Austria could not trust Servia's pledges and must have guarantees, but had no territorial ambitions. He added that he was working for an understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

The situation at Berlin to-day, therefore, appeared to be as follows: Germany was much affected by Russia's partial mobilization, and the military party in Berlin was thereby rendered more powerful. The attempt to sound England as to her neutrality was no doubt the consequence

¹ White Paper 107. ² Denkschrift, Exhibit 22, and Russia, July 29th.

of this situation, which had been accentuated by Germany's commitments to Austria under the terms of her treaty with that country. While all this time Germany was putting pressure of a sort on Austria to come to terms with Russia, she does not seem to have made any definite suggestion as to the practical method by which mediation of the four Powers should proceed.

RUSSIA

The first event of importance in St. Petersburg on the 29th was the issue of orders for partial mobilization. A meeting of the Council of Ministers under the presidency of the Tsar also took place. The attitude of Austria and her refusal to listen to Russia's suggestion for negotiation over her demands on Serbia was the reason given for this step.¹

According, however, to a statement² of the Chief of the Russian General Staff to the German Military Attaché in St. Petersburg, no reservists had been called on up to 3 p.m. The Military Attaché doubted this, however, and said that he had evidence that mobilization was going on even in Vilna and Warsaw, on the German frontier.

Apparently on the morning of the 29th M. Sazonof saw Sir George Buchanan,³ and said that on the suggestion of Count Pourtalès he had again proposed exchange of views with Austria, but the proposal had been refused. He said that he was ready to return to Sir Edward Grey's Four Power Conference, or, if thought desirable, that the Ambassadors of three disinterested Powers together with the Austrian Ambassador should exchange views with him. He added that he would agree to anything which was agreed upon by the four Powers, *if it was acceptable to Serbia*. This last condition, depending upon the willingness of Serbia, was a subtle piece of diplomacy, for it was clear that Serbia would do nothing without the wish of Russia, and therefore, for all practical purposes, Serbia *was* Russia.

Meanwhile M. Sazonof had telegraphed to the Russian

¹ Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.

² Denkschrift, Exhibit 10.

³ White Paper 78.

Ambassador in London describing an interview¹ with Count Pourtalès on this day, in which the latter said that Germany was continuing to exercise influence at Vienna and would continue to do so even after the declaration of war on Servia. He said he favoured direct negotiations between Austria and Russia. M. Sazonof replied that he preferred parallel discussions to be carried on, on the one hand by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and on the other hand by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia, on the same lines as occurred in the crisis of 1912. According to a telegram² on the following day (the 30th) from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, Count Pourtalès is described as having told M. Sazonof at this same interview that Germany was willing to guarantee that the integrity of Servia should be observed by Austria. This, so far as we know, is the only occasion on which this offer was made.

From German sources³ it is also stated that at this interview Count Pourtalès told M. Sazonof how hard it was to influence Austria, now that Russia had begun to mobilize.

From Russian sources,⁴ however, it appears that the German Ambassador went a good deal further, for according to this account he asked M. Sazonof if Russia would cease military preparations. The latter answered that Russia could not do this, since Austria would not agree to a pacific settlement. Indeed, M. Sazonof added that Russia intended to hasten military preparations and regarded war as inevitable.

During the afternoon the Tsar wired to the Kaiser⁵ declaring that a shameful war had been opened by Austria on Servia, and urged the Kaiser to restrain his ally. This telegram was replied to by the Kaiser. (See Germany, July 29th.)

Russia's action on the 29th, therefore, shows that she was determined to make Austria deal with her in her dispute

¹ White Paper 93 (2).

² Ibid. 97.

³ Denkschrift, Exhibit 10.

⁴ Orange Book 58.

⁵ Denkschrift, Exhibit 21.

with Servia. In attaining this object she was evidently relying to some extent on the assistance of France and England. The former was certain to support her, but the latter was still doubtful. The report of Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg on this day shows how England's support was valued.¹ "Confident of England's support," he says, "about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war." It is possible that Russia decided upon her military step on the 29th, after being assured privately of this support. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey, although he may morally have supported Russia in her military measures against Austria, had not made his position clear to Germany, who was doubtless under the impression at this time that, even if England would not remain neutral under all circumstances, she would not at any rate back Russia unconditionally in her interference over Servia.

FRANCE

There are two incidents to be recorded in France on the 29th.

The German Ambassador, on the order of the German Chancellor, warned France about military preparations which he declared she was making.

The Russian Ambassador in France also reported to M. Sazonof an interview² between the French Premier and the German Ambassador, in which the latter said that the words "conference or arbitration" in any mediation proposal frightened Austria.

ENGLAND

The Austrian Ambassador in London to-day reflected the unyielding attitude of his Government in an interview with Sir Edward Grey.³ The Ambassador presented a Memorandum from his Government detailing the Austrian case against Servia. Sir Edward Grey said that he was concerned about the peace of Europe, and remarked that

¹ See Press Correspondence (xxiii).

² Orange Book 55.

³ White Paper 81 and 91.

Austria might attack the independence of Servia while at the same time respecting her territorial integrity.

Later Sir Edward Grey saw M. Cambon¹ and told him how grave the situation was, and informed him what he proposed to say to the German Ambassador that afternoon. He warned M. Cambon that England would have to act in her own interests; that the British public saw the case differently from the Morocco case; that even if Germany and France were involved in a war the British Government had not yet made up its mind.

In the afternoon Sir Edward Grey saw the German Ambassador.² After speaking of the general situation he said privately to him that he must not be misled into thinking that England would stand aside under all circumstances. He said that he did not wish to threaten, but that if British interests became involved they would have to intervene rapidly. He also added³ that Russia could not be expected to stand aside whilst Austria completely humiliated Servia.

The Italian Ambassador also called on Sir Edward Grey during the day⁴ and officially told him that his Government suggested that Germany should propose some new method of mediation.

Sir Edward Grey's attitude to-day therefore appears obscure. He did not object to Russia interfering in Servia and thereby making the Austro-Servian dispute a European one. At the same time he would not say openly whether he would support Russia in the ensuing quarrel, although the Reuter's message from St. Petersburg on this day suggests that Russia had received an intimation privately of what England would really do. Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey told the French Ambassador officially that England would not bind herself to support France, and had not made up her mind, while he told the German Ambassador that if France were involved England might be drawn in and therefore might have to be reckoned with. England's

¹ White Paper 87.

² Ibid. 88 and 89.

³ Ibid. 90.

⁴ Ibid. 92.

attitude, viewed through German eyes, is fairly clearly explained by the correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* in Berlin. "England's position," he wired on the 29th, "would be made clearer by a statement whether, in case localization is foiled by a Russian attack on Austria, England would refrain from supporting Russia and France. Technically, at least, localization or spread depends on Russia alone, and the British Government, it is argued here, can influence Russia's decision by making British policy plain."

Sir Edward Grey did not do this. He did not say, at any rate openly, that he would back Russia under all circumstances; nor did he say that he would remain neutral under all circumstances. Nor did he define clearly the conditions under which England would be drawn in, or at what point the question became a matter of British "interest."

ITALY

Two telegrams¹ from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome reflect the attitude of the Italian Government. They suggest that Germany should be asked to propose a method for exchange of views and thus keep the door open to a settlement.

JULY 30

AUSTRIA

By this time Austria began to show signs of listening to reason, frightened as she no doubt was by the Russian partial mobilization.

At an earlier stage in the day Sir Maurice de Bunsen met the Russian Ambassador² and expressed the hope that Austria would understand the meaning of Russia's mobilization, namely, that Russia must be consulted over the fate of Servia. Meanwhile news arrived that Germany was making more serious efforts to press Austria to come to terms than she had done hitherto. Thus the French Ambassador heard from Berlin² that the German Ambassador

¹ White Paper 80 and 86.

² Ibid. 95.

in Vienna had been instructed to "speak seriously to the Austrian Government about acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war." Sir Maurice de Bunsen, however, remarked that M. Tschirsky was so identified with anti-Slav propaganda that he doubted whether he would plead the cause of moderation seriously.

Indeed, it cannot be denied that the personality of the German Ambassador in Vienna and his reluctance to obey his Government was one of the main difficulties of effecting an Austro-Russian understanding.

The pressure which Germany began to put on Austria to-day is further confirmed by the communication given by the German Foreign Office to the correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* in Berlin to-day.¹ That remarkable document, which was printed in the *Westminster Gazette* for August 2nd, showed that Germany went to the farthest limit that she could to put pressure upon Austria without breaking her alliance. "The refusal of Austria," it said, "to exchange views with Russia was a great mistake, and Germany would refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration because Austria would not listen to Germany's advice."

The authenticity of this communication was challenged by Sir Valentine Chirol in a letter to the *Westminster Gazette* on Friday, September 18, 1914, in which he stated, without producing evidence, that this document was purposely falsified and had never been sent to Vienna at all.

It is rather remarkable, however, that in a passage in the English White Paper No. 95 (quoted above) the British Ambassador in Vienna relates having heard from the French Ambassador—a quite independent source—that the German Ambassador in Vienna has been instructed "to speak seriously to the Austrian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war." This statement, coupled with the communiqué of the German Government published in the *Westminster Gazette*, may certainly be regarded as two independent sources of evidence both pointing in the same direction.

The Russian Ambassador meanwhile had an interview

¹ See Documents (a).

with Count Berchtold during the morning of the 30th,¹ and the result was communicated to Sir Maurice de Bunsen and the French Ambassador during the afternoon. At this interview Count Berchtold's attitude was described as quite friendly, a fact which showed that he had considerably changed his attitude from that which he had taken up on the previous day. He said he saw no objection to commencing conversations at St. Petersburg between Austria and Germany. These conversations, it will be remembered, had been discontinued since the outbreak of war with Servia. Count Berchtold, however, would not say if these conversations would be upon the basis of the Servian reply.

Again, from German sources² it is described how on the 30th the German Government forwarded to Vienna the English proposal which was to serve as a basis of negotiation, namely that Austria should dictate her conditions in Servia after she had occupied Belgrade.

In a telegram from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey³ on the same day there is further evidence of German pressure on Vienna. In this the German Chancellor is described as having sent to-day a message "begging Austria" to reply to the English proposal of this day (30th). (See England, July 30th, and White Paper 103.) Count Berchtold, according to this account, replied that he would see the Austrian Emperor that morning and consult with him.

All this cumulative evidence, therefore, shows that, possibly as the result of Russia's partial mobilization and possibly from fear of England not maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality, as had been intimated by Sir Edward Grey's statement to Prince Lichnofsky (see England, July 29th, and White Paper 88 and 89), the diplomats at Berlin had apparently realized the dangers of the situation and were making desperate efforts to make their ally come to terms with Russia.

Their efforts, moreover, had some prospects of success, for Austria undoubtedly at this time began to show signs

¹ White Paper 96.

² Denkschrift, Exhibit 11.

³ White Paper 112.

of becoming reasonable. Sir Maurice de Bunsen's special dispatch,¹ moreover, shows in one passage how, in spite of Russia's partial mobilization, Austria was willing on the 30th to start direct conversations with St. Petersburg.

The hopes of the diplomats, however, were blighted by the unexpected military developments which so speedily followed in Russia.

GERMANY

An account of Germany's pressure on Austria is also given from Berlin to-day.² Herr Jagow, in an interview with Sir Edward Goschen, said that after Prince Lichnowsky's last wire containing an account of his conversation with Sir Edward Grey on the 29th (see White Paper 89) he had asked Austria if she was willing to "accept mediation on the basis of the occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade, or some other point, and issue her conditions from there." He had at that time (morning) received no reply, but he added that he feared the partial mobilization of Russia had complicated matters. He said he regretted Sir Edward Grey's warning about the possibility that England would participate in a war, but he appreciated the frankness. To the French Ambassador Herr Jagow also used similar language,³ saying that Germany had asked Austria direct what condition would satisfy them, but added that he had not yet got a reply.

The only contradictory evidence of this comes from the Russian Orange Book,⁴ where in a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Berlin the latter was described as having said that Russia's proposal (see Russia, July 30th, and White Paper 97) for mediation in the Austro-Servian dispute under certain conditions would be unacceptable to Austria.

Meanwhile the Kaiser wired again to the Tsar⁵ that Russian mobilization impeded his efforts at Vienna, and Prince Heinrich wired King George asking him to use his influence on Russia and to secure the neutrality of Russia and France.

¹ Cd. 7596.

² White Paper 98.

³ Ibid. 107.

⁴ Orange Book 63.

⁵ Denkschrift, Exhibit 23.

The Press correspondents also to-day reflect the attitude of Germany in the following manner. The *Times* correspondent in Berlin¹ says that "with the exception of the military journals, which are beginning to clamour for German measures, and of the Clerical Press, which is purely Austrian in tone, there is a strong demand for real activity on behalf of peace."

Reuter's agent in London² also learns on the 30th that Germany is working for peace; "she cannot altogether control her ally, but she is giving good advice in Vienna."

There are strong grounds for believing that Germany was exerting herself for moderation and peace in Vienna on July 30th. Unfortunately, the diplomats who had the situation in hand on that day appeared to have lost control of it on the 31st, when, owing to causes which we find in the next section, the military party got the upper hand.

RUSSIA

Early in the morning (2 a.m.) of the 30th the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg saw M. Sazonof.³ The situation then was very serious. Russia's partial mobilization on the 29th had upset Germany's nerves, and showed her that if war was to be averted she must bestir herself at once in Vienna. Count Pourtalès did not know what his Government in Berlin were going to do by way of pressing Austria. He seems to have assumed that war was already inevitable, and to have completely broken down in the presence of M. Sazonof. He implored the Foreign Minister to give him some suggestion to telegraph to his Government. Thereupon M. Sazonof dictated to him the following formula:—

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed a character of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the principle of Servian sovereignty, *Russia engages to stop all military preparations.*"

This, according to the Russian Orange Book,⁴ was

¹ Press Correspondence (xix).

³ White Paper 97.

² Ibid. (xxi).

⁴ Orange Book 60.

telegraphed to Berlin, and the attitude of the German Government awaited with anxiety. Austria's answer to that suggestion did not come that day, and Germany, as we have seen (Germany, July 30th), was engaged for the greater part of the day in urging Austria to come to terms at once with Russia. Austria, as we see, was beginning to unbend (see Austria, July 30th), and had instructed her representative in St. Petersburg to discuss the matter direct with M. Sazonof.

But how did Russia treat the situation? Sir George Buchanan, at the end of his telegram to Sir Edward Grey,¹ declared that preparations for a Russian mobilization were to be proceeded with at once, if the above proposal was rejected by Austria. He also said that Germany was "arming" and hinted that Russia would have to convert partial into general mobilization. What Sir George Buchanan referred to when he said "that Germany was arming" is not clear. It is certain that there was no general calling up of reservists in Germany at that time. It is shown elsewhere that nothing more than ordinary military precautions were going on on this day in Germany, as there were in all other countries at this time. (See General Mobilization, Germany.)

But Russia did not wait for an answer to the proposal handed to the German Ambassador early on the morning of the 30th, as quoted above. M. Sazonof must have known also that Austria had agreed to commence conversations again in St. Petersburg. (See Austria, July 30th, and White Paper 96.) But in spite of both these facts a *general* mobilization was ordered in St. Petersburg late on this night (the 30th).

This fact is recorded by the *Times* correspondent in St. Petersburg, who wires on the 31st that "the Government decided on the general mobilization late last night." (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.) There is no evidence given in any official paper or in any of the telegrams of Press correspondents, so far as we are aware, that Austria's reply to Russia's suggestion, made early that morning (see

¹ White Paper 97.

above and White Paper 97), had been given, nor is there any evidence that Austria had stiffened her back or had gone back on her promise that she would discuss with St. Petersburg again. Indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary.

There are two other points to be noted on the 30th in St. Petersburg.

At 1 p.m. the Tsar wired to the Kaiser^{*} saying that Russia's mobilization could not be stopped now because it had been decided upon five days ago, and that these measures undertaken then were now coming into operation. He thereby admitted that Russia had been making a partial mobilization of her forces as far back as July 25th.

An interview also took place during the day between the Military Attaché at the German Embassy and Prince Trubetskoy,² in which the former said that Russia would be responsible if there was a general war.

FRANCE

In Paris to-day Sir Francis Bertie and M. Poincaré had an interview,³ in which the latter said that Germany had warned Russia to stop her mobilization, otherwise Germany would herself mobilize. Later this was modified into a request to be told under what conditions she would stop mobilization. The answer given was contained in White Paper 97 (see Russia, July 30th), describing the interview between Count Pourtalès and M. Sazonof. The French President, thinking that Austria and Germany would not agree to the suggestion produced at this interview, and feeling the danger of a general conflagration nearer at hand, asked England to say now unconditionally that she would come down on the side of Russia and France. But Sir Francis Bertie said that it would be difficult for England to do this.

A Cabinet meeting took place during the afternoon and lasted two hours.

^{*} Denkschrift, Exhibit 23 (a).

² Ibid., Exhibit 18.

³ White Paper 99.

ENGLAND

During the morning of this day Prince Lichnowsky had an interview with Sir Edward Grey.¹ Presumably he had heard of the suggestion of Russia that she would demobilize under certain conditions. He then told Sir Edward Grey that Germany would try to make Austria promise not to go beyond Belgrade provided that meantime the Powers would examine how Serbia could satisfy Austria's demands. Sir Edward Grey appeared to regard this as a relief to the situation, and telegraphed this statement of Prince Lichnowsky's to Sir George Buchanan, saying that he hoped that Russia would consent to disarm and suspend all further military operations provided that other Powers did the same.

Instead of doing this, however, Russia declared a general mobilization. (See Russia, July 30th.)

Sir Edward Grey also saw the Russian Ambassador, Benckendorff, about this time, and reported the result of his conversation in this same telegram to Sir George Buchanan. The Russian Ambassador had communicated to him the suggestion in White Paper 97. (See Russia, July 30th.) Sir Edward Grey slightly modified the formula in order to make it more explanatory, apparently with the Russian Ambassador's consent. In its modified form it was returned to St. Petersburg, and ran as follows:—

“If the Austrian advance is stopped at Belgrade the Powers will examine how Serbia can satisfy Austria without impairing her sovereignty rights and independence.”

The difference between this and the first formula is that the Powers are specially mentioned as arbitrators to decide upon those points concerning the sovereignty and independence of Serbia.

It appears, therefore, that as far as the representatives of Germany and Russia in London were concerned on the 30th, a basis had already been found which might have led to an understanding.

Another important interview also took place in London

¹ White Paper 103.

on the 30th between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon.¹ The latter reminded him of his letter of November 1912, in which Sir Edward Grey agreed that if either England or France were the subject of an unprovoked attack, they would at once consult how they might take measures in common. M. Cambon asked how England would act if Germany attacked France now. He added that the aggression might take the form of a demand to cease military preparations or a demand that France should remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war.

France, he said, would do neither. He thereby admitted that France would support Russia in this crisis and that Russia's quarrel was unconditionally her quarrel. Sir Edward Grey did not give an answer to these questions of the French Ambassador. He merely said that the British Government had not made up its mind and that a Cabinet meeting was shortly to be held at which it would be discussed.

On this day also Sir Edward Grey replied by wire to Sir Edward Goschen to the German Chancellor's bid² for England's neutrality.³ He indignantly rejected the suggestion that England should remain neutral under the conditions laid down by the Chancellor. He said that England could not under any circumstances allow French Colonies to be taken, for France without Colonies would be subservient to Germany. According to Sir Edward Grey, the refusal of the German Chancellor to unconditionally guarantee the integrity of the whole French Empire under all circumstances, even on the supposition that France might be the aggressor, was to be regarded as a disgraceful attempt to bribe the British Empire to stand aside. Yet he had just told M. Cambon (see above, and White Paper 105) that he could not give an undertaking to support France and Russia, and that he had not made up his mind what to do. Sir Edward Grey went on to say that he could not bargain away obligations to Belgium. England, he said, must

¹ White Paper 105.

² See Germany, July 29th, and White Paper 85.

³ White Paper 101 and 102.

preserve full freedom of action as circumstances required. He then pressed Germany to combine with England to preserve the peace of Europe, and forecasted a future European arrangement to which Germany would be a party if the present crisis passed.

Sir Edward Grey on this occasion at any rate had conceived an idea. He hoped to enlarge the present grouping of the Powers, so that Germany should associate with Powers other than the Teutonic ones. How he proposed to do so he did not say, but the group system had become so stereotyped in European politics that it obviously stood in the way of a settlement along these lines. Therefore, while Sir Edward Grey intimated to the French Ambassador that we were not in alliance to assist her under all circumstances (White Paper 105), he told the German Ambassador a few hours later (White Paper 101) that we should not remain neutral under all circumstances, and that we regarded ourselves as the protectors and guarantors of the French Colonies.

What the "circumstance" was which would decide our neutrality or our intervention he did not, at least openly, disclose either to France or to Germany on July 30th.

JULY 31

AUSTRIA

The outlook again to-day in Vienna was hopeful. Sir Maurice de Bunsen in his special dispatch¹ refers to the fact that Austria and Russia were fast approaching an understanding in St. Petersburg.

Some time during the day the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs saw Sir Maurice de Bunsen² and told him that direct conversations were proceeding at St. Petersburg between the Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof, and he hoped that a general war might be "staved off" by these efforts. Sir Maurice expressed a fear that Germany would mobilize, to which the Under Secretary

¹ Cd. 7596.

² White Paper 118.

replied that Germany must do something to "secure her position." He admitted that Austria was mobilizing on the Russian frontier as well as on the Servian frontier, but said that this was only in reply to Russia's general mobilization and was not aggressive.

This conversation was reported later in the day to the Russian Ambassador by Sir Maurice de Bunsen.¹ The former had seen Count Berchtold, who had begged him to remove the impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged by Austria on all further conversations." Count Berchtold denied that Austria had broken off negotiations with Russia, and added that Austria wanted neither the "*infractio* of Servian sovereign rights nor the *acquisition* of Servian territory."

This attitude of Count Berchtold is confirmed in the Russian Orange Book,² where, in a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Vienna to M. Sazonof, Count Berchtold is described as insisting that Austria had "no aggressive intention against Russia and no desire for conquest over Servia"; she only desires to give Servia a lesson and to obtain "guarantees for the future."

Although the Russian Orange Book says nothing about the *infractio* of Servian sovereign rights, the evidence accumulated in the White Paper and in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch³ shows clearly that on the 31st Austria was ready to consider the excision from the terms of her demands of everything that endangered Servian independence. The *Figaro* for October 5th is also interesting.⁴

GERMANY

Berlin was in the meantime in a state of great alarm at the Russian general mobilization, and on this day the internal struggle, going on between the diplomats and the military party, reached its height.

The German Chancellor saw Sir Edward Goschen in the morning⁵ and told him that Russian mobilization made it difficult to put pressure on Vienna, but added that he was

¹ White Paper 137. ² Russian Orange Book 66. ³ Cd. 7596.

⁴ See Addenda to Diary, p. 93.

⁵ White Paper 108.

still very active there, indeed "perhaps almost more active than was altogether palatable to the Ballplatz." (See Austria, July 30th, White Paper 95, and Documents (a).)

The Chancellor then had an audience with the Kaiser.

After the audience he again received Sir Edward Goschen,¹ who informed him of Sir Edward Grey's reply to his proposal that England should remain neutral. (See England, July 30th, and White Paper 101.) The Chancellor was, however, so taken up with the news from the Russian frontier that he hardly noticed the reply, and asked that it should be left for his consideration.

Later he informed the British Ambassador² that the German Government had received news of the complete mobilization of Russia, which "put an end to hopes of a peaceful solution of the crisis." This news indeed proved to be fully correct. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Russia.) Sir Edward Grey then asked the Chancellor if he could still put pressure on Austria. The Chancellor replied that last night (30th) he had "begged Austria to reply to the last proposal" from England. (See July 30th, Austria and Germany; White Paper 95, 98, and 112, and Denkschrift, Exhibit 11.) As a result he had heard that Count Berchtold was consulting with the Austrian Emperor to-day.

With regard to the neutrality of Belgium, the Chancellor said apparently at this same interview³ that he would have to know what the French intended to do before he could give an answer to England's request that they would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

Sir Edward Goschen also had a talk with Jagow during the day,⁴ and urged him to accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal. (See England, July 31, and White Paper 111.) Jagow said it was impossible to consider any proposal until Russia's reply about her mobilization, but he added that the Emperor and the Chancellor had been "urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions." (See above and White Paper 112.) But, he added, Russia's mobilization has spoilt everything.

¹ White Paper 109.

² Ibid. 112.

³ Ibid. 122.

⁴ Ibid. 121.

At 2 p.m. "Kriegszustand" was proclaimed in Berlin. This is a military state preceding mobilization, which, however, does not necessarily mean mobilization. It was evident that about this time military opinion in Berlin was beginning to overpower the Foreign Office.

The Kaiser meanwhile had telegraphed to King George¹ to say that a Russian general mobilization had forced him to take precautionary measures. The Kaiser also addressed a crowd of people from the Palace window that afternoon.

The German Emperor also sent a telegram at 2 p.m.² to the Tsar, declaring that all responsibility now rested on Russia. Feeling in Berlin was now rising to fever heat, and by evening the military element had practically got control of the situation.

RUSSIA

Meanwhile events in St. Petersburg were becoming very obscure and confusing.

In a telegram from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey,³ the general mobilization of the Russian army was announced, thereby proving the truth of the assertions which were current in Berlin on the same day. The reasons given by the Russian Government to Sir George Buchanan were, firstly, that Austria was moving troops against Russia, and, secondly, that Austria was "determined not to yield to the intervention of the Powers." With regard to the first accusation against Austria, it should be noted that nothing is said about an Austrian general mobilization. It is assumed that it was necessary to order a general mobilization only because Austria had replied to Russia's partial mobilization of the 29th by moving troops towards the Russian frontier. Russia, it should be noted, does not say that Austria had proceeded to a general mobilization, nor is there any direct evidence that she had done so. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.) If Austria had done so, it is highly probable that Russia would have used this

¹ Documents (d).

² Denkschrift, p. 124.

³ White Paper 113.

as an excuse when stating the reasons for her general mobilization.

With regard to the second point, there is no evidence that Austria had refused, or, for that matter, had even had time to reply to, Russia's suggestion of the previous day. (See White Paper 97.) This, it will be remembered (see White Paper 103, and England, July 30th), had been modified by Sir Edward Grey in London on the 30th. It was then returned to St. Petersburg, where on the 31st M. Sazonof put it into its final form and communicated it to the French and German Ambassadors. This formula^{*} combined the first formula of M. Sazonof with that of Sir Edward Grey and ran as follows :—

“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops in Servia, and if, recognizing that the dispute between her and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia can satisfy the Austrian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, *Russia will undertake to maintain a waiting attitude.*”

It should be noted that there is no suggestion here, as in the first formula, that Russia should demobilize, but only that she should maintain a “waiting attitude.” Something had evidently happened in the meantime. Russia, in fact, without waiting for the result of the conversation, already producing excellent results (see Cd. 7596), without waiting for the modified formula to be fully considered by the Vienna Cabinet, had ordered a general mobilization of her whole army and navy. This, then, seems to account for the omission of any reference to the arrest of Russian military preparations, which is apparent in this final formula. It, moreover, fully accounts for the stampede of public opinion in Berlin.

So far, indeed, from any summary rejection by Austria of the Russian proposal, it appears from M. Sazonof himself that while all this was going on, the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was holding conversations with him and

^{*} White Paper 120, Orange Book 67.

had declared the "readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia." In other words, he was ready to discuss with M. Sazonof what points in the Austrian Note could be so modified as to make it harmonize with Russia's view. The Russian Foreign Minister, however, although he expressed his satisfaction at this offer, "said that it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers." Thus it appears that at this moment when Russia had chosen to mobilize, Austria was willing to submit the whole of her demands on Servia to the consideration of Russia. The above conversation of the Austrian Ambassador with M. Sazonof is recorded in a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen. The former heard of it through the Russian Embassy in London on the following day, August 1st, and the Russian Embassy had heard of it in a telegram from M. Sazonof dated July 31st. This important telegram, although quoted at length in the English White Paper,^{*} is not to be found in the Russian Orange Book, the Russian Government having apparently suppressed it.

The relations now between Russia and Germany were becoming more strained than they were between Austria and Russia. (See Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch, Cd. 7596.) The latter, as we see above, were on a fair way to settling their dispute. The cause of the Russian general mobilization, therefore, remains a mystery, and cannot be explained unless it can be shown that news of an Austrian general mobilization had come to hand. Even then one would have expected that Russia would have waited for the results of her negotiations with Austria, which were now fast approaching a solution, and would have held her hand until the joint Anglo-Russian suggestion, which also had the consent of Germany, had had time to be considered by the Vienna Cabinet. But military exigencies had triumphed in St. Petersburg on the 30th just as they were triumphing in Berlin on the 31st. At 2 p.m. the Tsar telegraphed to the Kaiser that he could not stop his mobilization now, but he promised to take no provocative action.

^{*} White Paper 133.

But Germany, as we saw above, was panic-struck with the idea of Russia's mobilization on the East Prussian frontier, and at midnight to-night the fatal step was taken of demanding the demobilization of the Russian army within twelve hours, in default of which Germany would herself mobilize.¹ This was delivered by Count Pourtalès to M. Sazonof. This ultimatum was almost as rash as Russia's determination to mobilize, and the shortness of the time limit given by Germany to Russia was as bad as the refusal of Russia to wait for the results of the mediation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

FRANCE

On the evening of this day the German Ambassador saw the French Premier² and told him that an ultimatum was to be addressed to Russia demanding demobilization. He was instructed also to ask what would be the attitude of the French Government under these circumstances.

The British Ambassador was informed of this step at 7 o'clock that evening, and at 10.30 he again met the Premier, who said that he would consult about the question of Belgian neutrality with his colleagues, and meanwhile asked what the attitude of England would be to Germany's demand on Russia.³

Later, Sir Francis Bertie reported to Sir Edward Grey⁴ the reply of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on the question of Belgian neutrality. He said that France would respect the neutrality of Belgium provided that another Power did not violate it. In the latter case, however, she would be compelled to act otherwise in defence.

According to M. Hanotaux, in an article in *Le Figaro* for October 5, 1914, on this day (July 31st) the Austrian Ambassador in Paris stated the intentions of his Government to open up a second phase of the negotiations with Russia. Accordingly he took steps similar to those taken by Count Szapary in St. Petersburg.⁵

¹ White Paper 141 ; Denkschrift, Exhibit 24 ; Orange Book 70.

² White Paper 117 ; Denkschrift, Exhibit 25.

³ White Paper 117 and 124.

⁴ Ibid. 125.

⁵ See Addenda to Diary of Negotiations, p. 93, July 31st, France.

ENGLAND

In a telegram to-day from Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan,¹ the former describes an interview between himself and Prince Lichnowsky, who said that, at the instance of Germany, "a conversation had taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador." He then asked Sir Edward Grey to ask Russia to cease her mobilization, but Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not do this if Austria would not agree to limit the "advance of her troops into Servia."

This point about the Austrian advance into Servia was at this moment the subject of discussion between the Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof in St. Petersburg; the formula had been agreed upon (see White Paper 120 and Orange Book 67), and Austria had expressed her willingness to consider it. (See White Paper 133.) Sir Edward Grey, however, told Prince Lichnowsky that he could not see his way to urge Russia to suspend her military preparations. He *did*, however, tell Sir George Buchanan in this same telegram that "if Russia objected to Austria mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this was not too great a number against 400,000 Servians." Whether Sir George Buchanan pressed this point on Russia we do not hear, but it is the only evidence we have of any suggestion to Russia on the part of Sir Edward Grey that she might relax her military efforts without danger.

Incidentally this last remark of Sir Edward Grey is also interesting, as showing that he at any rate was not aware of any Austrian general mobilization on July 31st. He speaks as if, so far as he knew, Austria had only mobilized eight army corps. This information is corroborated elsewhere. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.)

In this same interview with the German Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey made another proposal to him.² He said that he would undertake to sound St. Petersburg whether

¹ White Paper 110.

² Ibid. 111.

it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that she did not impair Servian sovereignty and territorial integrity. He promised that if Germany would support this at Vienna, he would tell Russia and France that they would be unreasonable if they did not accept it, and would not be responsible for the consequences. This was the boldest move that Sir Edward Gray made during the crisis. He threatened, in fact, to refuse to support the Dual Alliance, in spite of the naval understanding which he had with France, and which was shortly to be brought before the British Parliament. If he had taken this line before the military parties in Berlin and St. Petersburg had got the upper hand, it is conceivable that it might have been of some use in the preservation of the peace of Europe. It was obviously useless twelve hours after Russia had ordered the general mobilization of all her forces and Berlin was in a panic.

Meanwhile the French Ambassador had seen Sir Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office,^{*} and had told him that the French Ambassador in Berlin had informed his Government that England's undecisive attitude was causing Germany to stiffen her back. He appealed, in fact, for a definite statement of England's position.

Shortly after this a Cabinet meeting took place, at which the attitude of England was discussed. After the meeting Sir Edward Grey saw the French Ambassador, and told him that he still could not define England's position at present. He added that he could not pledge Parliament in advance, and that no British treaties or obligations were at the moment involved. At the same time he denied that he had left Germany in the dark as to what England's attitude would be. He had told the German Ambassador, he said, that if France and Germany became involved England would be drawn in, but at the same time he did not call this a definite pledge.

^{*} White Paper 119

He then referred casually to the question of Belgian neutrality, "*which might be, he would not say decisive, but an important factor in determining England's attitude.*" He added that he was proposing to raise the question of Belgian neutrality at once, and to obtain guarantees from France and Germany about it.

Thus it would appear that Sir Edward Grey, as far as he had made up his mind on the 31st, would still not commit England to unconditional support of France, but, nevertheless, he would not tell Germany under what conditions England would remain neutral.

The question of Belgian neutrality, moreover, was, in spite of the imminence of war between Russia, France, and Germany, a matter of comparatively secondary importance in his mind.

BELGIUM

On the same day the French Minister at Brussels told the Belgian Foreign Minister¹ that there would be no incursion of French troops into Belgium, even if important forces should be massed on its frontier. The Government of the Republic, it added, will respect the neutrality of Belgium, and will only modify its attitude if another Power should not respect it.

The Secretary-General of the Belgian Foreign Office then held an important conversation with the German Minister at Brussels.² The former referred the German Minister to an assurance given in 1911, when the question of Dutch fortifications on the Scheldt was under consideration, that in the event of a Franco-German war, Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. The German Chancellor had given similar assurances, and in 1913 the German Foreign Secretary had made like statements before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. The German Minister said that "the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed."

Mobilization of the Belgian army ordered.³

¹ Belgian Grey Book 9.

² Ibid. 12.

³ Ibid. 10.

AUGUST 1

AUSTRIA

On August 1st, according to the English White Paper,¹ the orders for the general mobilization of the Austrian army were issued. The confusion of dates that arises out of this announcement compared with that in Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch (Cd. 7596) is discussed in the special Chapter on Mobilization (Austria).

Sir Maurice de Bunsen and the Russian Ambassador met and discussed the situation during the day.² The latter reported the German ultimatum to Russia the day before, and said that war was now practically certain. Russia's mobilization, he said, was in reply to Germany's military preparations, and the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. Russia, however, would even now, he said, be satisfied by assurances about the integrity and independence of Servia. The Russian Ambassador finally accused Germany of having worked for war from the first.

It will be noticed that the Russian Ambassador did not excuse Russian mobilization on the grounds of an Austrian general mobilization, but on the grounds of German military preparations. This further confirms the supposition that Austria had not mobilized more than her eight army corps before August 1st. (See Chapter on Mobilization, Austria.)

GERMANY

The detention of British shipping in Hamburg was the subject of conversation between Sir Edward Goschen and Herr Jagow to-day.³ The latter promised to see that the ships should be released.

In a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan⁴ it transpires that Austria has already informed the German Government that she was ready to consider favourably Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation

¹ White Paper 127.

³ Ibid. 143.

² Ibid. 141.

⁴ Ibid. 135.

between Austria and Servia. She made a reservation, however, to the effect that Austrian military action against Servia should continue for the present, and that meanwhile the British Government should urge the Russian Government to stop the mobilization of her troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would cease her defensive military preparations in Galicia.

In the afternoon, orders for the general mobilization of the German army and navy were issued.¹

Sir Edward Grey meanwhile telegraphed to Berlin² saying that the last formula (White Paper 120) accepted by Russia should afford a basis of negotiation offering still a chance of peace. He expressed the hope that no Great Power should commence warlike operations until that formula had been examined.

Sir Edward Goschen then saw Herr Jagow,³ and urged him to restraint, saying that Germany was only drawn into this dispute as an ally of Austria. But Jagow said that it was impossible to take a calm view of the situation in view of Russia's mobilization; for, as he pointed out, Germany's strategic position made it necessary for her to act at once, since while "she had the speed, Russia had the numbers."

And so the German Government, with indescribable folly, refused to consider any more the proposals for mediation, in spite of the fact that Austria and Russia, the original authors of the quarrel, had by this time practically come to an understanding with each other. Regardless of this fact, and looking only to the Russian mobilization, which of course must be admitted to have been a grave danger to her, she took the fatal plunge and challenged Russia to war. Russia's wanton action, it is true, was a grave danger to Germany, since from a military standpoint Germany could not afford to allow Russia to have the start, and the military party in Berlin, making good use of this fact, overbore the diplomats and threw all other conditions aside.

¹ White Paper 142.

² Orange Book 71.

³ White Paper 138.

Prince Lichnowsky had meanwhile telegraphed¹ to the German Chancellor saying that Sir Edward Grey had just that morning asked him by telephone whether, if France remained neutral in a Russo-German conflict, Germany would agree not to attack France. He said he thought he could assume the responsibility for accepting this, but wired to Berlin for confirmation, as is explained later. (See England, August 1st.)

The Kaiser thereupon wired to King George² that he understood England to guarantee the neutrality of France. In that case, he said, although he could not stop the mobilization of Germany, which was now in full swing, he would undertake not to attack France so long as France remained neutral.

The Chancellor wired in the same sense³ to Prince Lichnowsky. The above supposition that England would secure the neutrality of France was found to have rested upon a misunderstanding, as we see in King George's reply. (See England, August 1st.)

The Kaiser then wired to the Tsar⁴ saying that he had shown yesterday how war could have been avoided, but still he asked the Tsar not to let his troops cross the frontier.

RUSSIA

The Austrian Ambassador and M. Sazonof were still holding conversations in St. Petersburg on the morning of the 1st. This appears in a telegram on the morning of the 1st from Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.⁵ Moreover, the negotiations for the terms of the Austrian Note were progressing satisfactorily.

The Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, at the request of Count Berchtold, was also reported in the same telegram to have said that Austria desired neither "the infraction of Servian sovereignty nor the acquisition of Servian territory." Austria, he said, had not "banged the door" on all further conversations.

¹ See Documents (*h*).

² Ibid. (*g*).

³ Ibid. (*i*).

⁴ Denkschrift, p. 126.

⁵ White Paper 137.

Indeed, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, in his special dispatch,¹ not only explains that there was no break in the negotiations to-day, but says that by the 1st of August he was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue, by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to "submit to mediation those points in the Servian Note which were incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence."

On the other hand, in an interview with M. Sazonof, the French Ambassador, and Sir George Buchanan in St. Petersburg on the morning of the 1st,² the Russian Foreign Minister spoke of his conversation on the previous evening with the Austrian Ambassador, and said that the latter refused to discuss Austro-Servian relations. M. Sazonof spoke strongly against Austria and Germany, saying that the former had behaved immorally and the latter in a double-faced way; that she would not put pressure upon Austria until too late, and that Russia could not endure the Austrian domination of Servia any more than England could endure German domination of Holland.

These passages in Sir George Buchanan's telegram to Sir Edward Grey clearly conflict with the passages in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's special dispatch (Cd. 7596) and White Paper 137, in which it clearly states that the previous day Count Berchtold had instructed the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg to "remove the wholly erroneous impression that the door had been banged by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations, and that neither the infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was contemplated by Austria-Hungary."

It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile the statements in White Paper 137 with those in White Paper 139 and Cd. 7596.

Later in the day the Tsar wired the Kaiser,³ saying that he understood Germany must mobilize. He asked for a guarantee that this did not mean war, and said he would take no provocative action while negotiations continued.

¹ Cd. 7596.

² White Paper 139.

³ Denkschrift, p. 125.

In the afternoon of this day Russian troops were reported, but only from a German source,¹ to have crossed the frontier into Germany.

At 7.10 p.m. Count Pourtalès met M. Sazonof, and after a dramatic interview, handed to him on behalf of his Government a formal declaration of war on Russia.²

FRANCE

On the morning of August 1st the German Ambassador and the French Premier had a conversation,³ in which the latter said he could not understand the threatening communication of the previous day (July 31st), in view of the fact that, as he said, "Russia and Austria were still ready to converse." The German Ambassador did not demand his passports at this interview, but said that he had packed up.

Sir Francis Bertie also had an interview during the morning with the French President,⁴ who said that Germany was trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for this impasse. He justified Russia's general mobilization by saying that it took place after Austria's general mobilization. (For this confusing statement, see White Paper 127 and 113, and also Chapter on Mobilization (Austria).) The President also added that Germany, under cover of precautionary measures, was really mobilizing, and that German troops were already in French territory.

At 3.40 p.m. general mobilization of the French army took place.⁵ The French War Minister saw the British Military Attaché and told him that under cover of martial law Germany had called up six classes of reservists, and added that three of these classes sufficed to bring the covering troops on the frontier up to the full strength. The French forces on the frontier, he said, had now opposed to them eight German army corps on a war footing. A zone of 10 kilometres was left by French and German troops on the frontier. (See Chapter on Mobilization, France.)

¹ Denkschrift, p. 126. ² Orange Book 76. ³ White Paper 126.

⁴ White Paper 134.

⁵ Ibid. 136.

Meanwhile, the Austrian Ambassador saw the French Minister for Foreign Affairs¹ and explained to him the Austrian attitude. There was, he said, "no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain aggrandizement." There was, he also said, "no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the Sanjak." This statement in Paris corresponds to a similar one made in St. Petersburg on the same day to M. Sazonof by the Austrian Ambassador. (See Russia, August 1st, and White Paper 137.)

Confirmation of Austria's conciliatory attitude to-day is also obtained from purely Russian sources.² "Austria," said the Russian Ambassador in France to M. Sazonof in the Russian Orange Book, "not only has no intention of destroying Servian territorial integrity, but is ready to discuss her quarrel with Serbia with the other Powers."

The only statement that conflicts with this, as I pointed out above, is Sir George Buchanan's telegram to Sir Edward Grey. (See Russia, July 29th, and White Paper 139.)

The Russian Ambassador in Paris also to-day saw the French President,³ who told him again of Austria's willingness to respect not only the territorial integrity, but also the sovereign rights of Serbia.

ENGLAND

At 11 a.m. on the morning of August 1st Sir Edward Grey telephoned to Prince Lichnowsky and asked him a question.

The German Ambassador appears to have thought that Sir Edward Grey wished to ascertain whether Germany would refrain from attacking France if France remained neutral in a Russo-German war.⁴ The German Ambassador said he thought he could take the responsibility upon himself and accept it. He therefore telegraphed at once

¹ White Paper 137.

³ Ibid. 75.

² Orange Book 73.

⁴ Documents (*h*).

what he thought to be Sir Edward Grey's proposal to the German Chancellor.¹

The Kaiser thereupon telegraphed to King George accepting this offer. (See Germany, August 1st, and Documents (j).)

To this King George telegraphed a reply² correcting the misunderstanding, and pointing out that Sir Edward Grey had only referred to the "avoidance of hostilities between the French and German armies" while Austria and Russia came to an understanding. This topic was again the subject of conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey at an interview later in the day. (See White Paper 123 and Documents (l) (m) (n).) King George was evidently referring to this and not to the conversation over the telephone.

Apparently nothing was said at either conversation about the possibility of securing French neutrality in a Russo-German conflict. In an answer, however, to a question by Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on August 28th,³ Sir Edward Grey threw some light on this misunderstanding. According to him, it was the German Ambassador who made the suggestion. Sir Edward Grey understood it to be that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France if England would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. Sir Edward Grey said he thought it was possible to arrange this. He then explained that what the Ambassador really meant was that France should remain neutral in a Russo-German war. This is certainly what the German Ambassador had in his mind when he sent his first telegram on August 1st to the German Chancellor. (See Documents (h).) Sir Edward Grey, however, continued, in his answer to Lord Robert Cecil, by saying that he could not promise to secure such a condition from France, because it was "in all probability incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance."

Both from Sir Edward Grey's answer in the House of Commons and from King George's reply to the Kaiser, it is

¹ Documents (j) ; see also Germany, August 1st.

² Ibid (k).

³ Documents (o).

clear that England would not prevent France from taking part in a Russo-German conflict if France wished to do so. England, in fact, refused to discriminate between a quarrel which arose out of a purely Franco-German misunderstanding, and a quarrel in which France became involved with Germany on account of her engagements to Russia. That, it was felt, would destroy the Dual Alliance, and Great Britain was too heavily committed to the Dual Alliance by her moral obligations in the naval understanding to back out now.

After he had telegraphed his message (Documents (*h*)) to the German Chancellor, based as it was on a misunderstanding, Prince Lichnowsky then had a very important interview with Sir Edward Grey. Previous to this he had again telegraphed to the German Chancellor^{*} that he was going to discuss with Sir Edward Grey proposals for England's neutrality in the event of Germany being at war with France as well as with Russia. A large part of this conversation is reported in the White Paper in a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen.² Sir Edward Grey began by saying that he regretted the reply of the German Government with regard to Belgian neutrality. This reply was contained in White Paper 122. (See Germany, July 31st.) "If Germany," said Sir Edward Grey, "should see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve the anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there was a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one Government while the others respected it, it would be difficult to restrain public feeling in this country." It will be observed that Sir Edward Grey did not say that the violation of Belgian neutrality would be considered at once by the British Government to be a *casus belli*, but he did suggest to the German Chancellor that if it was violated public feeling in England might give the Government cause to intervene. Prince Lichnowsky then asked "*whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we (that is, England) would engage to remain*

^{*} Documents (*l*).

² White Paper 123.

neutral." Sir Edward Grey replied that he could not say. "All I could say," he added, "was that our attitude would be determined largely by public feeling here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion. I do not think we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone."

Unable, therefore, to secure England's neutrality on condition that Germany should respect the neutrality of Belgium, Prince Lichnowsky then "pressed" Sir Edward Grey as to whether he could "formulate conditions in which we (England) would remain neutral." He even suggested that "the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed." But Sir Edward's reply was explicit. "I felt obliged," he said, "to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

The substance of this conversation also appears in the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor describing this interview.* It was published in the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for September 5th. It repeats exactly what Sir Edward Grey said about Belgian neutrality being a matter which affected public opinion in England, and describes how he refused to give a pledge that England would be neutral if Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium. There is added, however, a part of the conversation which did not appear in the White Paper 123. According to Prince Lichnowsky, he asked Sir Edward Grey if it were possible to secure that in a Russo-German war France and Germany should stand opposed to each other armed but not attacking each other. He said that Germany neither wished to ruin France nor to conquer her territory, and that it seemed to him possible to arrange this, since it would secure Great Britain's neutrality.

Sir Edward Grey, however, only said he would endeavour to obtain information, and seemed to see difficulties in the way of holding back the military authorities.

At 8.30 p.m. Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed^a back to the German Chancellor saying that "as no positive English

* Documents (m).

^a Ibid. (n).

proposals have been submitted, further steps in connection with the instructions given were superfluous." He thereupon cancelled his previous telegrams.

This interesting interview was the subject of a question to Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 27th by Mr. Keir Hardie,¹ who asked whether these proposals and suggestions of the German Ambassador were considered by the Cabinet, and why they were rejected.

Sir Edward Grey replied by saying, firstly, that they were "personal suggestions" made by the German Chancellor on August 1st, and were "without authority" to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed on July 29th to Sir Edward Goschen at Berlin by the German Chancellor. (See Germany, July 29th, and White Paper 85.) Sir Edward Grey drew a distinction between "personal suggestions" made by the German Ambassador and official "communications on behalf of his Government." The German Ambassador, he said, spoke on his "own personal initiative without authority." This, according to Sir Edward Grey, was enough to warrant his refusal to consider them as practicable. They were not to be taken seriously because they were personally suggested by the German Ambassador. The only basis upon which Sir Edward Grey would discuss the question of Belgian neutrality with Germany was on the basis laid down in No. 85 of the White Paper. He categorically refused the basis personally suggested in No. 123. No. 85, it will be remembered, described the German Chancellor's statement to Sir Edward Goschen on July 29th (see Germany, July 29th), that Germany would respect the integrity of France but not her Colonies, if England remained neutral. The question of Belgium here was left doubtful, indeed was scarcely mentioned, showing that it was not strong in the mind of either statesman at that time.

Sir Edward Grey then went on to explain, in answer to Mr. Keir Hardie's question, that the substance of Prince Lichnowsky's suggestion in No. 123 was considered at a

¹ Documents (p).

Cabinet meeting on the following day (Sunday, August 2nd). It is clear, however, that these personal suggestions were not accepted at this meeting, even if they were discussed, and the statement was simply made by Sir Edward Grey in answer to Mr. Keir Hardie that "respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of the conditions of English neutrality." Sir Edward Grey then went on to say that the German Ambassador requested him on the morning of August 3rd "not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of his conditions when he spoke in the House."

Now this was two days after the personal suggestions contained in No. 123, and it seems, therefore, that the German Ambassador, failing to induce Sir Edward Grey to formulate conditions of neutrality over Belgium, attempted to dissuade him from insisting upon this condition at all. Since he could only get an indefinite statement from Sir Edward Grey, viz. that respect for Belgian neutrality must be "one of" England's conditions, the German Ambassador then tried another tack. (See England, August 3rd, and statement issued by the German Embassy, Documents (*u*).) He tried, in fact, to get England to agree to remain neutral if Germany respected the north coast of France.

But it was now too late. The German military authorities had already laid their plans, and England had meanwhile been committed to the naval understanding with France. (See Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons, August 3rd.)

It is obvious that this naval understanding with France goes a long way to explain why Sir Edward Grey could not accept a German offer to respect the neutrality of Belgium without further guarantees. (White Paper 123.) The existence of the moral obligation arising out of this naval understanding with France also explains why England could not guarantee to Germany that she would keep France out of a Russo-German conflict (see above, telegram of King George to the Kaiser.)² In both cases England's hands were tied. She was compelled to follow

² Documents (*k*).

the policy of the Dual Alliance, and could not give any guarantees to Germany about her neutrality without the consent of France and Russia.

During August 1st also Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward Grey, in which he informed him that Austria would respect the integrity and sovereignty of Servia. This confirmed what took place in St. Petersburg and Vienna on this day, namely, the virtual settlement of the Austro-Servian quarrel which had been the real cause of all the trouble in Europe.

BELGIUM

In an interview between Sir F. Villiers and the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels to-day,^{*} the latter said that Belgium would uphold her neutrality, and felt herself in a position to do the same.

ITALY

The German Ambassador at Rome on August 1st asked the Italian Government² what the intentions of Italy were in the impending war between the Dual and Triple Alliances. The Italian Foreign Minister replied that the war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences that might result from it, had an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and Italy would therefore remain neutral. The *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance would not arise.

AUGUST 2

The sands of peace were now fast running out. The fatal errors of the previous days committed by the Chancelleries of Europe were now beginning to bear fruit.

^{*} White Paper 128.

² Ibid. 152.

AUSTRIA

By irony of fate, the countries over whom all the trouble had originally started, Austria and Russia, had by this time settled their grievances, and nothing more is recorded from Vienna till the declaration of war against Russia on August 5th, which was caused, not by any grievance against Russia, but because of her alliance with Germany.¹

GERMANY

In Berlin Herr Jagow saw Sir Edward Goschen,² and informed him that Russian troops had crossed the frontier, thus causing a state of war between Russia and Germany. The Secretary of State also stated that the British ships detained on the Saturday had now been released.

In the afternoon the Kaiser made a speech from the Palace at Berlin, declaring that Russia had attacked them, and praying for success.

RUSSIA

At St. Petersburg to-day the Tsar issued an Imperial Ukas giving his reasons for war, and declaring that Germany had attacked Russia.³

St. Petersburg was now in a frenzy of excitement to know if England would join in with Russia. The telegram of the *Times* correspondent on this day is interesting.⁴ "Truth," he says, "compels me to say that Russians, high and low, are waiting with the intensest anxiety to learn Great Britain's decision. The articles in the *Times* have done much to inspire hope, but if, contrary to reasonable expectation, the British Parliament insists on neutrality, there will be a terrible revulsion of feeling here."

If this is at all a correct reflection of what had taken place at St. Petersburg, it is clear that at an early stage of the crisis the Russian public had been given to understand that England's unconditional support in a Russo-German quarrel would sooner or later be forthcoming.

¹ Cd. 7596.

² White Paper 144 and 145.

³ Manifestoes (b).

⁴ Press Correspondence (xxv).

ENGLAND

A Cabinet Council was held early in the morning.

After the Council Sir Edward Grey saw M. Cambon, to whom he gave the following memorandum¹ :—

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

Sir Edward Grey then said that the Government could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily, if war broke out between France and Germany, but they felt it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast undefended.

M. Cambon then asked about the violation of Luxemburg, and Sir Edward Grey told him the doctrine laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon on that point in 1867.² According to debates in both Houses of Parliament that year, it was laid down by those two statesmen that the guarantee of the neutrality of Luxemburg was "limited in liability," and carried with it more a "moral sanction than a contingent liability to go to war. No party was called upon to undertake the duty of enforcing it."

M. Cambon then asked Sir Edward Grey³ what he would say about the violation of Belgian neutrality. He replied that "that was a much more important matter." He was "considering what statement he should make in Parliament to-morrow [August 3rd]—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*."

¹ White Paper 148.

² *Annual Register*, 1867.

³ White Paper 148.

It would seem from this that on Sunday, August 2nd, the Cabinet, though it had decided upon naval aid for France, had not made up its mind what it would do about Belgian neutrality.

Then, in a telegram to the German Chancellor, Prince Lichnowsky explained the mistake he made the previous day. (See Germany, August 1st, and Documents (*h*).) "Sir Edward Grey's proposals," he said, "to guarantee the neutrality of England and France, if Germany did not attack France, were made without consultation with France and no longer held good."

BELGIUM

Confirming his statement of the 31st, the German Minister in Brussels¹ told the Belgian Foreign Minister that "he had not been instructed as yet to make an official communication, but that Belgium knew his personal opinion upon the security Belgium was entitled to feel in regard to her eastern neighbour."

At 7 p.m. the German Minister presented an ultimatum² stating that Germany had received reliable information that French forces intended to march across Belgium to attack Germany by way of Givet and Namur; that Germany feared Belgium would not be able to resist it, and that Germany must forestall the enemy. She proposed to Belgium friendly neutrality while she marched her troops along the Meuse to the French frontier. At 12 p.m. a Cabinet Council was held to consider it.

LUXEMBURG

The German Minister at Luxemburg to-day handed to the Luxemburg Government a Note³ saying that their military measures were not hostile and that compensation would be made.

Early in the morning German troops entered Luxemburg

¹ Belgian Grey Book 19.

² Ibid. 20, and Documents (*s*).

³ White Paper 129.

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territory. The Luxemburg Government protested against the violation of their neutrality.¹

The French Minister then tells the Luxemburg Government that France will respect her neutrality.

AUGUST 3

GERMANY

To-day Germany issued an official declaration of war on France,² giving as reasons certain hostile acts said to have been committed by France, including amongst others the dropping of bombs by French aviators on the railway near Nuremburg, and also marching troops across Belgium to attack Germany.

FRANCE

M. Viviani, the Premier, made a long speech³ in the Chamber of Deputies to-day, stating France's case in the coming war. He declared that Germany had done nothing to restrain her ally, Austria, that she had worked for war from the beginning and had been guilty of various acts of aggression, such as flying aeroplanes into French territory and violating the frontier with troops.

RUSSIA

To-day the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg addressed a crowd of people from the British Embassy and assured them of England's sympathy.⁴

ENGLAND

In the morning Prince Lichnowsky saw Sir Edward Grey and begged him not to make Belgian neutrality the condition of England's neutrality.⁵

Baron Kuhlmann, of the German Embassy in London,

¹ White Paper 147.

² Manifestoes (c).

³ Parliamentary Speeches (a).

⁴ Press Correspondence (xxvi).

⁵ Documents (p), also England, August 1st.

then issued an official communiqué¹ that Germany would undertake not to attack the north coast of France, or use the Dutch or Belgian seaports as bases, if England would remain neutral for the time being.

Seeing that Germany could not secure England's neutrality on the basis of a German guarantee to respect Belgian neutrality (see England, August 1st), she thus tried on the 3rd to get her to stand out if she (Germany) would not attack the north coast of France.

Sir Edward Grey answered this in his historic speech in the House of Commons that afternoon.² He first traced the history of England's relations with France, showed how the Entente had grown from an agreement over Morocco and Egypt in 1904 to a diplomatic understanding in 1906, and from that to a naval understanding in 1912, which, though not made public, carried with it a "moral obligation to support France" to-day. Referring to the German offer to respect the north coast of France, he rejected this, saying that "this was too narrow an engagement for us." Towards the end of the speech only did he mention the question of Belgian neutrality, which he still described as "an important point to consider." The chief point of this speech was the explanation of the naval understanding with France, which by allowing her to concentrate in the Mediterranean had left her north coast undefended. This revelation, hitherto unknown to Parliament, explained many hitherto obscure points in British diplomacy, such as the reasons for supporting France unconditionally in a war with Germany and the impossibility for England to keep out of war in spite of a German guarantee to respect Belgian neutrality or not attack the French coast. The commitment to France was unconditional, and a war in which France was unconditionally involved along with Russia meant a war in which England must automatically become involved too.

From Belgian sources³ comes an interesting sidelight on

¹ Documents. (*u*).

² See Appendix to White Paper and also Historical Introduction, p. 13.

³ Belgian Grey Book 26.

what passed between Sir Edward Grey and the Belgian Minister in London on August 3rd. The former told the latter on this day that if Belgian neutrality were violated there would be war with Germany. This was the day on which Sir Edward Grey spoke in the House of Commons. He referred in his speech almost entirely to France and the naval understanding, and said practically nothing about Belgian neutrality. If he had seen the Belgian Minister before he spoke in the House he must have withheld the knowledge of our armed support for Belgium from the House. On the other hand, he may have seen him after his speech, in which case the decision about Belgium was arrived at between the speech in the House and the meeting with the Belgian Minister.

BELGIUM

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister in Brussels informed the Secretary-General of the Foreign Office at Brussels¹ that French airships had thrown bombs on German soil and patrols of French cavalry had crossed the frontier. This he put forward as an excuse for violating Belgian soil !

The Cabinet sat from 1 to 4 a.m.

At 7 a.m. the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to the German Minister the reply of his Government, saying that Belgium would offer a strenuous resistance to any Power which violated its neutrality and had no fear that France would fail to respect it. She "refused to believe that her independence can only be preserved at the cost of violating her neutrality."

The French Military Attaché at Brussels offered the Belgian Government, on behalf of his Government,² the assistance of five French army corps to Belgium. The Government expressed its thanks for the offer, but said they would decide on their course of action later.

¹ Belgian Grey Book 21.

² White Paper 151.

AUGUST 4

GERMANY

To-day the German Chancellor made an historic speech in the Reichstag,¹ explaining the causes of the war from the German standpoint. He passed lightly over the Austro-Servian dispute and the "free hand" which Germany gave to her ally Austria, and which proved one of the main causes of the European war. He dwelt upon the justifiable anger which was felt throughout Germany at (what he described as) the deceitful behaviour of Russia in mobilizing her army while negotiations were quietly proceeding between Vienna and St. Petersburg and a settlement was almost in sight.

He admitted that Austria had moved two out of her eight mobilized army corps on to the Austrian-Russian frontier, but denied a general Austrian mobilization. Such being the case, Russia, he said, had no right to mobilize, and had to be treated as an enemy. France also, he added, would not give Germany an assurance of her neutrality, and so Germany was surrounded by foes. With characteristic Prussian brutality and lack of imagination, he then went on to justify the attack on Belgium. After he admitted the illegality, he explained its necessity on strategic grounds, and said that in circumstances like those in which Germany was placed she had to "hack her way out" as best she could. Herr Haase, the leader of the Social Democrats, also spoke supporting the Government in repelling Russian barbarism, but declaring that the war was not a people's war.

In the afternoon Sir Edward Goschen saw Herr Jagow and formally requested him, according to his instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to respect Belgian neutrality and to withdraw his troops from Belgian soil.²

Herr Jagow, however, declined.

At 7 p.m. Sir Edward Goschen handed in the British ult-

¹ Parliamentary Speeches (b).

² White Paper 159 and Sir Edward Goschen's dispatch, Cd. 7445.

matum to Germany.¹ The German Chancellor then sent for Sir Edward Goschen, and in great excitement protested against England acting in this manner against Germany. Since the British Government had only on the previous day decided to make the violation of Belgium a *casus belli*, and since the plans of the German military authorities to go through Belgium had been known to the European Chancelleries for years past, his excitement may perhaps be pardoned. Instead of proceeding calmly, however, he then made the disgraceful reference to the Belgian Treaty as a "scrap of paper," and appealed to England to disregard it. England, however, who had up to the previous day been in doubt as to whether she would fulfil her obligations under the Belgian Treaty, had at last determined to do so, and Sir Edward Goschen gave a polite but firm refusal. The deadlock being reached, there was nothing for Sir Edward to do but to ask for his passports, which he did at 9.30 p.m.

Meanwhile the declaration of war had been issued by the London Foreign Office.

FRANCE

In Paris the President sent a message to-day to the Chamber² stating the causes of the war, and accusing Germany of aggression on France.

The French Government then notified the Powers of a state of war between France and Germany.

ENGLAND

The King of the Belgians made an appeal to-day to King George, asking him for diplomatic help.³

Prince Lichnowsky then made a final statement to Sir Edward Grey,⁴ that Germany would respect Belgian territorial integrity and would annex no part of her territory. The sincerity of Germany could, he said, be seen, because she had engaged not to touch Holland, and Belgian terri-

¹ Cd. 7445.

³ White Paper 153.

² Manifestoes (a).

⁴ Ibid. 157.

tory without Dutch would be useless to Germany. It was necessary, however, to march troops across Belgium, since reliable information had come to hand that France intended to march her troops across Belgian territory. France, however, had promised to support Belgian neutrality, as is seen elsewhere.¹

Sir Edward Grey also informed the Ministers of Norway, Holland, and Belgium that England expects that the three countries will resist German pressure and guard their neutrality.² He also offered them alliance and support of the Triple Entente if they would do this.

At midnight, in default of a satisfactory reply having been given to the British ultimatum by Germany about Belgian neutrality, a formal declaration of war against Germany was issued.

BELGIUM

At 6 o'clock on the morning of August 4th the German Minister in Brussels handed a second ultimatum³ to the Belgian Government threatening, in default of a reply, to force the passage of German troops through Belgium.

Meanwhile the British Minister conveyed to the Belgian Government⁴ the expectation of his Government that Belgium would uphold her neutrality and integrity, and offered armed assistance for this purpose.

Later in the day German troops entered Belgian territory and summoned Liège to surrender, but were repulsed.⁵

The King of the Belgians then made a speech⁶ before the Chamber, in which he said that Belgium must resist the German invasion with all her power.

AUGUST 5

AUSTRIA

On this day Austria formally declared war on Russia on account of the hostilities existing between her and Germany.

¹ White Paper 125.

³ White Paper 154

⁵ Ibid. 158.

² Belgian Grey Book 36.

⁴ Ibid. 155.

⁶ Parliamentary Speeches (I).



SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EVENTS

JULY 23RD.

Austria hands her Note to *Servia*.

JULY 24TH.

Russia proposes extension of time limit to *Servia* and decides on a partial mobilization. She also tries to obtain the unconditional support of *England*.

England proposes that the four Powers not directly interested in the dispute should work together for moderation in *Vienna* and *St. Petersburg*.

JULY 25TH.

Germany passes on to *Austria* the proposal for the extension of the time limit and agrees to Four Power mediation between *Vienna* and *St. Petersburg* in case of an *Austro-Russian* but not an *Austro-Servian* dispute.

Russia accepts Four Power mediation if direct conversations with *Vienna* should fail. Tsar signs orders for partial mobilization of fourteen army corps.

England.—Sir E. Grey says that *England* is not interested in *Austro-Servian* dispute, but if it is enlarged she would become interested.

JULY 26TH.

Germany.—Herr Jagow states he has passed on *Germany's* hope that *Austria* will take a favourable view of the *Servian* reply.

Russia.—M. Sazonof has a conference with the *Austrian* Ambassador which he describes as satisfactory.

England.—Sir Edward Grey proposes Four Power Ambassadorial Conference in *London*.

JULY 27TH.

Germany.—Herr Jagow refuses Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, and says he prefers direct negotiations between *Austria* and *Russia*, aided by Four Power mediation. Press correspondents in *Berlin* testify to German desire for peace and moderation.

France and Italy accept Four Power Ambassadorial Conference.

Russia.—M. Sazonof accepts Four Power Ambassadorial Conference if direct negotiations with *Austria* fail.

JULY 28TH.

Austria.—Refuses Four Power Ambassadorial Conference; breaks off discussion with *Russia*; says that the *Servian* reply as a basis of negotiation has come too late, and declares war on *Servia*. She also mobilizes eight army corps.

Russia.—Partial mobilization begins.

England.—Sir Edward Grey asks Germany to suggest along what lines Four Power mediation between Austria and Russia should proceed.

JULY 29TH.

Austria.—Still refuses direct communications between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Germany.—Chancellor says he has asked Austria to say openly that she has no territorial designs on Serbia, and is only seeking guarantees. He makes an attempt to secure the neutrality of England in case of a European war. Military party in Berlin begins to get alarmed at Russian mobilization; German Ambassador in St. Petersburg says that Germany will guarantee Serbia's integrity.

Russia.—M. Sazonof expresses willingness to return to England's Four Power Ambassadorial Conference, if it were acceptable to Serbia. Partial mobilization order issued.

England.—Sir Edward Grey tells M. Cambon that England has not made up her mind to support France, but he warns the German Ambassador that if France is involved England will be drawn in.

JULY 30TH.

Austria.—Count Berchtold expresses willingness to begin conversations again with Russia, but not on the basis of the Servian reply.

Germany.—Herr Jagow says that he has proposed to Austria that she should occupy Belgrade, or some other point, and issue her conditions from there. Germany even threatens to break the Alliance if Austria will not listen to reason and discuss with Russia; she asks Russia for an explanation of her mobilization.

Russia.—M. Sazonof, at bidding of German Ambassador, makes a proposal that if Austria will respect the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia will stop military preparations; this is forwarded to Vienna *via* Berlin. M. Sazonof also takes up conversations with the Austrian Ambassador. A general mobilization of the whole army and navy is ordered late in the evening.

France.—M. Cambon reminds England of her naval understanding.

England.—Sir Edward Grey refuses to give France a definite assurance of support. He refuses the German Chancellor's proposal that England should remain neutral if French territory in Europe were guaranteed.

JULY 31ST.

Austria continues discussions with Russia, and Count Berchtold says that Austria did not want infringement of Servian sovereign rights.

Russia issues general mobilization orders. Tsar informs Kaiser that he will take no provocative action so long as negotiations continue. M. Sazonof modifies his offer to Austria of the previous day to read that "if Austria will stop her advance in Serbia and accept mediation of the Powers, Russia will maintain an expectant attitude."

Germany refuses to continue negotiating or put pressure on Vienna so long as Russia mobilizes ; asks for reasons for Russia's mobilization, and on receiving no satisfactory answer, sends an ultimatum late at night to Russia and France. Will not give a definite answer about respecting the neutrality of Belgium.

England.—Sir E. Grey makes another proposal and undertakes to sound Russia if Four Powers might guarantee to Austria full satisfaction of demands on Servia.

France agrees to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

AUGUST 1ST.

Austria orders a general mobilization, but continues to discuss with Russia. She reaches a settlement to-day and gives way on the only outstanding point.

Germany orders general mobilization in the morning, and declares war on Russia late at night.

France orders general mobilization.

England refuses to secure France's neutrality in a Russo-German war ; refuses to remain neutral on condition that Germany respects Belgian neutrality, and refuses to make any suggestion to Germany about British neutrality.

Belgium declares she will uphold her neutrality.

Italy decides to remain neutral.

AUGUST 2ND.

Russia in state of war with Germany.

England.—British Cabinet agrees that subject to sanction of Parliament British naval aid shall be given to France in the event of a German attack.

Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium proposing friendly neutrality and passage for her troops.

Luxemburg territory violated by German troops.

AUGUST 3RD.

Germany declares war on France ; offers England not to attack the north coast of France, or use Dutch and Belgian ports as bases.

England refuses the German offer to stand out under these conditions, and holds herself bound to France under all circumstances.

Belgium refuses to entertain Germany's offer.

AUGUST 4TH.

Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium threatening force ; offers England not to annex any Belgian territory.

England sends an ultimatum to Germany demanding respect for Belgian neutrality, and in default of reply declares war at midnight.

AUGUST 5TH.

Austria declares war on Russia.

ADDENDA TO DIARY OF NEGOTIATIONS

AUGUST 9TH.

Belgium.—On this day Germany made another offer to Belgium. She approached the United States, asking for her good offices to open up negotiations again. The United States refused, and then Germany approached Holland, who agreed. Baron Fallon thereupon saw the Belgian Foreign Minister in Brussels, and said that he had been commissioned to say on behalf of Germany that she did not want to make Belgium an enemy, and that she was only compelled by necessity to make a counter-stroke to the French military plan, and to take Liège; she prayed Belgium to avoid further horrors of war, and said that she would respect Belgian territory and independence after the war.

AUGUST 12TH.

Belgium.—The Belgian Government then answered the German Government's proposal of the 9th, that Belgium would remain true to her international obligation, and that she could only repeat her answer to the German ultimatum of August 2nd.

JULY 31ST.

France.—The Austrian attitude on the 31st, as reflected through its representative in Paris, is described in an interesting article in *Le Figaro* for October 5, 1914. He refers first to the willingness of his Government, expressed by the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg on the 31st to M. Sazonof, that Austria should "submit to mediation those points in the Austrian Note which were incompatible with Servian independence." M. Hanotaux comments on this by pointing out that the Austrian official *Fremdenblatt* had said that there was no truth in this statement about the Austrian attitude.

He then proceeds to relate how on July 31st he met the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, who told him that "if Russia advises Servia to ask Austria what are her conditions, Austria will answer frankly and will suspend her mobilization, provided that Russia does the same." "Austria," he said, "had no intention of acquiring Servian territory or of threatening her sovereignty."

He then made an interesting statement, namely, that "this would not last, and that Germany, herself compelled to take precautions, would drag Austria along with her, if she did not act at once, in order to make St. Petersburg recognize the Austrian propositions, and also make Servia take the steps which would therefore open up a second phase of the negotiations." Commenting upon this M. Hanotaux said it was clear that Austria feared being dragged along by Germany, and for that reason the Austrian Ambassador in Paris made the same *démarche* on this day (31st) as Count Szapary made in St. Petersburg on the same day.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND MOBILIZATIONS

IN sifting the evidence concerning the military measures taken by the different countries during the various stages of the crisis, it is first necessary to recognize the distinctions between "military preparations" and "mobilization." The former may be taken by any Government as soon as it has reason to think that the diplomatic situation is strained, and may consist of the movements of troops on a peace footing to places on the frontier, the strengthening of garrisons and forts, commandeering of railways and telegraphs—in fact, anything short of calling up reservists. As soon as the army is brought from a peace to a war footing by the calling up of reservists, mobilization takes place. Mobilization is generally preceded by martial law, which enables the Government to facilitate the transition from a peace to a war footing. Mobilization may be partial or general. In the former case it affects certain concentration areas only, in the latter case it affects them all.

It is now proposed to take each of the four countries—Russia, France, Germany, and Austria—and trace, as far as is known, the history of the military and naval preparations and mobilizations of each in the ten days preceding the outbreak of war.

The information which throws light upon the military measures is derived to some extent from the British and German White Books, but chiefly from the Press correspondents in Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg. While isolated statements of facts from Press sources must be received with caution, agreement on the part of a number of correspondents on specific points can generally be

accepted as evidence. But in regard to information about military measures, in any given country, it is best to look for such evidence from correspondents in the country itself rather than to trust correspondents in other capitals, who probably set forth evidence based only on rumour and often distorted, especially if that country's relations with the first country happen to be strained. Thus, in looking for evidence about the progress of Russian military preparations and mobilization on the German and Austrian frontiers during the earlier stages of the European crisis, I have relied on news from St. Petersburg rather than on that from Berlin and Vienna.

RUSSIA

JULY 24 AND 25

The earliest reference to Russian military activity comes from the *Morning Post* correspondent in St. Petersburg, who wired on July 28th to London as follows: "As a matter of fact Russia took steps for mobilization the moment the Council of Ministers decided last Friday (July 24th) that the sovereign status of Servia must be protected at all costs." It appears that on the day following the presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia, a Council of Ministers was held, and it seems to have been decided at this meeting to take military measures. They were not, however, put into operation till a further meeting had been held on the following day. This took place at Krasnoe Selo under the presidency of the Tsar on Saturday, July 25th. In referring to this meeting the *Times* correspondent at St. Petersburg telegraphed on July 27th that at the close of the meeting the Tsar, speaking of the Austrian Note to Servia, is said to have exclaimed, "We have stood this sort of thing for seven and a half years. This is enough!" "Thereupon," the correspondent continues, "His Majesty authorized the issue of orders for a partial mobilization confined to the fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. At the same time an intimation was given to Germany that orders for the mobilization of the remainder of the Russian

army would follow immediately upon mobilization in Germany."

Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, telegraphing on the 25th, gave similar information about the outcome of the Council meeting on Saturday the 25th, although he reported that orders had been issued for the mobilization of five (not fourteen) army corps. "Mobilization," he added, "is to be proceeded with at once."

According to the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent at St. Petersburg, the Cabinet was divided into a war and peace party, the Ministers of War and Interior being for the former, and the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture for the latter.

From German sources we hear, through a telegram of the German Ambassador¹ at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 25th, that Russian manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo had been broken off, and the troops had returned to their garrisons. Military pupils were raised that day to the rank of officers, and the telegram concludes that the impression prevails that complete preparations were being made for mobilization against Austria.

From French sources we hear that the *Temps* correspondent in St. Petersburg stated on the 26th that on the 25th, "after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, it was decided that mobilization orders should be issued immediately for the army corps at Odessa and Kief. The energetic intervention," he added, "of the War Minister, General Sukhumlinof, created a great impression."

Evidence about the commencement of partial mobilization in Russia is still further confirmed by the telegrams of the Tsar to the Kaiser on July 30th,² when the former replies to the latter's request to demobilize his forces by saying that the "military measures now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago." This would mean that they began on the 25th, and so confirms the previous evidence.

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 5.

² Ibid., Exhibit 23A.

JULY 26

On the following day, Sunday the 26th, there were indications only of precautionary measures which immediately precede mobilization, but no direct evidence that the mobilization orders were posted.

Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, on 25th, telegraphed that "a decree had been promulgated forbidding the publication of detailed information concerning the army and navy," and described St. Petersburg and Moscow as being placed under extraordinary protection," which is a modified form of martial law.

The *Standard* correspondent in St. Petersburg wired also on the same day that there was reason to believe that important steps in the way of mobilization had been taken.

The *Morning Post* correspondent in St. Petersburg also stated that military steps were being taken on the 26th. He recorded the fact that mobilization warnings had already been sent to the frontier military districts, and that the Chief of the General Staff had returned from a tour of inspection.

Another source of information for the 26th came from two telegrams in the German White Book. In one telegram ¹ the German Military Attaché informed the German General Staff that he considered it certain that mobilization had been ordered in Kief and Odessa, that it is doubtful in Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere.

In another telegram ² the German Chancellor informed the German Ambassador in London that the call for several classes of reservists is immediately expected in Russia, and that this is equivalent to mobilization.

These two telegrams, taken in conjunction with the reports of the Press correspondents in St. Petersburg, seem to indicate that all preparations for mobilization were being made on this Sunday. Partial mobilization orders may have been issued to certain southern districts during that day, but the only direct information from this source is German, and this must be discounted.

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 7.

² Ibid., Exhibit 10.

JULY 27

On this day the *Daily News* correspondent in St. Petersburg threw some light on Russian military preparations by his remark that the "crisis will become acute later in the week, when the mobilization of the Kief, Warsaw, and Vilna military contingents will be in full swing." This remark suggests that the mobilization was already in its initial stages, and would be in full progress in a few days. It also suggests that the calling up of reservists would not be confined to the military districts on the Austrian frontier only, but would include that of Vilna and Warsaw, which lie directly on the German frontier. The correspondent added, that mobilization means that the Russian field force is thereby raised to double its summer strength.

From the German sources¹ we have confirmation that Russian military preparations were not only confined to the Austrian frontier. The German Consul at Kovno, according to the German White Paper, conveyed to the Imperial Chancellor that martial law (*Kriegszustand*) had been declared in Kovno, a Russian town close to the German frontier. This does not necessarily mean mobilization, but it generally precedes it. This announcement is significant when read in conjunction with the *Daily News* St. Petersburg remarks about the possibility of mobilization in the Warsaw and Vilna areas. The *Denkschrift*² also recorded the departure of the Warsaw and the strengthening of the Alexandrovno garrisons.

On the other hand, a telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the German Chancellor described an interview on the 27th between the German Military Attaché and the Russian War Minister, in which the latter gave his word of honour that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He admitted that general preparations were being made, but denied that reserves were being called up. He added that if Austria crossed the Servian frontier the military districts directed against Austria, viz. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, were to be

¹ *Denkschrift*, p. 120.² *Ibid.*

mobilized, but under no circumstances those on the German frontier, viz. Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg.

JULY 28

On this day some further information from Press correspondents is forthcoming.

The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in St. Petersburg recorded that the Baltic fleet received orders to-day to "prepare to mobilize," and added that midshipmen had been promoted. The correspondent of the same journal in Paris makes a passing reference to the fact that Russia is "undoubtedly mobilizing." The *Daily Chronicle* correspondent at St. Petersburg said: "Already a rapid mobilization is proceeding in the west and south-west, virtually from the German frontier to the Black Sea." The vague statement may or may not refer to military areas of Warsaw and Vilna on the German: it certainly refers to those on the Austrian frontier.

Reuter's correspondent in St. Petersburg, telegraphing on the 29th, confirmed the above remarks and definitely stated that a partial mobilization was ordered on Tuesday night. "It is confined to the military districts of Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, and affects the Austrian and not the German frontier. Kazan," he added, "is the central district from which reserves are drawn for the western borders."

As a matter of fact the Kazan district provides recruits for both the Austrian and the German frontiers, being situated equi-distant from both. It is unlikely that reserves for the military areas on the Austrian frontier only were affected. The order calling up reservists in the Kazan area would certainly refer to the reservists drawn to the German as well as to the Austrian frontier.

In connection with the announcement of partial mobilization in these four areas, it is interesting to note that according to the British White Paper * M. Sazonof informs the Russian Ambassador at Berlin that the mobilization

* White Paper 70.

announcement was going to be made on the 29th. In the Russian Orange Book, however,¹ the official communiqué of the Foreign Minister declares that Russia began her mobilization of four military districts five days after the handing in of the Austrian Note, which means that it began some time on the 28th. In view of all the evidence from the Press of partial mobilization stated above, and of the evidence in the Russian Orange Book, it appears that the mobilization orders were issued to the different districts affected on the 28th, but, according to the White Paper, not officially announced till the following day, the 29th.

JULY 29

Further definite information about the progress of partial mobilization is forthcoming on this day.

The *Daily Chronicle* correspondent at St. Petersburg announced that "mobilization is even now being actively pushed forward." He added that an official announcement was issued foreshadowing a general mobilization of all the military forces in the Empire, as a reply to Austria's action.

The *Times* correspondent in Paris on the 29th gave details of twelve Russian army corps which were being mobilized, and estimated that the peace strength was thereby raised from 400,000 to 700,000.

Reuter to-day also recorded that "a partial mobilization has already been ordered," and went on to suggest that it might become wider in its scope, for, he said, "there is every indication that the whole of the vast military machinery will be soon set in motion." He concluded by a remark which indicated how Russian public opinion had been led to expect England's support for a Russian forward policy. "Confident of England's support," he said, "about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war." There can be little doubt from statements such as these, that the hints, whether open or secret, from England had much to do with the warlike tone of St. Petersburg during these days,

¹ Orange Book 77.

and with the readiness on the part of the Russian authorities to proceed to a display of military strength.¹

From France comes an interesting statement on this same day, July 29th, to the effect that active military preparations were not confined to the Austrian frontier only. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Temps* telegraphed that "mobilization is proceeding in Kief, Odessa, Vilna, Warsaw, and St. Petersburg." The last three military areas are against the German frontier. They are not mentioned in the references to the mobilization areas in the Press on the 28th, nor do they appear in the official announcement of partial mobilization (see White Paper 70), where the Kief, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan areas only are mentioned. In these three districts against the German frontier, according to this account, reservists were being called up, but no public announcement was made of the fact, in order apparently not to compromise relations with Germany. This news, if it came from Germany, would have to be heavily discounted, but as it comes from France it demands attention. The *Temps* correspondent mentions also in this same telegram, as an indication that mobilization was proceeding in these districts, the fact that "troop trains are passing Warsaw every quarter of an hour." If they were "passing Warsaw" they could only have been going to the German frontier.

The uneasiness meanwhile felt by Germany is indicated clearly in the German Denkschrift,² when on page 122 it describes the interview between the German Military Attaché in St. Petersburg and the Chief of the Russian General Staff. The latter gave the former his word of honour that no mobilization had taken place at all up to 3 o'clock that afternoon. This statement can not have been strictly true, because the orders for partial mobilization were issued on the night of the 28th, and the reservists were already on their way. The German Military Attaché added at the interview that he had received news of the calling up of reserves in different parts of the country,

¹ Also see Press Correspondence (xxiii) and (xxiv).

² Denkschrift, p. 122.

including Warsaw and Vilna, thus tending to confirm the *Temps* and other correspondents' telegrams of this day. In regard to naval preparations on the 29th, it may be noted that various lights on the Baltic and Black Sea coasts were extinguished, and certain harbours were put under special regulations.

JULY 30

The Russian papers on this day, according to the *Morning Post* correspondent at St. Petersburg, contained the mobilization orders of four out of the twelve military districts of the Empire. He added that these four areas were the most densely populated of all Russia, and produce in mobilization about half the fighting strength of the Empire.

Again we find statements, as on previous days, that this partial mobilization was in reality much larger in its scope than the official world would publicly admit. The *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in St. Petersburg, Mr. Harold Williams, telegraphs on the 30th that "the order for partial mobilization is intended as a reply to the Austrian declaration of war. As a matter of fact," he continued, "it is absolute and general. Reservists in the northern districts are also being called up." Now reservists from the northern provinces do not all serve on the Austrian frontier. If they were all being called up to the colours, it follows that many of them must have been ordered to the districts on the German frontier as well. There is thus reason to suppose that the mobilization by this time had extended beyond the limits of the officially announced four southern and south-western districts.

Indeed, the Government appears to have decided about this time to openly declare a general mobilization of all the fleet and army, and thus admit in print what apparently had already been going on in fact before it was actually announced.

"There are rumours that a general mobilization will be ordered to-night," said the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in Warsaw on the 30th. This is confirmed by the telegram of the *Times* correspondent in St. Petersburg on the 31st, in

which he states that "the Government decided upon a general mobilization late last night" (July 30th).

JULY 31

The telegrams to all the military districts which had not already been affected by the partial mobilization were apparently sent out late on the night of the 30th, and the orders were posted early on the morning of the 31st. (See White Paper 113 and German Denkschrift.) The remoter parts of the Empire received the order to mobilize in the early hours of the morning of the 31st. This is proved by Mr. Stephen Graham's letter in the *Times* of September 11th, in which he describes how he was in a Cossack village on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia at the outbreak of war, and how the first telegram to mobilize came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st. From this time forward the fullest military measures came into operation throughout the whole Empire.

Stated concisely, the decision of Russia to mobilize partially was taken on the 24th, directly after the Austrian Note to Servia. This was confirmed on the 25th, and during the week-end all military preparations except the calling up of reservists were made, and partial mobilization orders signed but not issued. In spite of rumours there is no direct evidence that reservists were on the move on Monday the 27th. On the 28th several correspondents agree that mobilization was in progress, but that it was partial, and one definite statement comes from Reuter that a partial mobilization order was issued on the night of the 28th. On the 29th it was officially announced, and all through this day proceeded steadily. Rumours grew that the districts on the German frontier were being affected, but we have only one definite statement to this effect from the *Temps* on the 29th, and two other less definite ones. On the 30th, late, a general mobilization order was issued, thus bringing officially the whole military machinery of the Empire into action. It may, therefore, be said that Russia began to put her army from a peace to a war footing early

in the week that preceded the outbreak of the general European war, gradually extending the operations till by the 31st the whole machinery was in progress.

FRANCE

Turning to France, we will trace the course of the military preparations which preceded the general mobilization there. Here again it is desirable to eliminate, or at any rate to largely discount, news from Berlin, where a mere rumour about the movement of a patrol is liable to be exaggerated into a statement comprising the mobilization of an army corps. News from France itself, however, may be taken as fairly reliable.

On July 25th we hear from the *Temps*, in its issue of the 26th, that the "garrisons of Toul, Nancy, Neufchâtel, and Troy on the Franco-German frontier were mobilized and the soldiers sent to the forts." There is no reason to suppose that any mobilization order was issued, or that this measure was anything more than a concentration at certain points of frontier troops which had hitherto been scattered. The same journal reports similar measures being taken at Metz on the German side of the frontier. These were ordinary measures of precaution which would be taken by any country when the diplomatic situation becomes delicate.

On the following day, the 26th, the *Times* correspondent in Paris reports that after the informal Cabinet Council held that day there was much activity at the War Ministry: precautionary measures were decided on, officers on leave were recalled, and the postal officials were at their posts all day.

The *Daily Chronicle* correspondent at Paris also records on the same day that the French are taking necessary measures; that the War Minister has given urgent instructions that every one concerned with the army is to be at his post, and officers on leave have been recalled.

On the 27th we learn in the German Denkschrift,¹ from

¹ Denkschrift, Exhibit 9.

the German Ambassador at Berne in a telegram to the Chancellor, that the manœuvres of the 14th French Army Corps were broken off.

Throughout the 28th there is no more news, except that of general preparations for placing the army on a war footing at some future and undetermined date.

According to the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in Paris, no mobilization orders had been issued, though there had been movements of troops on the frontier. Corroboration is also given that manœuvres were also broken off.

The *Daily News* correspondent in Paris also learns on the best authority that a partial mobilization order calling up classes of troops liberated in the previous November had been prepared, and was waiting the signature of the President, who arrived in Paris on that day (28th).

On the 29th the *Times* correspondent sends a telegram throwing some light on the military situation. "All preparations," he said, "are being made on the east and north-east frontiers." Six army corps, he added, were being brought up to full peace strength of 200,000 men, and this means that, since these corps draw their recruits locally, they will be brought up to 280,000 on the first day of mobilization.

This means that the fullest peace strength was being maintained, in order at the quickest possible moment to transfer the army to a war footing.

The White Paper also shows in a telegram* from Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, that the French Ambassador in Berlin had information from his Government that the military precautions were the same as in Germany, and were chiefly concerned with the recall of officers on leave.

On the 30th the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in Paris records the issue of a Government communiqué or Note describing as false the rumours that a single recruit had been summoned to the colours, or that concentration had begun at any point. The first part of this statement is indisputable, but the second hardly corresponds with the

* White Paper 76.

universal news quoted above that the frontier fortresses had been strengthened.

On the 31st the *Times* correspondent in Paris reports that at a Cabinet Council that day it was decided to bring French covering troops up from a peace to a war footing, by the incorporation of 40,000 old recruits from the locality. This means that a partial mobilization had begun. No doubt the partial mobilization order, which the *Daily News* correspondent reported on the 28th was awaiting the President's signature, was issued about this time, and applied chiefly to the Franco-German frontier districts, thus enabling the frontier garrisons to be placed on a war footing. The *Times* correspondent also records that railway bridges were being guarded, and that the troops mobilized were kept a distance of ten kilometres from the frontier.

France definitely started the mobilization of her whole army and navy at 3.40 on August 1st,¹ after the issue of the German ultimatum. This appears in Sir Francis Bertie's telegram to Sir Edward Grey in White Paper 136. This, it may be noted, is just exactly the same time as the issue of the order of German general mobilization.² It may therefore be said that while both countries were taking precautionary measures, strengthening garrisons and frontier troops all through the week, the final movement of the army from a peace to a war footing did not take place till the afternoon of August 1st, and was simultaneous in both countries. Each of course accused the other of acts of aggression. The French say the Germans violated the ten kilometres limit on the Franco-German frontier (see White Paper 134), while the German say that French aeroplanes dropped bombs on Nuremberg on August 3rd, and were preparing to invade Belgium. (See M. Viviani's speech in French Chamber.³) But these accusations must be discounted on both sides as coming from sources not likely to be impartial, especially at a time of so much tension.

¹ White Paper 136.

² Ibid. 142.

³ Parliamentary Speeches (a).

GERMANY

News about German military preparations during the early stages of the negotiations, except for that which comes from Paris through the *Temps*, is scanty. On the assumption that news of the movement of troops coming from a potentially hostile country is liable to be tainted or exaggerated (a principle which should apply all round), news from this quarter should be received with caution, unless strongly supported by independent evidence.

On the 25th there came some news from Paris to the effect that military activity had commenced in the German frontier fortresses. The *Times* reports that "leave was stopped in the garrisons at Saarbùrg and Strassburg," and that the "garrisons at Metz were mobilized and sent to the forts." These movements correspond to the report of similar measures which appeared in the same journal about French military preparations in their frontier fortresses. (See Mobilization, France, July 25th.) It appears, in fact, that these measures took place simultaneously on both sides of the frontier.

On the 26th again comes news from Paris about preparations for mobilization. Railways received orders to distribute their rolling stock; manœuvres were broken off and men on leave were recalled.

On the 27th the *Daily News* correspondent in Berlin contradicts the news that any officers at all had been recalled, although, he said, extension of leave had been refused. On the same day the *Temps* reported from Paris that local mobilization had begun. By this, presumably, it was meant that local reservists in the frontier garrisons had been called up in the same way as took place on the French side of the frontier on the 29th (see *Times*, 29th). No confirmation of this, however, comes from German sources, or from the foreign correspondents resident in Berlin. Since it comes from a Paris source alone it can hardly be accepted as complete evidence.

On the 28th the *Temps* reports that the German covering troops on the frontier were brought up to their full effective

by the calling up of individual reservists. Horses and motor-cars, moreover, were said to have been commandeered. Here, again, there is no corroboration from an independent source.

The only evidence of this news is from Reuter in Berlin, who reported the official announcement that the German fleet was returning to home waters on this day, and concentrating at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.

The *Daily News* correspondent in Berlin reported news of dislocation of traffic on the eastern frontier, but said that otherwise there was no "outward appearance of unusual activity."

There was no news on the 29th, but on the 30th the *Temps* itself denied through its correspondents in Berlin that there had been any mobilization of the German army. "Precautionary measures only," it adds, "such as the guarding of railway bridges, have been taken."

This is confirmed by the Berlin correspondent of the *Morning Post*, who telegraphed on this day that the measures adopted up to now were solely for defensive purposes, and that the troops on the eastern and western frontiers were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to protect railways in case of need.

The *Times* Paris correspondent also reported that the German Government had informed the French Government that there had been no mobilization in Germany.

There was a report from Russia² about this time, however, which conflicts with the above statements. In the Russian Orange Book, a telegram from the Russian Embassy in Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg declared that a general mobilization of the German army and navy had been issued on this day. The statement, however, was withdrawn in the next telegram, No. 62, and the Russian Ambassador in Berlin explained that there had been a false rumour published by a Berlin newspaper which had been officially denied, and the newspaper was confiscated.

On the 31st the *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in Paris

² Orange Book 61.

reported activities of the German military authorities on the frontier, and described the seizure of a locomotive, the cutting of telephonic communications, the barring of all the public ways, and the seizure of motor-cars. From three sources also come vague statements about German mobilization.

The *Times* correspondent in Paris stated that Germany had been carrying on a secret mobilization, and that tens of thousands of reservists had been brought up by individual appeal. Several army corps had been brought up to the frontier and put into position. This call on reservists cannot have been universal, for no evidence is given of any mobilization orders. The statement apparently refers to the incorporation of local reservists in the frontier garrisons which went on on both sides of the frontier from the 29th onwards.

From Russian sources also we hear vague statements about German mobilization.¹ In the Orange Book there is a telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Berlin to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggesting that Germany was making secret mobilization under cover of martial law. "Kriegzustand" was not, however, proclaimed in Germany until the 31st.

In regard to these German preparations, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs sent to M. Cambon a statement² that the German army, on Friday the 31st, had twice crossed the frontier and penetrated into French territory. He also says that reservists have been called up by tens of thousands. This document is dated the 31st, but in the English White Paper it appears as an enclosure under No. 105. It is represented as having been handed by the French Ambassador in London to Sir Edward Grey on the 30th. Thus Sir Edward Grey telegraphs to Sir Francis Bertie in No. 105, on July 30th, and says, amongst other things, "He [M. Cambon] gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced on the frontier than anything France had done." But as this paper, which was a copy

¹ Orange Book 68.

² White Paper 105 (iii.)

of the telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, is dated on the 31st, it is hard to say how it could have been handed to Sir Edward Grey by M. Cambon on the 30th.

It may, however, be noted that in the recently published penny edition of the White Paper, the date of this enclosure No. 3 has been omitted, thus making it appear that the document handed to Sir Edward Grey by M. Cambon was written on the 29th or 30th. The first edition of the White Paper prints the date on this document as "Vendredi, Juli 31." This is an important point which ought to be cleared up, since it makes a difference of at least forty-eight hours in the record of the German mobilization. It is difficult to prove from these documents as they stand at present that before the 31st the military measures on the German side of the frontier were any more advanced than those on the French side of the frontier. Indeed, the declaration of martial law is announced in Sir Edward Goschen's telegram to Sir Edward Grey only on the 31st. (White Paper 112.)

This is confirmed by the *Times* Berlin correspondent, who describes the declaration as being issued at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. It is hardly likely, therefore, that mobilization over a large area had been carried on in Germany for some days previous to the 31st under cover of martial law, if that martial law had not been declared till 2 p.m. on that afternoon.

On August 1st the mobilization order was issued for the whole of the German army and navy.

This is confirmed by Sir Edward Goschen's telegram to Sir Edward Grey on this day,¹ and it also added that the first day of mobilization was to be August 2nd. The time of the issue of the order coincides exactly with the time at which the general mobilization orders were issued for the French army. (See White Paper 136.)

Curious independent information concerning German mobilization is obtained from the *Westminster Gazette's* Berlin correspondent, who wrote in that journal for

¹ White Paper 142.

August 10th an account of an English traveller's experience (Mr. Littledale), when travelling in East Prussia at the outbreak of war. At a place called Konitz, he describes how "the red mobilization order did not appear till Saturday, August 1st." "This point," adds the correspondent, "is important, as proving that near the Russian frontier Germany mobilized only at the same time as round Berlin."

In conclusion, therefore, the evidence shows that exactly similar measures of military precaution were taken on the frontier by Germany throughout this week as were taken by France. These measures took the form of the mobilization of the frontier garrisons and the strengthening of the covering troops along the frontier. But the raising of the army from a peace to a war footing did not begin till August 1st, at exactly the same time as that of the French army, and about thirty-six hours after that of the Russian army.

AUSTRIA

News about Austrian mobilization and military preparations is scanty, but there are several important points about which a certain amount of information has come to hand. It appears that Austria, like Russia, first ordered a partial mobilization of her army, which it applied to certain military districts, and then enlarged the area at a later date till the mobilization became general.

The first information comes in the Russian Orange Book,^{*} from the Russian Consul in Prague, who reports that mobilization was ordered on the 26th. While there is no direct confirmation of this, still we find that the *Temps* reports on July 28th, through the Havas Agency, and the *Times* Berlin correspondent also notes on the same day, that eight Austrian army corps were being mobilized on this day. These army corps were centred at Prague, Leitvenitz, De Gratz, Budapest, Temesvar, Agram, Serajevo, and Ragusa. According to three sources, therefore, it appears that at some time between the 26th and 28th

^{*} Orange Book 24.

mobilization of the Austrian army began. But it is also clear that it was only a partial mobilization, for in the official communiqué¹ issued by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg it is stated that Russia ordered her partial mobilization on the 28th as a reply to the mobilization of *half* the Austrian army. It is clear, therefore, according to this statement that Austrian mobilization was only partial on the 28th.

From Russian sources,² however, we learn that on the 28th a general mobilization of the whole of the Austrian army was *signed*. It does not say that the orders were issued or that mobilization began on that day, and therefore it appears that since Austria was at that time only fighting Serbia, her mobilization remained partial for some days.

This is further confirmed by Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir George Buchanan on July 31st,³ when he says, "If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians." These words clearly show that Sir Edward Grey was under the impression that the mobilization of the Austrian army had not become general.

On the following day, August 1st, Sir Maurice de Bunsen reports from Vienna,⁴ "General mobilization of army and fleet." This, it may be noted, was on the same day as the German and French general mobilization, and about thirty-six hours after that of Russia. But here we find conflicting evidence, for Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who telegraphed the news of the general mobilization in Austria on the 1st (White Paper 127), states in his special dispatch on the rupture of diplomatic negotiations⁵ that "Russia replied to the partial Austrian mobilization by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. Austria met this by completing her own mobilization, and Russia again responded, with the results which have passed into history." Now, according to evidence, Russia's general mobilization took place late on the night of July 30th (see Chapter on Mobilization,

¹ Orange Book 77.

² White Paper 110.

³ Ibid. 47.

⁴ Ibid. 127.

⁵ Cd. 7596.

Russia), while Austrian mobilization, according to Sir Maurice de Bunsen himself in the White Paper, did not take place till August 1st (see White Paper 127). According to this evidence, therefore, Austria could not have replied to Russia's partial mobilization by a general mobilization on her part, because Russia converted her partial mobilization into a general one at least thirty-six hours before Austria did so. The evidence, therefore, of the official documents is conflicting.

The evidence from Russian sources¹ also conflicts in one passage with the evidence in the White Paper. In a telegram on August 2nd from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Representatives abroad, the former states that "Russian mobilization was called forth by the great responsibility which would have rested on her if she had not taken all precautionary steps during the time that Austria had proceeded to a general mobilization." This suggests that Austria's general mobilization took place before Russia's, but no dates are given, and therefore it cannot be accepted as evidence. On the other hand, in the telegram of Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st,² the British Ambassador explains Russia's reasons for mobilization on the grounds that Austria would not hold to the intervention of the Powers, and secondly because she had moved troops against Russia. This movement of troops on the Russian frontier may well refer to the mobilization of the eight army corps which was already known to be in progress in Austria, and it is known that some portion of these forces was sent to the Russian frontier. Indeed, it is admitted in the speech of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4th,³ who said that at the time of Russia's general mobilization Austria had two army corps only on the Russian frontier, and the rest were all concentrated against Servia. But the omission of Sir George Buchanan in this telegram on July 31st (No. 113) to mention any reference to an Austrian general mobilization as a reason for a Russian, suggests

¹ Orange Book 178.

² White Paper 113.

³ See Parliamentary Speeches (b).

strongly that no evidence had come even to St. Petersburg that Austria had taken this step or had extended her measures beyond that of the eight army corps. Moreover, the Press correspondence confirms this view. Thus, the *Times* correspondent in St. Petersburg describes on the 31st the reason given by Russia for her general mobilization. "This step," he said, "has been forced upon them (the Russian Government) by the German military preparation and by considerations of strategy. It became apparent that the Germans were purposely delaying an official notice of their mobilization in order to place Russia in a position of inferiority." No mention is made of an Austrian general mobilization as the cause for Russia's step. The only reference is to Germany, and we see what evidence there is relating to German mobilization under the section dealing with that subject.

It may also be remembered that according to Sir Maurice de Bunsen himself (Cd. 7596), the tension between Austria and Russia by this time, the 31st, was becoming less. He describes in his special dispatch how Count Berchtold had allowed conversations between Russia and Austria to begin again on the 30th, and an agreement was almost arrived at on August 1st. It is hardly likely, therefore, that with diminishing tension against Russia, Austria would have mobilized the whole of her army.

Without more definite information to the contrary, therefore, it is safe to assume that the English White Paper is correct in telegram No. 127, when it describes the general mobilization of the Austrian army as beginning on August 1st. In that case, however, the statements in the Orange Book and in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's special dispatch require further explanation.

THE GERMAN DENKSCHRIFT

Official Translation by German Government

FOREIGN OFFICE, BERLIN,
August, 1914.

ON June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Archduke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian politics directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the Pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighbourly relations.

In this manner, for the third time in the course of the last six years, Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan States under Russian patronage, and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan War, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the Monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government apprised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the Monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with her dignity, nor deny her our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our

own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued, with the aid of Russia and France, to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian Pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. *We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.*

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a Note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Serajevo and the Pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the Pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian Note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the Monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to her loss, she had sufficiently experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment.¹ In this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign Powers.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Serbia towards the Monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkans.²

In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired and aimed at a localization of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th.³ The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers.⁴

¹ See Exhibits 1 and 2. ² See Exhibit 3. ³ See Exhibit 4.

⁴ See Exhibit 5.

After the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.

The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in the evening.^{*}

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilization.^{*} The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:—

“Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

“But mobilization means war.

“As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding.”

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Sukhumlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honour that no order to mobilize had been issued; merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against Austria-Hungary,

^{*} See Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.

^{*} See Exhibits 10, 10A, 10B.

the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats.¹ The Military Attaché then pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as, for instance, the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovno garrison.

On July 27th the first information was received concerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manœuvres and returned to its garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localize the conflict by most emphatic steps.

On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.²

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two Powers.³

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna, in which he suggested Austria-Hungary⁴ should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Govern-

¹ See Exhibit 11.

² See Exhibit 12.

³ See Exhibits 13, 14.

⁴ See Exhibit 15.

ment remarked, with full appreciation of our action, that it had come too late, hostilities having already been opened.¹

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the Monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land.²

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph as follows :—

“The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us with regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration—a great concession on the part of a State engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.

“I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of

¹ See Exhibit 16.

² See Exhibit 17.

a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia."

On July 29th the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :—

"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere had there been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse, up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.

"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the General that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given.

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of the reserves."

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. *The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with Sazonof.* Count Szapary was empowered to explain

to the Russian Minister the Note to Servia, though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly, and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict.¹ *We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna*, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war all over important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.

During the same days there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Tsar Nicholas an exchange of telegrams, in which His Majesty called the attention of the Tsar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.²

On July 31st the Tsar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser :—

“I thank You cordially for Your mediation, which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military

¹ See Exhibit 19.

² See Exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23A.

preparations, which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. *As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon.* I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

"Your cordially devoted

NICHOLAS."

This telegram of the Tsar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. :—

"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon of July 31st, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization¹ of the Russian army and navy, which must be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notify Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a declaration within eighteen hours, whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.²

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European Cabinets. The Russian mobilization, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Tsar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser as follows :—

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, but *I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz. that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our*

¹ See Exhibit 24.

² See Exhibit 25.

hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-trying friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your august reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :—

"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1st, at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands.¹ However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e. the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., which gave

See Exhibit 26.

no clear idea of the position of France,* as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.

THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES

THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA

Presented July 23rd in Belgrade

“On March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:—

“Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the counsels of the Powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations.

“The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.

“Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained

* See Exhibit 27.

in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the unbridled language of the Press, glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues: she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian people into hatred of the Monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself guilty has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance.

"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Serajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Servian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier officials.

"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the Monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the Monarchy.

"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the Monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself

to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration :—

"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of the Royal army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the army.

"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows :—

- "1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity ;

- "2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form ;
- "3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;
- "4. To remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government ;
- "5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ;
- "6. To commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th who are on Servian territory. Officials delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the examinations ;
- "7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation ;
- "8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the

smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Serajevo in crossing the frontier ;

- “9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th.
- “10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Serajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is enclosed with this Note.”

Enclosure.

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the Court of Serajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th, has, so far, yielded the following results :—

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac.
4. To ensure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez

in a forest near the target-practice field of Topshider (outside Belgrade).

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinovic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

THE SERVIAN ANSWER

Presented at Vienna July 25, 1914

(With Austria's commentaries [in italics])

The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere have there been raised such protests against the great neighbouring Monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in the Skuptchina, as well as in the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of the State at that time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31, 1909; furthermore, that since that time neither the different corporations of the kingdom nor the officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no protest in this sense excepting in the case of a schoolbook, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous

cases evidence of her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to Serbia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved.

The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 31, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our Note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited Note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the State. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded in solving the greater number thereof, with mutual profit to both countries.

The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of the Press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private character and thus escape governmental control stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern States and even the most liberal of Press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the Press and the societies to a certain control of the State. This is also provided for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its Press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to the Monarchy.

The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the outrage in Serajevo. The Government expected to be invited to co-operate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready, in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it should receive information.

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws, to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done nothing in this direction.

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to position and rank, every Servian citizen of whose participation in the crime of Serajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the following enunciation :—

“The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should be directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal machinations.”

The Austrian demand reads :—

“The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. . . .”

The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognized the

same as hostile to the Monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present one.

The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text.

The formula as demanded by Austria reads :—

“The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and junctionaries . . . have participated . . .”

Also with this formula and the further addition, “according to the declaration of the I. and R. Government,” the Servian Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.

The Royal Government binds itself further :—

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptchina to embody in the Press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy is to be most severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications, as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.

Austria had demanded :—

1. *“To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt for the Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.”*

We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that such attacks of the Press would cease in the future.

Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means towards this end, viz. :—

(a) *A law according to which the expressions of the Press hostile to the Monarchy can be individually punished, a matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so as the individual prosecution of Press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired success.*

(b) *An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of the Government to enforce it, and that has not been promised us.*

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by the Skuptchina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of the Government.

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the Note of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this manner through any one of their members. Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against Austria-Hungary.

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the Monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is therefore an entirely unacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked besides :—

“To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies, to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form.”

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly

silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.

3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.

Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction" —a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian schools.

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been charged.

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the co-operation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation which does not run counter to international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations.

The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of State police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials.

The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:—

1. *To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.*

2. *Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire").*

3. *It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.*

If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a

plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which the Note was received the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, wherefore a warrant has been issued against him.

The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt obtained in the investigation at Serajevo.

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade.

8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the existing measures for the suppression of smuggling of arms and explosives.

It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those expressions

have actually been made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected therefor.

The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews, and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the demand.

10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as this has not been already done by the present Note, of the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put into execution.

The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest not to rush the solution of this affair, and it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this question to the International Court at The Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on March 31, 1909.

The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time.

EXHIBIT I

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23, 1914.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the Pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the separation of the south Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with

the Servian kingdom must be sought in Belgrade, where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the Pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a Great Power, but to press its demands with the Servian Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it.

I have the honour to request you to express yourself in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sazonof) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question

there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict because every intercession of another Power on account of the various treaty-alliances would precipitate incalculable consequences.

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview.

EXHIBIT 2

The Chancellor to the Ambassadors of Germany.

Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914.

You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited:—

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its Note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the Pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The Pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the Pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preserva-

tion if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst. through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a Great Power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of necessity, and a duty for Russia, to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the *Nowoje Wremja* believes itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

The Russian Press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favour toward Pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her existence, and creates conditions which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajevo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localize, there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident, and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory, or to touch the existence of the Servian

kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance, with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localization of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

EXHIBIT 3

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the
Chancellor on July 24, 1914.*

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view towards Servia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest towards Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary must have a guarantee for continued amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of power in the

Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary *ad referendum*, with the promise to submit it immediately to Sazonof.

EXHIBIT 4

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 24, 1914.

I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview with Sazonof. The Secretary (Sazonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary, and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned.

EXHIBIT 5

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of July 26, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest, but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

EXHIBIT 6

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador of St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 25, 1914.

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide-de-camp to the Tsar).

The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains

great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria are being made.

EXHIBIT 7

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 26, 1914.

The Military Attaché requests the following message to be sent to the General Staff:

I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kief and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.

EXHIBIT 8

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July 27, 1914.

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

EXHIBIT 9

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July 27, 1914.

Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued manœuvres.

EXHIBIT 10

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately, which is equivalent to mobilization. If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to counter-measures very much against our own

wishes. Our desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.

EXHIBIT 10A

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 26, 1914.

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia, which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation at the peace of Europe, that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

EXHIBIT 10B

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26, 1914.

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.

EXHIBIT 11

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor on July 27, 1914.

Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War :—

Sazonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed

toward Austria, viz. Kief, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing.

EXHIBIT 12

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27, 1914.

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

EXHIBIT 13

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25, 1914.

The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all Powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other Powers.

EXHIBIT 14

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 28, 1914.

We continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to

elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

EXHIBIT 15

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27, 1914.

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna.

EXHIBIT 16

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

EXHIBIT 17

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29, 1914.

News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening state of war (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.

EXHIBIT 18

*Telegram of the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg to
H.M. the Kaiser on July 30, 1914.*

Prince Trubetskoy said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Tsar Nicholas: "Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come." He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Tsar, but as the mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia, which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized.

EXHIBIT 19

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador
at Rome on July 31, 1914.*

We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Tsar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching

measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.

EXHIBIT 20

I. *His Majesty to the Tsar.*

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 21

II. *The Tsar to His Majesty.*

PETERHOF PALACE, July 29th, 1 p.m.

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure

exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity, as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

EXHIBIT 22

III. *His Majesty to the Tsar.*

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guarantee that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator, which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 23

IV. *His Majesty to the Tsar.**July 30th, 1 a.m.*

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization ; I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner, and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders ; You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) WILHELM.

EXHIBIT 23A

V. *The Tsar to His Majesty.**PETERHOF, July 30, 1914, 1.20 p.m.*

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. *The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago*, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

EXHIBIT 24

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31, 1914. Urgent.

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization,

Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication.

EXHIBIT 25

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31, 1914. Urgent.

Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have therefore declared the threatening state of war, which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within twelve hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

EXHIBIT 26

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg on August 1, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon five o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement :—

“Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.

Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

“A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l’Allemagne, l’Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d’un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l’existence même de l’Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s’adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l’Empereur de toutes les Russies insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l’Allemagne, j’ai l’honneur d’ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :—

“Sa Majesté l’Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l’Empire relève le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.”

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time.

Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy.

EXHIBIT 27

*Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the
Chancellor on August 1, 1.50 p.m.*

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK¹

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

COLLECTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

Negotiations from 10th to 24th July (23rd July to August 6th), 1914, preceding the war

St. Petersburg, Imperial Press

NO. 1

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BELGRADE, July 10/23.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador at six o'clock has given to Finance Minister, who is acting for Pashitch, ultimatum from his Government giving forty-eight hours for acceptance of its demands. Giesl supplemented this by saying that in the event of this not being accepted in full within forty-eight hours he would leave Belgrade with his whole Mission. Pashitch and other Ministers have gone on an electioneering tour, and are recalled and expected in Belgrade at 10 a.m. to-morrow. The Finance Minister communicated to me the above Note and asked for Russian protection. He said that no Servian Government could agree to the Austrian demands.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 2

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BELGRADE, July 10/23.

The following Note has been presented to-day by the Austrian Ambassador to the Servian Government:—

¹ Translation made by author from original Russian text.

(Here follows Austrian Note to Servia. See White Paper 4.)

No. 3

Memorandum communicated by the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg to Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 11/24, at 10 a.m.

The Imperial and Royal Government has found it necessary to instruct its Ambassador to convey on the 10th/23rd of this month the following Note to the Servian Government :—

(Here follows text of Note, Document No. 2.)

No. 4

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in Austria.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 11/24.

I shall be glad if you communicate to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs the following :—

The conduct of Austria towards the Powers in presenting its ultimatum to Belgrade with a time limit of forty-eight hours deprives the Powers of the possibility of taking in the short time remaining any useful steps towards settling the complications arising therefrom. Therefore in order to avert the immeasurable and undesirable consequences which the action of Austria may cause, we consider it indispensable that the latter should first of all prolong the time allowed for the Servian reply. Having expressed her readiness to acquaint the Powers with the circumstances on which she founds her accusation, Austria ought to afford them the possibility of forming a judgment on the matter. In the event of the Powers being convinced of the justice of the Austrian demands they could give Servia suitable advice. The refusal of Austria to present us with a clear statement of her case is contrary to international etiquette, and would deprive the announcement made by her to-day

of any meaning. This Note has been communicated to London, Berlin, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 5

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Imperial Representatives in England, Germany, Italy, and France.

ST. PETERSBURG, July 11/24.

In reference to the telegram communicated to Kudashef we hope the Government to which you are accredited will agree with our standpoint and will instruct its Ambassador in Vienna in this sense. This has been communicated to Belgrade.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 6

Telegram of the Crown Prince of Servia to the Emperor of Russia.

BELGRADE, July 11/24.

Yesterday evening the Austrian Government handed Note to Servian Government relating to Serajevo murders. Servia in accordance with international obligation expressed on first day after the terrible murder her condemnation of the crime and her readiness to open investigation in her territory if evidence brought forward by Austria showed complicity of her subjects. But demands included in Austrian Note are not consistent with maintenance of Servian integrity, and aim at her humiliation. Among other things a declaration is demanded from us in the *Official Gazette*, and an Imperial Proclamation to the Army in which we denounce the hostile spirit against Austria and express regret for our criminal laxness in relation to such intrigues; further, that we agree to the co-operation of Austrian officials in Servia, both in the carrying out of the investigations and in the undertaking of measures demanded in the Note. They give us forty-eight hours for complying with all this; if not, Austria withdraws her Ambassador from Belgrade. We are ready to accept those demands

of Austria which can be reconciled with our independence and integrity, and also those which Your Majesty advises us to accept, and we are willing to punish severely all those who are shown to be implicated in the crime. Among the demands are some that will necessitate a change in our legal system, and for this time is indispensable. The time allowed is too short. The Austrian Army is posted along our frontier and can attack us at the end of the time limit. We cannot defend ourselves. Therefore we pray Your Imperial Majesty to give us help as quickly as possible. Your Imperial Majesty has given me abundant evidence of Your precious goodwill, and we hope that the call will find response in Your noble heart which loves the Slav race. I express the feeling of the Servian people, which in this troubled time prays Your Majesty to take interest in the fate of Servia.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

No. 7

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 11/24.

All the morning papers, even some which acknowledge the harshness towards Servia of the Austrian conditions, are sympathetic towards the arbitrary tone of the Austrian Note. Especially frank is the semi-official *Lokal-Anzeiger*, which says that the appeal of Servia to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, and Bucharest is superfluous, and concludes that the German people will now breathe freely, knowing at last that there will be established a stable state of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 8

Chargé d'Affaires in Paris to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 11/24.

The Official Copy of the Note handed in at Belgrade has now been communicated by Austrian Ambassador to

French Government. The German Ambassador visited the French Minister and read to him a communication in which the Austrian case was reproduced, and further states that in the event of a Servian refusal Austria would have to resort to pressure and in case of necessity to military measures. In conclusion Germany considers the question to be one immediately between Austria and Servia, and it is in the interest of the Powers that the matter should be confined to the interested parties. The Director of the Political Department, who took part in the conversation, asked the Ambassador whether or not the Austrian Note must be regarded as an ultimatum. In other words, would military measures follow inevitably if Servia did not submit to the Austrian demands. The Ambassador declined to give a definite answer, not having received instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

NO. 9

Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BELGRADE, *July 11/24.*

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He proposes to give Austria within the given time limit, that is by to-morrow, Saturday, evening at 6 o'clock, an answer indicating the acceptable and unacceptable points. To-day an appeal to the Powers for the protection of Servian independence will be sent. After that, says Pashitch, if war is unavoidable, we shall fight.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 10

Government Communication.

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 12/25.*

The Government is anxiously awaiting the consequences of Austria's aggressive Note to Servia. The Government is following closely the developments of the Servo-Austrian dispute, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

NO. 11

Chargé d'Affaires in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

VIENNA, July 12/25.

Count Berchtold is in Ischl. Owing to the impossibility of reaching him personally in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal for the prolongation of the time limit allowed in the ultimatum, and have communicated it verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to transmit it immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but added that he could say with certainty that it would be rejected.

(Signed) KUDASHEF.

NO. 12

Chargé d'Affaires in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

VIENNA, July 12/25.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day, I have received through Macchio a negative answer from the Austrian Government to our proposal for the prolongation of the time limit.

(Signed) KUDASHEF.

NO. 13

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

(Received after a delay on July 14/27.)

BELGRADE, July 12/25.

I communicate the answer given by the Servian President of the Council of Ministers to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade to-day at the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

(Here follows text of Servian reply. See White Paper 39.)

NO. 14

Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 12/25.

Your telegram of 11th/24th received and contents communicated to Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He says British Government has asked him to recommend in Vienna a prolongation of the time limit. He has telegraphed about it to Vienna, but he fears that the absence of Berchtold at Ischl and the lack of time will prevent any result, and he doubts if it would be politic for Austria to agree to yield at the last moment in view of the possible strengthening of Servia's self-confidence. I replied that a Great Power like Austria could yield without loss of prestige, and cited various arguments to strengthen this view, but he did not give any more definite assurance. Even on hints that action from Vienna might be followed by terrible consequences the Secretary for Foreign Affairs refused any assurances.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

NO. 15

Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 12/25.

Your telegram of July 11/24 concerning the prolongation of the time limit in the Austrian ultimatum; I made the above communication. The French representative in Vienna has been given corresponding instructions.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

NO. 16

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 12/25.

Have received telegram of 11th/24th. Grey has telegraphed to English Ambassador in Vienna to support our proposal

relating to the prolongation of the time limit in the ultimatum. Meanwhile he told me that the Austrian Ambassador had been with him and had explained that the Austrian Note should be regarded, not as an ultimatum, but as a *démarche* which would result, in the absence of a reply or on an unsatisfactory reply, in the breaking off of diplomatic relations and the immediate recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade, but not in the immediate beginning of military operations. Grey added that in view of this explanation he, in his instructions to the Ambassador, had suggested to the latter that if it were too late to discuss the prolongation of the limit, the question of arrest of military operations might be raised.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

NO. 17

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in England.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 12/25.

In the event of the situation becoming more critical, possibly involving the Great Powers, we assume that England will not delay to take a definite stand by the side of Russia and France in order to preserve the equilibrium of Europe, which she has always stood for in the past, and which will be undoubtedly destroyed in the event of an Austrian triumph.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 18

Memorandum communicated by the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

July 12/25.

We are informed from authoritative sources that the report in certain journals that the action of Austria in Belgrade was taken at the instigation of Germany is altogether false. The German Government up to the time of its delivery was not aware of the text of the

Austrian Note, and had no influence over its contents. The statements made that Germany had adopted a definite attitude are entirely without foundation. Germany as an ally of course supports Austria in a claim against Serbia which she considers legitimate. Above all she wishes, as she has shown from the very beginning of the Austro-Servian quarrel, that the conflict should be localized.

NO. 19

Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 12/25.

In reference to my telegram of 11th/24th. There appeared in this morning's papers, although not in very clear terms, the announcement of the German Ambassador, yesterday, together with Press comments, in which its threatening character was underlined. The German Ambassador, disturbed at these revelations, visited the Chief of the Political Department this morning and assured him that his words had in no way a threatening character. He explained that Austria presented the Note to Serbia without previous conversation with Berlin, but that Germany sympathizes with the Austrian standpoint, and that of course, as he said, "once the shot has been fired" Germany can only be guided by her obligations to her ally.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

NO. 20.

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, July 12/25.

Grey tells me that he is told by the German Ambassador that Germany was not informed of the text of the Austrian Note, but that she fully supports Austria's action. The Ambassador asked if England would agree to exert its influence at St. Petersburg in the interests of peace. Grey answered that it was altogether impossible. He added that so long as the complication was confined to Austria and Serbia, British interests were only indirectly affected. He said,

however, that he was forced to realize that Austria's mobilization would mean Russia's mobilization, and that from that moment a state of affairs would arise in which all the Powers would be interested. England, in that event, would preserve for itself full freedom of activity.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

NO. 21

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BELGRADE, July 12/25.

Austrian Ambassador, despite the unexceptional character of Servian reply to the ultimatum, at 6.30 this evening informed the Servian Government by Note that, not having received a satisfactory answer within the given time, he would withdraw from Belgrade with his whole suite. The Skuptchina will meet on July 14/27 at Nisch, to which town the Servian Government and diplomatic corps proceeds this evening.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 22

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 12/25.

Grey told German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilization would mean Russian mobilization, and that then there would arise the danger of a general war. He said he saw only one means for a peaceful solution, that in view of the danger of an Austro-Russian mobilization Germany, France, Italy and England should refrain from immediate mobilization and should make an offer of mediation. Grey told me that this plan needed above all the agreement of Germany and a promise from her not to mobilize. With this object he was making inquiries in Berlin.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 23

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in Italy.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 13/26.

Italy could play an all-important rôle in the preservation of peace if she could use her influence in Austria and adopt an unfavourable attitude towards the conflict, since it could remain localized. It would be desirable for you to express your conviction that it is impossible for Russia not to give help to Servia.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 24

Consul in Prague to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PRAGUE, July 13/26.

Mobilization ordered.

(Signed) KAZANSKY.

No. 25

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in Austria.

(TELEGRAPHIC.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 13/26.

I had a long talk to-day with the Austrian Ambassador in a friendly tone. We went over with him the ten demands on Servia, and I showed him that, besides their unacceptable form, some of the demands were altogether impossible to execute, even if the Servian Government consented to do so. For instance, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without altering the Servian laws concerning the Press and societies, and that it would hardly be possible to obtain the consent of the Skuptchina; that the execution of points 4 and 5 would inevitably produce dangerous consequences, and might even lead to terrorist acts directed against the Royal House and Pashitch, which would hardly be in accordance with Austria's aim. In regard to other

points, it seemed to me that with certain modifications in detail it would not be difficult to find a basis of agreement if the accusations included in them were confirmed by sufficient evidence.

In the interests of peace, which, in the words of Szapary, was equally dear to Austria as to the other Powers, it is indispensable to put an end to the present strained relations as quickly as possible. With this object it seems very desirable that the Austrian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views and to work out with me certain points in the Austrian Note of July 10/23. In this way it might be possible to find a formula which, while acceptable to Servia, would give satisfaction to the Austrian demands. Speak in this sense to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a quiet and friendly manner. This has been communicated to the Ambassadors of Germany, France, England, and Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 26

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Germany.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 13/26.

When communicating the contents of my telegram to Vienna to the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, please express my hope that he will find it possible on his part to influence Vienna to meet our proposals.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 27

Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 13/26.

The Director of the Political Department has communicated to me that, when he handed to the Austrian Ambassador the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not hide his surprise that Giesl was not satisfied with it. The submissiveness of the Servian reply

should, in the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, produce in Europe a favourable impression.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

NO. 28

Chargé d'Affaires in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 13/26.

To-day the German Ambassador visited the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made the following statement: "Austria expressed to Russia that she has no territorial designs and does not threaten the integrity of Servia. Her only object is to secure her own tranquillity. On Russia accordingly rests the responsibility for the avoidance of war. Germany feels herself at one with France in the urgent desire to preserve peace, and hopes France will use her influence in St. Petersburg in favour of moderation." The Minister observed that Germany might on her part undertake similar steps in Vienna, especially after the yielding attitude of Servia. The Ambassador answered that this was not possible in view of the decision not to interfere in the Austro-Servian quarrel. Then the Minister asked could not the four Powers, England, Germany, Italy, and France, take steps in St. Petersburg and Vienna, since the whole question at bottom resolves itself into the quarrel between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador said that he had no instructions. In conclusion the Minister refused to agree to the German proposition.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

NO. 29

Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 13/26.

Director of Political Department expressed his personal opinion that the consistent German policy in Paris had the object of frightening France and of making her influence felt in St. Petersburg.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

No. 30

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 13/26.

On the receipt of the news in Berlin of the Servian^{*} mobilization a great crowd, consisting, according to the newspapers, partly of Austrian elements, created a noisy demonstration in favour of Austria. Late in the evening the demonstrators several times collected before the Russian Embassy making hostile exclamations against Russia. Meanwhile the police were almost entirely absent and took no measures of any kind.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 31

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 14/27.

Received your telegram of July 13/26. Please telegraph me whether your direct conversations with the Vienna Cabinet are consistent with the project of Grey for the mediation of the four Powers. Learning from a telegram from the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you are ready to accept this concerted action, Grey decided to make an official proposal, which was done yesterday in Berlin, Paris, and Rome.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 32

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in France and England.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 14/27.

At request of his Government British Ambassador has asked whether Russia agrees to England taking the

^{*} The French edition of the Orange Book says "la mobilisation de l'armée autrichienne." The original Russian version, however, says "Mobilizatsi Serbskich voysk," which means "mobilization of Servian soldiers." The reference in the original text is evidently to Servian and not to Austrian mobilization.—ED.

initiative in calling a conference in London of the representatives of France, Germany, and Italy in order that they shall consider *à quatre* the possibility of solving this problem. I answered the Ambassador that although my direct conversations with the Austrian Ambassador had begun, I had not yet received an answer to my proposal for a joint revision of the (Austrian) Note. The Russian Government is ready to accept the English proposal or any other as a means of finding a peaceable solution to the problem, if our direct conversations with the Vienna Cabinet do not lead to anything. This is communicated to the Embassies in Germany, Austria, and Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 33

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in France, England, Germany, Austria, and Italy.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 14/27.*

I am acquainted with the answer handed in by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation and its willingness to give the fullest satisfaction to Austria. Provided the Vienna Cabinet is not seeking a pretext for war with Servia, we are at a loss to understand on what the further demands of Austria can be based.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 34

Chargé d'Affaires in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, *July 14/27.*

German Ambassador to-day again discussed situation in detail with Director of Political Department. The Ambassador was very insistent on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or a conference.

(Signed) SEVASTOPULO.

No. 35

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 14/27.

I have conversed with the Director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the presence of Berthelot, who has just returned to Paris. They confirmed to me details concerning the action of the German Ambassador over which Sevastopulo has communicated to you in his telegram. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed in writing the declaration made by him yesterday :—

1. Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek extension of territory and does not aim at destroying the integrity of Servia. Her object is security for her own peace.

2. On Russia rests the responsibility of averting war.

3. Germany and France on the basis of their complete agreement to preserve peace ought to influence Russia in this sense.

Thereupon Baron von Schoen especially emphasized the expression concerning the solidarity between Germany and France. In the opinion of the Minister of Justice the above-mentioned step of Germany had as its undoubted aim the severing of Russia from France. It was an attempt to induce the French Government to put pressure on St. Petersburg, and thus to compromise our ally in our eyes, and in the event of a war to throw the responsibility not on Germany, who, it would appear, is using all her efforts to keep peace, but on Russia and France.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 36

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 14/27.

From your telegrams of July 13/26 it is clear that you were not yet aware of the answer of the Servian Govern-

ment. The telegram to me from Belgrade with this news was twenty hours on the road. The telegram dispatched to Vienna under the triple tariff the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the order to support our step was only delivered at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that it was purposely delayed in the Austrian telegraph office.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 37

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

PARIS, July 14/27.

At the order of his Government the Austrian Ambassador here has communicated to the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the answer of Servia was considered in Vienna to be unsatisfactory, and that to-morrow (Tuesday) Austria will undertake "energetic action" with the object of compelling Servia to give the necessary guarantees. On the question of the Minister as to what form this activity would take, the Ambassador answered that he was not exactly informed about it, but that it might be a talk of the crossing of the Servian frontier, of an ultimatum, and even of the declaration of war.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 38

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 14/27.

I asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorized through frequent conversations with you to secure an agreement of both parties as to the terms of the Austrian demands. Jagow answered that he approved of this, and that he inclined to the opinion expressed by Pourtalès, that once Szapary has started on this exchange of views he should be able to continue on these lines. To this effect he had telegraphed to the German Ambassador in Berlin (*sic* ;

? Vienna, or St. Petersburg). On my request that he should himself strongly urge Vienna to adopt a peaceful attitude he replied that he could not advise Austria to give way.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

NO. 39

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, July 14/27.

To-day, before my visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the French Ambassador was with him attempting to induce him to accept the English proposal that England, Germany, France, and Italy should take action to preserve peace both in St. Petersburg and Vienna at the same time. Cambon proposed that these Powers should offer advice in Vienna in the following form: "To abstain from all acts which would prejudice the *status quo* at the moment." This ambiguous formula would avoid mentioning the indispensable necessity of restraining Austria from an invasion of Servia. Jagow gave to the proposal a sharp refusal, notwithstanding the insistence of the Ambassador, who brought out the good side of the proposal, that is to say, the combination of the two groups of Powers, thereby avoiding the opposition between the two groups of which Jagow himself had so often complained.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

NO. 40

The Tsar to the Servian Crown Prince.

ST. PETERSBURG, July 14/27.

Your Royal Highness, in appealing to me in a most serious moment, did not mistake the feelings which I cherish towards you, and my cordial sympathy for the Servian people. The present state of affairs has roused my warmest attention, and my Government is making all efforts to get rid of the present difficulties. I do not doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government are filled with the desire to lighten this task, neglecting nothing in

order to reach a decision which, while it preserves the dignity of Servia, avoids the horror of a new war.

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must be directed to this goal. Should we, however, against our most earnest wish, have no success, your Highness can be assured that Russia under no circumstances will remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

No. 41

The Russian Ambassador in Austria to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

VIENNA, July 14/27.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is absent.

I had to-day a prolonged conversation with Macchio, in which I explained to him in friendly terms what an unfortunate impression the Austrian demands on Servia had produced in Russia, and how they were utterly unacceptable for an independent, though small, State. I added that this step, which may carry with it most undesirable complications, caused in Russia deep perplexity and universal censure. One must suppose that Austria has counted on the support of the German Government in Vienna playing in the course of this crisis the rôle of an instigator and preventing the probability of localizing the conflict with Servia, and destroying the possibility for the latter of bearing with impunity this heavy blow. The declaration of the Imperial Russian Government that Russia cannot remain indifferent to this step produces great anxiety here.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 42

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 14/27.

Grey has just replied to request of the German Ambassador, who asked him about the possibility of influencing St. Petersburg, by pointing out that influence should be

exerted in Vienna and that this would be done best of all by the Berlin Cabinet. Grey also pointed out to the Ambassador that the Servian answer to the Austrian Note exceeded in its moderation and conciliatory character all that could possibly have been expected. Grey added that he inferred that Russia had used her influence in Belgrade to secure a conciliatory answer, and that he thought that the Servian answer could serve as a basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question. In view of this, Grey continued, if Austria, notwithstanding this answer, proceeds to military operations, that will show that she is taking measures to annihilate Servia. The situation that would arise from this produces conditions under which war might follow, in which all the Powers might be involved. Grey finally pointed out that the British Government was ready to co-operate most sincerely with the German Government as long as peace could be maintained. Should this not be possible England would maintain for herself full freedom of action.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 43

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian
Ambassador in London.*

ST. PETERSBURG, July 15/28.

From the private conversation between Count Pourtalès and myself, it seems highly probable that the key to the situation lies in Berlin, and that Germany is upholding the irreconcilable attitude of Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, which could arrest the whole development of the crisis, does not apparently exert any pressure on its ally. The Embassy (Germany) here think the answer of Servia unsatisfactory.

I look with alarm at this attitude of Germany, and I submit that England could, better than any other Power, undertake steps in Berlin for a mutual understanding.

I have communicated with the Embassy in France.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 44

Consul-General in Fiume to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

FIUME, July 15/28.

State of siege declared in Slavonia, Croatia, and Fiume, and simultaneous with this mobilization of all classes of reservists.

(Signed) SALVIATY.

No. 45

Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

VIENNA, July 15/28.

I have just had a friendly conversation with Berchtold on the lines of your proposal that the Austrian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into direct conversations with you for a combined attempt to solve certain difficulties in the Austrian Note. I pointed out the desirability for Austria herself of reaching some such solution of the question which might improve her relations with Russia and at the same time give a sufficient guarantee for future relations between the Monarchy and Servia. I drew attention to the existing danger which was threatening the peace of Europe in the event of an armed conflict between Austria and Servia. The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that he fully understood the seriousness of the situation and the advantage of an open discussion with us about this matter, but that the Austro-Hungarian Government, having unwillingly decided to take a decisive step in its relations with Servia, could not at the present moment retract and proceed to a discussion of the text of its Note. The answer of Servia, added the Minister, showed the insincerity of her assurances for the future. This is communicated to the Ambassadors in Germany, France, England, and the Chargé d'Affaires in Servia.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 46

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 15/28.

The Wolff Bureau here has not printed the text of the Servian reply, which was communicated to it, and since a full account does not appear in any of the local papers, it appears that they do not wish to give it a place in their columns, realizing the sobering impression which it would produce on the reading public in Germany.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

No. 47

Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

VIENNA, July 15/28.

Order for general mobilization signed.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 48

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in London.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 15/28.

Owing to the military operations between Austria and Servia it is indispensable that the influence of England should be exercised at once to secure mediation, and to put a stop to Austria's military activities against Servia. Otherwise mediation will serve only to prolong the settlement, and in the meantime to give Austria the opportunity of crushing Servia and of obtaining a commanding position in the Balkans.

This is communicated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 49

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 16/29.

At the request of the Imperial Chancellor himself the German Ambassador informed me that Germany has not ceased to exercise moderating influence in Vienna, and will continue to do so notwithstanding the declaration of war.

I asked the Ambassador to convey to the Chancellor the expression of my gratitude for the friendly character of this communication. Speaking to him of certain of our military measures, I pointed out that they were in no way directed against Germany, and cannot be taken as indicating any aggressive action against Austria. The measures taken by us are explained by the mobilization of the Austrian army. At the suggestion of the Ambassador to continue our conversation with the Vienna Cabinet, I answered that I was willing to do this if Austria would listen to German advice. At the same time I pointed out the readiness of Russia to accept the conference *à quatre*—the proposal for which had not, it appears, met with a sympathetic response in Germany. The best method of all for reaching a peaceful solution of the crisis seemed to us to be parallel negotiations of the Four Powers Conference at the same time as our direct conversations with the Vienna Cabinet, as was done at certain delicate moments during the last year's crisis.

We think that after the concessions made by Servia it would not be difficult to discover a compromise about the remaining points of difference, if Austria shows goodwill, and if Germany directs her strength towards conciliation. I ask you to bring the contents of this telegram to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited.

It is communicated to England, France, Austria, and Italy.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 50

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors in England and France.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 16/29.

At the time of my conversation with the German Ambassador I had not yet received the telegram from our Ambassador in Austria, from which it appears that the Vienna Cabinet declines to agree to an exchange of views with us. In view of this we wholeheartedly leave to England the initiative in those steps which it may consider expedient.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome, and Berlin.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 51

Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 16/29.

On my question as to whether he had received from Vienna the answer to your proposals for private conversations in St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative. In his own words it is extremely difficult to put pressure on Vienna, especially openly. To Cambon he even added that, in the event of too strong pressure, Austria would hasten to set before Germany a *fait accompli*. The Secretary of State said that he had received to-day a telegram from Pourtalès from which he infers that you are more inclined than at first to agree to a compromise which should be acceptable to all parties. I said that you had been inclined from the beginning towards compromise, provided that, of course, it was acceptable, not only to Austria, but also to us. Further, he said to me that we had apparently begun mobilization on the Austrian frontier, and he feared that this might make it more difficult for Austria to come to an agreement with us, the more so since Austria had mobilized only against Servia, and had made no preparations on our frontiers. I answered

that, according to information which reached me, Austria had also mobilized on our frontier, and therefore we had to take corresponding measures. I added that our military measures were in no way directed against Germany.

(Signed) BRONEFSKY.

NO. 52

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

NISCH, July 16/29.

To-day the Bulgarian Ambassador in the name of his Government informed Pashitch that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 53

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 16/29.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the arrival of the President of the French Republic a short survey was made of the present political situation approximately in the following words: Austria, threatened with internal disorder, had profited by the pretext of the murder of the Archduke to try to obtain guarantees which might take the form of a military occupation of Servian territory. Germany supports Austria. The maintenance of peace depends upon Russia alone, for, the question being that of punishment for the past policy of Servia and guarantees for the future, the affair is one which ought to be confined to Austria and Servia. From this Germany concludes that it is necessary to advise moderation in St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and London. In Paris Baron von Schoen is vainly trying to bring over France into solidarity with Germany, in order to influence Russia for the purpose of preserving peace. The same arguments were used in London. In both capitals it was observed that it was in Vienna that pressure should be

brought to bear; for the excessive demands of Austria, her refusal to consider the few objections expressed in the Servian reply, and her declaration of war threatened to cause a general conflagration. France and England could not bring moderating influence to bear on Russia, who had, up till now, shown the greatest moderation, especially in counselling Servia to accept what was possible in the Austrian Note. At present Germany apparently refuses the idea of bringing influence to bear only on Russia, and is in favour of common mediation both in St. Petersburg and Vienna, but in the meantime both Germany and Austria are trying to delay any such arrangement. Germany protests against a conference and does not suggest any possible line of action. Austria is clearly keeping up conversations at St. Petersburg, while at the same time she plans active measures. If these active measures are permitted her demands will increase proportionately. It is most desirable that Russia should express her complete agreement with the project of mediation put forward by Sir Edward Grey. In the other event Austria, under the pretext of obtaining guarantees, could in fact change the territorial *status quo* in Eastern Europe.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

NO. 54

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 16/29.

I have communicated the contents of your telegram of July 15/28 to Grey. He told the German Ambassador to-day that the direct negotiations between Russia and Austria have been unsuccessful, and that the newspaper correspondents communicate from St. Petersburg that Russia is mobilizing against Austria in consequence of the latter's mobilization. Grey added that the German Government in principle expresses itself in sympathy with mediation, but finds difficulty over the form. Grey insisted that the German Government should suggest the form

which in the opinion of Germany would allow the four Powers to realize their mediation for the avoidance of war. In view of the agreement of England, France, and Italy, mediation could be realized only if Germany would agree to stand on the side of peace.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 55

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 16/29.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full resolution of the French Government to act at one with us. This resolution meets with support in the widest circles and parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have just brought him a resolution of absolute confidence expressing the patriotic sentiment of their groups. On his arrival in Paris, Viviani at once telegraphed to London that, in view of the interruption of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it was indispensable that the London Cabinet should as quickly as possible renew in one form or another its proposal for the mediation of the Powers. Before my visit Viviani yesterday received the German Ambassador, who renewed his assurance as to Germany's efforts for peace. On the observation of Viviani that if Germany wanted peace she should hasten to concur in the proposal of England for mediation, Baron von Schoen answered that the word "conference" or "arbitration" frightened Austria. Viviani said that it was not a matter of words, and that it would not be difficult to find another form of mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen it is indispensable for the success of conversations between the Powers to know what Austria has in view in her demands from Servia. To this Viviani replied that for the Berlin Cabinet it was easy to ask this of Austria, and in the meantime the Servian reply to the Note could serve as the basis of discussion. He added that France was entirely on the side of peace, but at the same time has decided to act in complete unanimity with its allies and friends, and

that he (Baron von Schoen) could be assured that this decision met with the full sympathy of the country.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

NO. 56

*Telegram of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Servia
to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

NISCH, July 16/29.

I am deeply touched with the telegram with which Your Majesty was pleased to honour me yesterday, and I hasten to express to Your Majesty my most heartfelt thanks. I ask Your Majesty to believe that the cordial feelings which Your Majesty shows to this country are especially precious to us, and fill our spirit with hope that the future of Servia, which is the object of the gracious care of Your Majesty, is secure. These dark times cannot fail to strengthen the deep devotion which binds Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the feelings of eternal thankfulness for the help and protection of Your Majesty will always be sacredly kept in the souls of all Servians.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

NO. 57

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

NISCH, July 16/29.

I have communicated the text of the Imperial reply to Prince Alexander to Pashitch, who on reading it crossed himself and said, "Lord and High Honoured Russian Tsar!" Thereupon he embraced me, hardly able to restrain his emotion. The successor to the throne is expected to-night at Nisch.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 58

Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador in France.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 16/29.

To-day the German Ambassador communicated to me the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia does

not break off her military preparations. Such measures had only been undertaken by us in consequence of the mobilization which had already taken place in Austria and of the latter's obvious unwillingness to agree to any proposals for the pacific settlement of the dispute with Servia. As we cannot comply with the wish of Germany, it remains only to hasten our preparations and to reckon with the probable inevitability of war. Please bring this to the notice of the French Government, and at the same time express to it our heartfelt thanks for the assurances given to me through the French Ambassador that we can rely in full measure on the support of our ally France. In the present circumstances this expression is especially valuable to us.

This is communicated to the Ambassadors in England, Austria, Italy, and Germany.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 59

Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

NISCH, July 17/30.

The Regent issued yesterday manifesto signed by all the Ministers on the occasion of the declaration by Austria of war on Servia. Its concluding words were as follows: "Protect with all your strength your hearths and homes in Servia." At the solemn opening of the Skuptchina the Regent read the Speech from the Throne, in which he began by observing that the place of the assembly showed the earnestness of the event. After that came a review of the events of the preceding days: the Austrian Note, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Royal Government to do all compatible with the dignity of the kingdom to avoid war, and finally the armed attack by a powerful neighbour on Servia, side by side with whom stands Montenegro. Passing over in review the attitude of the Powers towards the conflict, the Crown Prince emphasized the feeling in Russia, and the most gracious communication of the Emperor that on no account would Russia desert Servia. At every mention of the name of the Emperor and of

Russia, loud and excited cries of "Long life!" resounded through the hall. The show of sympathy from the side of France and England was also referred to, and provoked approving shouts of "Long life!" from the deputies. The Speech from the Throne concluded with the announcement of the opening of the session, and with an expression of desire that all steps should be taken to lighten the task of the Government.

(Signed) STRANDMAN.

NO. 60

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Embassies in Germany, Austria, France, England, and Italy.

July 17/30.

The German Ambassador, who has just been with me, has asked whether we cannot be satisfied with a promise such as Austria could give, not to destroy the integrity of Servia, and on what conditions we would agree to arrest our mobilization. I dictated to him for immediate transmission to Berlin the following statement:—

"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares her willingness to exclude from her ultimatum the points which threaten the sovereign rights of Servia, Russia binds herself to cease military preparations."

Please telegraph quickly the attitude of the German Government to this new exhibition of our willingness to do all possible for the peaceful solution of this question, since we cannot allow that conversations of this kind should only serve Germany and Austria to gain time for making military preparations.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 61

Russian Embassy in Germany to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, July 17/30.

I am informed now that orders are issued for the mobilization of the German fleet and army.

(Signed) SVERVIEF.

No. 62

Ambassador in Germany to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

BERLIN, July 17/30.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me to inform me that the news published of the general mobilization of the German army and fleet was untrue, that the papers had been printed beforehand in order to be prepared against any event, and were circulated for a short time only; they have now been confiscated.

(Signed) SVERVIEF.

No. 63

Russian Embassy in Germany to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, July 17/30.

Your telegram of 16th/29th inst. received, and I gave the text of your proposal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I have just been. He told me that he had received identically the same telegram from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, but told me that he considered that our proposal would be unacceptable to Austria.

(Signed) SVERVIEF.

No. 64

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAPHIC.)

LONDON, July 17/30.

I have communicated the contents of your telegrams of the 26th/29th and 17th/30th to Grey, who acknowledges the extreme seriousness of the situation, but wishes to continue negotiations. I observed to Grey that since the time when you proposed to him to accept all that he could suggest in favour of the maintenance of peace provided that Austria should not take advantage of the delay to crush Servia, your position has evidently changed. At that time our relations with Germany were not compromised. But after the

declaration of the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg as to German mobilization the situation was changed, and his demand received from us only such an answer as befitted a Great Power. When the German Ambassador returned to you and asked you your conditions, you formulated them under altogether exceptional circumstances. I repeated to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the altered conditions caused through the fault of Germany and thanks to the *démarche* of the German Ambassador. Grey answered me that he understood this, and was taking these factors into consideration.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 65

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 17/30.

The German Ambassador has asked Grey why England is taking military measures on land and sea. Grey assured him that these measures have no aggressive character, but that such a state of affairs exists that each Power ought to be ready.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 66

Ambassador in Austria to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

VIENNA, July 18/31.

Notwithstanding the general mobilization I am continuing an exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues. They all insist on the absence on the part of Austria of any aggressive intentions against Russia or of any desire of territorial conquest against Servia. All insist, however, on the necessity for Austria of carrying the matter, when once begun, to an end, and of giving Servia a serious lesson which will ensure guarantees for the future.

(Signed) SCHEBEKO.

No. 67

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Embassies
in Germany, Austria, France, England, and Italy.*

ST. PETERSBURG, July 18/31.

In reference to my telegram of the 30th : by order of his Government, the British Ambassador has transmitted to me the desire of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula presented by me yesterday to the German Ambassador. I answered that I agreed to the English proposal and herewith transmit the accordingly modified formula.

"If Austria will agree to stop military operations in Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has acquired the character of a European question, she will allow the Great Powers to examine the question of the satisfaction that Serbia could give to Austria without suffering any loss of her sovereign rights and independence, Russia will undertake to maintain an expectant attitude."

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 68

*Russian Embassy in Germany to the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs.*

BERLIN, July 18/31.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our negotiations, rendered already difficult through the mobilization against Austria, have become still more so, in view of our serious military measures against Germany herself ; that news about this appears to have been received here from all quarters, and must inevitably call for counter-measures on the part of Germany. I answered him that I had trustworthy evidence, corroborated by all my fellow-countrymen who had arrived in Berlin, that measures against us were in full force. Regardless of this the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that only officers on leave were being called back and troops were returning from manœuvres.

(Signed) SVERVIEF.

NO. 69

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London.

(TELEGRAM.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 18/31.

I have conveyed to the British Ambassador a request to express to Grey my most sincere thanks for the adoption by him in the negotiations with Germany and Austria of a firm and friendly tone, thanks to which the hope of a peaceful issue from the present situation is not yet lost. I asked him to convey to the British Minister my belief that the only chance of success lies in conversations in London, which may make it easier for Austria to accept the necessary compromise. This has been communicated to the Ambassador in France.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 70

Secret Telegram to the Imperial Representatives Abroad.

ST. PETERSBURG, July 19/August 1.

At midnight the German Ambassador informed me, by order of his Government, that unless in twelve hours, that is by midday on Saturday, we demobilized, not only against Germany but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilization. On my question if that was equivalent to war, the Ambassador answered "No," but said that we should come very near to it.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

NO. 71

Ambassador in England to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

LONDON, July 19/August 1.

Grey told me that he has telegraphed to Berlin saying that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government presents a basis for negotiation offering some chance for a peaceful solution of the conflict. He expressed

the hope that no Great Power would commence warlike operations until the formula has been examined.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 72

Russian Embassy in England to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, July 19/August 1.

"The British Government has asked Germany and France whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium. France has answered in the affirmative. The German Government has stated that she cannot answer that question in a categorical form.

(Signed) BENCKENDORFF.

No. 73

Russian Ambassador in France to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PARIS, July 19/August 1.

The Austrian Ambassador was yesterday evening with M. Viviani, and informed him that Austria not only has no intention of destroying Servian territorial integrity, but is ready to discuss her quarrel with Servia with the other Powers. The French Government is anxious about the extraordinary military preparations of Germany on the French frontier, and is convinced that under the cover of martial law mobilization is being carried out.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

No. 74

Ambassador in France to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(TELEGRAM.)

PARIS, July 19/August 1.

On the receipt here of a telegram from the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the effect that the German Ambassador has communicated to you Germany's decision

to mobilize to-day, the President of the Republic signed the order for mobilization. Notices calling up the reservists are being posted in the streets. The German Ambassador has just visited Viviani, but has made no new communication to him, giving as his reason the impossibility of deciphering the telegram which he has received. Viviani has informed him of the issue of mobilization orders in reply to the German mobilization, and expressed his astonishment that Germany should proceed to such measures at the moment when a friendly exchange of views between Russia, Austria, and the Powers was still going on. He added that mobilization did not yet mean war, and just as the Russian Ambassador remains in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, so the German Ambassador could remain in Paris.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

NO. 75

Russian Embassy in France to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PARIS, July 19/August 1.

According to the President, the Austrian Ambassador recently assured him and the Council of Ministers that Austria had expressed her readiness to respect not only the territorial integrity of Servia, but also her sovereign rights, and that we had deliberately remained silent about this declaration. I categorically denied this.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

NO. 76

Note from the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ST. PETERSBURG, July 19/August 1, 7.10 p.m.

The Imperial Government has endeavoured since the beginning of the crisis to arrive at an understanding. In consequence of a desire expressed by the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor in agreement with England, made endeavours to play the rôle of a mediator between

the Vienna and St. Petersburg Cabinets. Meanwhile Russia, not waiting for the result, ordered a general mobilization on land and sea. In consequence of these measures, not provoked by any measure on the part of Germany, there is a serious danger to the German Empire. If the Imperial German Government did not take steps to stop this danger, it would undermine the safety of Germany. The German Government therefore found itself compelled to ask the Russian Government to stop the above-mentioned military measures. Since Russia refused (did not find it necessary to answer) to satisfy this desire, and meant by this refusal that her step was directed against Germany, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency by order of my Government that His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, considers himself in a state of war with Russia.

(Signed) POURTALES.

No. 77

Communication of the Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning events of the last few days.

July 20/August 2.

In consequence of distorted reports of the events of recent days having appeared in the foreign Press, the Minister of Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to give the following short account of diplomatic relations during that time. On July 10th (23rd) of this year the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade handed the Servian Government a Note charging the latter with the guilt for the propagation of the Pan-Serb movement which led to the assassination of the Austrian Heir Apparent. In view of this the Austrian Government solemnly demanded from the Servian Government not only a solemn condemnation of the above propaganda but also the undertaking of a number of measures carried out under the control of Austria for disclosing the plot, for punishing those Servian subjects who had participated in it, and for suppressing all such attempts in the Royal territory in future. For an answer to the above the Servian Government was given forty-eight hours.

The Imperial Government, being informed only seventeen hours after its presentation by the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the text of the Note which was handed in at Belgrade concerning the terms of these demands, could not overlook the fact that some of them were essentially impossible to fulfil, whilst others were presented in a form inconsistent with the dignity of an independent State. Considering inadmissible the degradation of Serbia included in these demands and the aspirations of Austria to assert her predominance in the Balkans, the Russian Government in the most friendly manner showed Austria the desirability of submitting to fresh discussion certain points in the Austrian Note. But the Austrian Government would in no way agree to discussing the Note. Similarly moderating influences of the other Powers in Vienna met with no success. Notwithstanding Serbia's condemnation of the criminal act and her aforesaid readiness to give satisfaction to Austria to an extent which exceeded the expectations not only of Russia but of all the other Powers, the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade considered the Servian reply unsatisfactory and left Belgrade. At an earlier stage, in view of the excessiveness of the Austrian demands, Russia, though expressing the impossibility of her remaining indifferent, did not refuse to apply all her strength for obtaining a peaceful issue and one which would be acceptable to Austria and at the same time not touch her pride as a Great Power. Meanwhile Russia firmly asserted that she was seeking a peaceful solution of the question as long as that solution did not mean the diminution of Servian dignity as an independent State. Unfortunately all the efforts of the Imperial Government were made in vain. The Austrian Government, declining any conciliatory mediation of the Powers in its dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilize, officially declaring war on Serbia, and on the following day began the bombardment of Belgrade. In the manifesto accompanying the outbreak of war, Serbia is openly accused of preparing and carrying out the Serajevo crime. Such an accusation of the whole people in this crime has by its obvious untruth evoked for Serbia

the sympathy of all Europe. In consequence of this action of the Austrian Government, carried out in spite of Russia's announcement that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Imperial Government was compelled to declare mobilization of the Kief, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan military districts. This decision was caused by absolute necessity, in view of the fact that five days had elapsed between the day of the handing of the Austrian Note to Servia and the first steps taken by Russia, while at the same time no steps had been taken by the Vienna Cabinet to meet our peaceable overtures, but on the contrary the mobilization of half the Austrian army had been declared. With reference to the Russian measures undertaken, the German Government was told that they were caused by the Austrian military measures, and were in no way aimed at Germany. Meanwhile the Imperial Government showed the willingness of Russia, either by means of direct discussions with the Vienna Cabinet or by means of a conference of the four Powers not directly interested, namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy, to continue negotiations for the peaceful solution of the quarrel. But this attempt also of Russia was not crowned with success. Austria declined to exchange views with us, and the Berlin Cabinet would not take part in the proposed Conference of the Powers. Nevertheless, Russia continued her efforts to preserve peace. On the question of the German Ambassador, who asked us to say on what condition we would agree to the arrest of our military preparations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that admission of Austria that the Austro-Servian dispute had acquired the character of a European question, and a declaration from her that she agrees not to insist on those demands which are not consistent with the sovereign rights of Servia, would be a necessary condition of the arrest of these preparations. The proposal of Russia was considered by Germany to be unacceptable to Austria. Meanwhile, in St. Petersburg news was received of a general mobilization on the part of Austria. At that time military operations were going on in Servian territory, and Belgrade was subjected to further

bombardment. In consequence of the failure of our peace proposals, it became necessary to take larger military precautions. On the inquiries on this matter by the Berlin Cabinet, it was answered that we were compelled to begin military preparations in order to guard against all possibilities. While taking these precautions, Russia continued with all her strength to seek a solution, and declared her readiness to agree to all means of solving the quarrel which would keep our conditions intact. Notwithstanding these peaceful communications, the German Government on July 18th sent Russia a demand, which ran up to 12 o'clock on July 19th, to stop all military measures, threatening, in the contrary event, to proceed to general mobilization. On the following day, July 19th, the German Ambassador handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the name of his Government, a Declaration of War.

NO. 78

Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Imperial Representatives Abroad.

(TELEGRAPHIC.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 20/August 2.

Undoubtedly Germany is already trying to lay upon us the responsibility for a rupture. Our mobilization is called forth by the great responsibility which would have rested upon us had we not taken all precautionary steps during the time that Austria, while carrying on negotiations, was bombarding Belgrade and had proceeded to a general mobilization.

The Emperor bound himself by word to the Kaiser that he would not undertake any aggressive action as long as conversations with Austria continued. After such guarantee and after all Russia's evidence of her love of peace, Germany had no right to doubt our assertion that a peaceful solution would be gladly accepted so long as it was consistent with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other issue was altogether incompatible with our own dignity, and of course would have shaken the equilibrium of Europe, con-

firming the hegemony of Germany. The European world-wide character of the conflict is infinitely more important than the matter which has created it. For the decision to declare war on us, at a time when conversations between the Powers were proceeding, Germany takes upon herself the heavy responsibility.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 79

Note Communicated by the Austrian Minister in St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ST. PETERSBURG, July 24/August 6.

By order of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has the honour to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government of Russia the following : Taking into account the threatening attitude assumed by Russia on the Austro-Servian conflict, and in view of the fact that in consequence of this conflict Russia, according to the communication of the Berlin Cabinet, has taken open warlike measures against Germany, and the latter has therefore found herself in a state of war with Russia, Austria from this moment considers herself in a state of war with Russia.

(Signed) SZAPARY.

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WHITE PAPER ISSUED BY THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION—EXTRACTS AND ANALYSIS

PART I

MEMORANDUM ABOUT THE SERVIAN PROPAGANDA

“THE Servian propaganda to upset the Austro-Hungarian Government goes far back into history.”

“The Servian Government has countenanced and assisted it.”

“The Narodna Odbrana, although private, is run with the assistance and connivance of the Servian Government. Many subjects of the Monarchy have been taken under the wing of the society and have been used to carry out their designs. In 1909 as many as 140 such individuals thus came under their influence.”

“Thus, it cannot be forgotten that on June 15, 1910, in Serajevo, at the time of the attempted murder of the Land-schef by Zerajic, the Servian journals issued highly compromising articles.”

It is interesting to learn how Zerajic came to cherish the ideas of his deeds. Before the attempt he burnt his papers. Under these circumstances the motive of his action could not come to light. But one was able through one of the badges found upon him to conclude that he held “Kropotkinisch” ideas. In the examination which was carried out it was made clear that he had come in contact with Anarchist movements in Servia.

On August 18th of that year the Servian journal *Politika*

said that Zerajic, though an anarchist, was "a heroic Servian, whose name is sacred among the people."

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana was at that time described by the society itself as follows :—

"In fanatical and unceasing toil to show the truth to the Servian people under the Monarchy, who have had their freedom taken away; to fight against Austria, the worst and greatest enemy; to extirpate with gun and cannon and to free the subjected provinces where millions of our brothers are down-trodden."

In 1909 the President of the Narodna Odbrana was Major Kovasevitch, a Servian officer. He said in a speech that they must prepare for battle against the dangerous and heartless enemy in the North who held seven millions of their brothers in slavery. Then it came to the knowledge of the judicial authorities in the Monarchy that the Servian "Sokolverein" had decided to unite in a secret union with certain analogous associations in the Monarchy whose character at that time was not quite clear. Investigation had hitherto led to no results. But at last one of the clues to the methods which had subversive tendencies of the Servian "Sokolverein" and their accomplices in the Monarchy has been found. Through their confidential friends and secret emissaries they carried poison into the minds of aimless youths.

The agitation was also carried into Croatia, the object of the Narodna Odbrana being to prepare an "atmosphere." This found expression in a series of plots which, when traced far enough back, were found to originate on Servian soil. Thus "Jukic," who fired at the Royal Commissioner in Agram on June 8, 1912, got his bomb and pistol from a Servian major in Belgrade. The bomb was made in the Servian military arsenal.

On May 20, 1913, an attempt was made by "Jacob Shupe" on the Ban of Croatia in an Agram theatre, but the attempt was at the last moment frustrated by the policeman. The examination made it clear that he had an accomplice, "Rudolf Hecigonja." The latter escaped to Servia, and it then transpired that he had taught "Shupe"

to do this deed, and had been excited to do so by the publications in the Narodna Odbrana. In this manner "Hecigonja" had worked in Agram on his friends, some of whom he had won over to his ideas. In the forefront of his plans stood the idea to assassinate the heir-apparent, Franz Ferdinand. Some months later a prosecution was instituted against "Luker Aljinovic" for treasonable propaganda. In the course of the investigation certain matters were brought out. "Aljinovic" made it clear that during 1913 in Belgrade a plot was made to assassinate the Archduke. For this object he had personally received a hundred dinars from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a Student Society. Thus one sees how the criminal action of the Narodna Odbrana has latterly concentrated upon the person of the Archduke.

But the Narodna Odbrana, instead of doing the deed themselves, obtained helpless young men, to whom they have taught these ideas, to commit them.

PART II

THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE NARODNA ODBRANA

"The principles and objects of the Narodna Odbrana were then set forth and defined as follows:—

"1. The uplifting and strengthening of the Servian national feeling.

"2. The association of all those who are sympathetic with these ideas.

"3. The formation of volunteer corps to be prepared for armed action.

"4. The collection of money for these objects.

"5. The organization and training of troops for special and independent ('Selbständiger') warfare.

"6. The protection of the Servian race."

The document then proceeds to set forth the manifesto of the Narodna Odbrana, which appeared as a special supplement of the Servian official newspaper *Serbsky*

Novinje on June 28, 1914. The manifesto ran as follows :—

“Brothers and sisters, only a part of Kossovo is avenged, only a part of St. Veittages is atoned for. As wide as are the provinces which contain our race, the Servian, Croatian and Slavonian people, from Kikendir to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo Selo, so great is the importance to us of St. Veittages and Kossovo. So many souls of our brothers in these lands are weeping, so many chains are hanging on them, so much work have we yet to do, so much still to sacrifice. St. Veittages has a meaning for us every day the sorrow lasts, but to-day we have gone deep into the life of the Servian people, for behind us is a great and glorious national history, and before us an even greater and more glorious. To-day, when we are in the midst of proving our national destiny, St. Veittages’ day must be for us the day of great joy and pride, not only for what is past but for what is to come. Servian men and women ! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes and Croats living beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the children of the Royal Kingdom, and their breasts are warmed with joy and hope when they realize their national ideals. God helps the courageous. Forward all ! The task which is not yet finished calls us. On St. Veittages’ day, 1914, in Belgrade.”

PART III

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE TAKEN BY THE SERVIAN COURT MARTIAL OVER “PRINCIP” AT SERAJEVO

1. *The Account of the Plot.*

The accused made the following statement :—

In April 1914, while in Belgrade, “Princip” hatched the plot with other students to kill the Archduke. He met “Cabrinovitch,” who favoured the plan. He (Princip) wanted to get the money, bombs, and pistols from the Narodna Odbrana, or from Major Precicevich, but finally arranged to get them from “Milan Ciganovich,” an official in the railway service. About Easter “Princip” met

"Grabez" and told him of the plan. Then a Servian officer, "Major Tankovich," taught them to shoot with it in the woods near Belgrade. On May 27th "Ciganovitch" gave "Princip," "Cabrinovitch," and "Grabez" six bombs, four Browning pistols and ammunition, and a glass tube with cyanide, which he taught him how to use if he needed it. He also gave him money.

2. *The Bombs and Passports.*

The five bombs which were not exploded were examined by the police. They were Servian military hand grenades, the same as the twenty-one which were found in 1913 on the Save, near Breko. According to their covering they came from the Servian Government Arsenal at Kragevatz. "Grabez" spoke of them as "Kragevatz bombs."

"Ciganovitch" then told the three men that they should go via Sabric and Loznitsen to Tuzler and see there "M. Ivanovitz," who would hand them the weapons. They should then go back to Sabric and see the frontier official, "Popovitch," for whom he gave a receipt. Accordingly on May 28th the three accomplices came with their weapons to Belgrade. They then returned to Sabric, where "Princip" handed over the receipt which he had got from "Ciganovitch" to "Popovitch." The latter then took them to the Commander, who furnished them with passports in which it was stated that one of them was a "Finanzwachmann," and the two others his comrades. Then they got a passport to proceed over the frontier via Loznitza, and crossed the frontier on foot as "Finanzwachmann" with the bombs and revolvers.

PART IV

SERVIAN PRESS ON THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION

"The *Balkan* for June 29th makes a bald statement about the murder without comment.

"The *Piemont* for July 1st said that the work of 'Princip'

has its explanation in the Bosnian system of Government, and says that the 'despair of these young martyrs was natural and intelligible.'

"The *Odjic* on July 3rd referred to the visit of the Archduke to Serajevo as 'a brutal manifestation of power and subjection, which had its counterpart in feelings of hatred and revenge.'

"The *Pravda* for July 4th said 'the down-trodden races of the Monarchy must have this method of protection since all other ways are impossible.'"

The following is the report of a meeting of the Narodna Odbrana in Nisch after the murder of the Archduke; it is said to have been received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna from a confidential person whose name is not disclosed. At this meeting the President, who was also director of the Mider Police Magistracy, Jaser Neuadovic, made the following speech:—

"Servians were bound to find the means to undertake the attempt on the Archduke, since his aggressive and eccentric character was a terrible danger for Serbia, and also for other Slav lands. If he had lived he would, in short, have challenged Serbia to war, and would have seized her, in which case Serbia, still weak and not yet ready with her defence organization, would have been lost. Now, since the Serajevo murder, Serbia is rescued, and thereby one who is dangerous to Serbia was got out of the way. Serbia will now have some years of peace, and the new heir-apparent, if he lives, is likely to follow the steps of his predecessor. Bombs and revolvers must play their proper part. If there is a Servian God we cannot allow matters to stop here." *

* The authenticity of this report is doubtful. The story sounds improbable, and the refusal of the Austrian Government to disclose the source of their information excites suspicion, especially in a Government that is capable of "Friedjung trial" and "Prochaska" methods.—ED.

BELGIAN GREY BOOK

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE WAR OF 1914

NO. 1

*Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister in Vienna to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels.*

VIENNA, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to present you the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia.

(Here follows the Austrian Note. See White Paper 4.)

NO. 2

*Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, Belgium,
Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

BRUSSELS, July 24, 1914.

The Government of the King is asked if under the present circumstances it will make, to the Powers who have guaranteed its independence and neutrality, a communication confirming her resolution to fulfil her international obligations which will be imposed on her in case of war breaking out on her frontiers. It has come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at the present hour, but that events might be forced and could not allow time at the desired moment for the necessary instructions to its representatives abroad. In this situation I have proposed to the King and to my

colleagues in the Cabinet, who have come round to my point of view, to give you precise indications of the *démarche* that you should make in case the Franco-German war becomes imminent. You will find a letter signed, but not dated, which you should read and leave a copy with the Minister of Foreign Affairs if the circumstances require. I will indicate by telegram the moment of action. The telegram will be addressed to you at the hour of mobilization of the Belgian Army, if contrary to our sincere desire and to the hopes of a pacific solution we are compelled to take measures of extreme precaution.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX TO NO. 2

The international situation is grave. Belgium has observed with scrupulous exactitude the duties of a neutral State, imposed on her in 1839. This she intends to fulfil whatever the consequences. The friendly attitude of the Powers in this respect has been confirmed, that Belgium can have confidence in seeing that her territory remains free from attack if hostilities come near her frontiers.

All the measures necessary to ensure the observation of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the King's Government. The Belgian Army is mobilized, and takes its stand on the strategic position chosen to ensure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and the Meuse are in a state of defence.

It is necessary to insist that these measures have no other object except that of putting Belgium in a position to safeguard its international obligations. She is not, and cannot be, inspired by a desire to take part in an armed conflict with the Powers nor by any sentiments of defiance towards any of them. Conforming with the order which I have received, I have the honour to submit to you a copy of the declaration of our action. The communication has been made to all other Powers who have guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.

No. 3

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

BRUSSELS, July 28, 1914.

I have addressed to your colleagues accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium a circular without date of which you will find a text enclosed. If the menace of a Franco-German war becomes imminent the circular will be communicated to the Governments of the Powers, that they may know our resolution to fulfil the international obligations which are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839. The communication will only be effectual on a telegraphic order on my part. If circumstances cause me to give this order, I ask you also by telegraph to give recognition of our *démarche* to the Government to which you are accredited, while communicating to it a copy of this joint circular by way of information and without demanding that you should give proof of this communication. My telegram will indicate to you eventually the date which ought to be added to this circular. This date you should take care to inscribe on the copy which you will hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is necessary that the present dispatch and its annex should be strictly confidential in character, till the receipt of new instructions on my part.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

(Here follows the Annex to No. 2.)

No. 4

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at Belgrade to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to forward to you enclosed the text of the answer made by the Servian Government to the Austrian communication of July 23rd.

(Signed) MICHOTTE DE WELLE.

(Here follows the text of the Servian reply.)

No. 5

Communication on July 26, 1914, by the Austrian Legation in Brussels to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

M. Pashitch gave yesterday, before 6 o'clock, the answer of the Servian Government to the Austrian Note. This answer not being considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and his personnel have left Belgrade. Servian mobilization had also been decreed three hours before.

No. 6

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, July 27, 1914.

According to a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, the Servian Government has given way on all points to the Austrian Note. It will admit of the collaboration of Austrian officials, if it is in accordance with international law. The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires thinks that this must be satisfactory unless Austria wants war. Nevertheless the impression is more favourable to-day because hostilities against Servia have not yet begun. The British Government proposes the intervention of England, Germany, France, and Italy, at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to find a basis of conciliation. Germany only has not yet answered. The Emperor will decide.

(Signed) BARON BEYRENS.

No. 7

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Vienna to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

VIENNA, July 28, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has notified a declaration of war by Austro-Hungary on Servia.

No. 8

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, Holland, and Luxemburg.

BRUSSELS, July 29, 1914.

The Belgian Government has decided to put the Belgian Army on a reinforced peace footing. This measure must be in no way confounded with mobilization. Because of the smallness of her territory Belgium constitutes a one-frontier zone. Her army on an ordinary peace footing is only composed of one class of militia under arms. On a reinforced peace footing her divisions of the army and of the cavalry, thanks to the recall of three classes, have their effective counterpart to those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers. This will enable you to reply to the questions which may be put to you.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 9

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London.

BRUSSELS, July 31, 1914.

The French Minister has come to show me a telegram of the Havas Agency decreeing a "state of siege" in Germany, and said to me as follows: "I take the opportunity of telling you no incursion of troops will take place into Belgium. Even if important forces are massed on the frontiers of your country, France does not wish to bear the responsibility of taking the first act of hostility in regard to Belgium. Instructions to this effect will be given to the French authorities." I thanked M. Klobukofsky for his communication, and I thought it necessary to remark to him that we have always had the greatest confidence in the loyalty of our two neighbouring States in maintaining their engagements towards us. We also have every ground for believing that the attitude of the German Government would be identical with that of the French Republic.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 10

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chiefs of the Legations abroad.

BRUSSELS, July 31, 1914.

Minister of Foreign Affairs is informed that mobilization is ordered. First day of mobilization, Saturday, August 1st.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 11

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London, Berlin, and Paris.

BRUSSELS, July 31, 1914.

The British Minister has asked to see me urgently, and has made the following communication to me which he wished to make several days ago. In consequence of the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments respectively if each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided that no other Power violates it.

"In view of the existing treaties," said the Minister, "I am instructed to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgium that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do all in its power to preserve and maintain its neutrality, and it is desired that all other Powers will do the same to maintain it." I have thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government specially appreciates, and I have added that Great Britain and other nations who are guaranteeing our independence can be assured that we will neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and we are convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations and confidence which we have always maintained with them, will observe and maintain their neutrality. I have not failed to affirm that our military power, considerably developed in consequence of our recent re-organization, will energetically defend any violation of our land. In the course of the conversation

which followed, Sir Francis Villiers appeared a little surprised at the rapidity with which we had ordered the mobilization of our army. I had remarked that the Dutch had taken an identical step, and that the date of our military regime and of the preparations which we had decided on this occasion imposed on us urgent and complete measures. Our neighbours and guarantors ought to see in this resolution a desire to show our deep wish to maintain our neutrality. Sir Francis Villiers appeared satisfied with my answer, and assured me that his Government awaited this answer to complete the negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which will be communicated.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 12

*Letter from Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
Belgian Ministers in London, Berlin, and Paris.*

BRUSSELS, July 31, 1914.

This morning, in the course of a conversation which my department had with M. von Below, we explained to the German Minister the extent of the military measures which we had taken, and told him that it was in consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations that they did not imply any form of defiance towards our neighbours. The Secretary-General also asked from the German Minister if he had any knowledge of the conversation which had taken place with his predecessor, M. de Flatow, and the answer which the Chancellor of the Empire had charged him to make. In the course of the agitation which was raised in 1911 concerning the fortifications of Flushing by the Dutch Government, certain journals had affirmed that in the case of a Franco-German war our neutrality would be violated by Germany. The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration made by the German Parliament on the occasion of a debate on political affairs would have the nature of appeasing public opinion, and would calm the distrust, so regrettable from the standpoint of the relation between the two

countries. M. Bethmann-Hollweg stated that he had been very much impressed by the sentiments that had inspired our *démarche*. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality, but he thought that, in making a public declaration, Germany would weaken her military position against France, who, reassured on the north side, would bring all her forces on the west. Baron von der Elst, at that time, said that he understood perfectly the objection made by M. Bethmann-Hollweg to the public declaration suggested, and he recalled that in 1913 M. Jagow had made before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag reassuring declarations about the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Below has answered, and in the course of conversation said that these sentiments had not been changed.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX TO NO. 12

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, May 2, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you according to the *North German Gazette* about the declarations made in the course of the sitting on April 29th of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War concerning the neutrality of Belgium. A member of the Social Democratic party said that in Belgium one views with some apprehension the approach of a Franco-German war because it is thought that Germany will not respect Belgian neutrality. M. Jagow, however, said that the neutrality of Belgium was fixed by international convention, and Germany is bound to respect these conventions. This statement did not satisfy another member of the Social Democratic party. Herr Jagow observed that he had nothing to add to the plain statements which he had made relative to the relationship of Germany with Belgium. To some more questions put by the Social Democratic

party, Herr Heering, Minister of War, answered : " Belgium does not play any part in the plan of German military organization, such as is justifiable by the situation in the East. Germany would not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties." To a member of the Progressive party, speaking once more about Belgium, Herr Jagow repeated again that his statement about Belgium was sufficiently clear.

(Signed) BARON BEYRENS.

NO. 13

Telegram addressed by Count Lalaing, the Belgian Minister in London, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 1, 1914.

England has demanded from France and Germany respectively if they would respect the territory of Belgium, providing that their enemy did not violate it. The German answer is awaited. The French have accepted.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

NO. 14

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs if in the case of war Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium, and the Minister has answered that he cannot answer that question.

(Signed) BARON BEYRENS.

NO. 15

Letter from Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London.

BRUSSELS, August 1, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has furnished us verbally with the following statement :—

" I am authorized to declare that in the case of inter-

national conflict the Government of the Republic will in all cases respect the neutrality of Belgium. If this neutrality shall not be respected by another Power the French Government might, for the purposes of its own defences, have to modify its attitude."

I have to thank his Excellency, and have added that on my part we have without delay taken all necessary measures for the respect of our independence and our frontier.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 16

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna.

BRUSSELS, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in the letter of July 24th.
[See No. 2.]

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 17

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

BRUSSELS, August 1, 1914.

Follow up instructions given in my letter of 25th February.
[See No. 3.]

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 18

Telegram from M. Eyschen, President of the Government of Luxemburg, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LUXEMBURG, August 2, 1914.

I have the honour to bring to the notice of your Excellency the following facts :—

On Sunday, August the 2nd, early in the morning,

German troops, according to the information which has been received in the Grand Duchy, at that time entered Luxemburg territory at the points between Wasserbillig and Remich. They marched towards the south of the country and towards Luxemburg. A certain number of armoured trains with arms and ammunition have been dispatched by the railway from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg and are expected to arrive at any moment. This constitutes an act contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government has not failed to protest energetically against this aggression to the representative of the German Government at Luxemburg. A similar protest has been sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

NO. 19

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 1, 1914.

I have informed the German Minister through M. Basompierre that a communiqué of M. Klobukofski, the French Minister, to the Brussels Press announces the formal declaration which the latter made to me on August 1st. On meeting Herr Below, the latter thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been charged with making any official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion of the security we had a right to expect from our neighbours in the East. I immediately answered that we knew the intentions indicated by him in former interviews allowed us of no doubt as to their perfectly correct attitude with regard to Belgium. I added that we should attach a great value to a formal declaration, which the nation would recognize with satisfaction.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

Note sent on August 2nd by Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 7.0 p.m.

BRUSSELS, August 2, 1914.

From the Imperial Embassy in Germany. Very confidential :—

The Imperial Government has received reliable information of a prospective march of the French forces by way of Maas, Strecke, Givet, and Namur. They have no doubt that the intention of France is to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory. The Imperial Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, will not be in a position without assistance to defend itself against the French march, which alone can give complete security against the danger threatening Germany. It is a necessity of self-preservation for Germany to parry this hostile attack. The German Government would regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility the fact that Germany is obliged to violate Belgian territory on account of the measures of her enemy. In order to avoid any misunderstanding the Imperial Government explains its position as follows :—

1. Germany has no intention of any animosity against Belgium. If Belgium is willing in the coming war to remain in benevolent neutrality towards Germany, the latter on her part will undertake at the conclusion of the war to guarantee the independence of its kingdom.

2. Germany also undertakes for the above consideration to evacuate the territory of the kingdom at the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium behaves in a friendly manner Germany is prepared to pay for all the needs of her troops and to make good any damage which may be caused by those troops.

4. Should Belgium be hostile to Germany and particularly seek to hinder her advance by a defence of Maas fortification or by destruction of railways, streets, tunnels, or other

artificial erections, Germany will with regret be forced to regard Belgium as an enemy. In this case Germany would not feel disposed to enter into any engagement, but would leave the settlement between the two States to force of arms. The Imperial Government hopes that this will not be necessary, and that the Belgian Government will take such steps as will prevent any such occurrence. In this case the friendly relations of the two States will be further and more lastingly consolidated.

NO. 21

Note of Interview between Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, and the Secretary-General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister demanded to see the Secretary-General. He said he had been informed by his Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs and that a patrol of French cavalry had violated international law and had crossed the frontier without a declaration of war. The Secretary-General asked Herr Below where this had taken place, and he answered in Germany. The Secretary-General remarked that in that case he could not understand the object of the interview. Herr Below said that these acts were contrary to the law of nations, being of such a nature as to lead one to suppose that other acts contrary to the laws of nations would be committed by France.

NO. 22

Note sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels.

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

According to the Note of August 3rd the German Government has been informed that according to reliable information French forces intend to march across the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of its desire, will not be able to repulse without help the French troops. The German Government considers itself under

the obligation to prevent this attack and the violation of Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the Belgian Government to take steps in order to guarantee the integrity of Belgium and its possessions fully. The Note adds that if Belgium makes difficulties in a march of Belgian troops Germany will feel herself obliged to look upon her as an enemy, and the solution in future between the two States will have to be settled by force of arms. This Note provoked among the Government of the King a profound and painful impression. The intentions which it attributes to France are contrary to the declaration by France which has been given to us in the name of the Republic. If, contrary to our hope, a violation of Belgian neutrality is committed by France, Belgium will fulfil all her international obligations and her army will oppose the invader to the uttermost. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, assured the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of His Majesty the King of Prussia. Belgium has always been true to her international obligations. She has fulfilled them in a spirit of loyal impartiality and has not neglected any effort to obtain or cause respect for her neutrality. The attempt on her independence, the menace of the German Government, forms a violation of the right of nations. The strategical interests do not justify a violation of this right. The Belgian Government, in accepting the propositions which were notified to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and would betray its cause before Europe. Conscious of the rôle that Belgium has played for eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to think that the independence of Belgium could not otherwise be maintained than at the price of the neutrality of our nation. If this step is decided upon, the Belgian Government is determined to repel it by all the means in its power in order to maintain her rights.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 23

Telegram addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, and The Hague.

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

Germany has handed at 7 o'clock a Note proposing benevolent neutrality to Belgium, promising the maintenance of the independence of the kingdom and its possession at the conclusion of peace; threatening, on the other hand, to treat Belgium as an enemy in case of refusal. Twelve hours are allowed for an answer. We have replied that this was an attempt on our neutrality, and that the acceptance of the German proposal would be a sacrifice of the honour of the nation. Conscious of its rights, Belgium has decided to withstand to the utmost the aggression.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 24

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

As you know, Germany has sent to Belgium an ultimatum expiring this morning, August 3rd, at 7 o'clock. No act of war has been committed at the actual hour, and therefore the Council of Ministers has decided that for the moment there is no need to make an appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. The French Minister has told me on this point, without being charged with instructions from his Government, "I believe that I can say that if the Belgian Government calls on the French Government, as a Power guaranteeing its neutrality, we will answer to its call immediately. If this appeal is not made, it is probable, at least well understood, that the care of her own defences will determine the exceptional measures which she will decide to take when Belgium has made an effort of resistance." I have thanked M. Klobukofsky for the support which the French Government will offer us eventually,

and have told him that the Belgian Government has not made for the moment any call upon the guaranteeing Powers, and reserves itself to appreciate later on whatever may take place.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 25

Telegram from the King of Belgium to the King of England.

Remembering the numerous marks of friendship of Your Majesty and of Your predecessors in the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and of the proof of the sympathy which she will again afford us, I make a supreme appeal for the diplomatic intervention of the Government of His Majesty to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

(Signed) ALBERT.

NO. 26

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 3, 1914.

I have shown your telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey), which he has communicated to the Cabinet. The Minister has told me that if our neutrality is violated there will be war with Germany.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

NO. 27

Letter from Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

I have been charged and have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, in consequence of the opposition of the Belgian Government to the well-intentioned proposals which the Imperial Government has submitted, it feels compelled with extreme regret to execute, if necessary by force of arms, the measures of security which are deemed to be indispensable to prevent French attack. I offer the expression of my highest esteem.

(Signed) VON BELOW.

No. 28

Note sent by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in Belgium, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

I am charged to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany exercises pressure to force Belgium to abandon her rôle as a neutral country, the Government of Great Britain expects that Belgium will resist with all the means in its power. The British Government in this case is prepared to join with Russia and France, if Belgium desires, to offer to her without delay a common assistance, to resist measures of pressure employed by Germany, and at the same time to offer a guarantee to maintain the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future.

(Signed) F. VILLIERS.

No. 29

Letter addressed by the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE HAGUE, August 4, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Queen's Government will be compelled under these grave circumstances to set up a war beacon on the Scheldt. The Note which announced this decision was read to me. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the Note, which was sent to me yesterday. As you see, the Scheldt will be only closed at night. During the day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been provided with the necessary naval passes. In this manner the interests of the defence of Dutch territory and that of the Belgian navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. You will note in consequence that the Dutch Government have demanded in the case of war beacons being set up that we withdraw the lightships set up at Vielingen and Vandelaar, in order to facilitate the neutrality of the Netherlands. I must remark that the terms employed in the Note, "the ascent of the Scheldt,"

are not sufficiently explicit. To descend the river will be permitted under the same conditions. The Minister will give me this assurance. As soon as the Dutch Government has decided on this measure I shall be informed. It is necessary to give six hours' notice of war beacons. I will telegraph you immediately.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

NOTE ANNEXED TO NO. 29

The Government of the Queen may be obliged in the interests of the maintenance of Dutch neutrality to set up on the Scheldt a war beacon, that is, to move or alter some of the beacons and lights. At all times the war beacons have been arranged in such a manner that after its institution it will be possible to ascend the Scheldt to reach Antwerp during the day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been provided with the necessary naval passes. In acting in this manner the Government of the Queen is convinced of being able to uphold the interests of the defence of Dutch territory and of the Belgian navigation of Antwerp. After war beacons on the Scheldt have been set up there will be no longer reason to enter the passage of the sea-way at Flushing during the night, and as the presence of the lightships at Vielingen and Vandelaar is not indispensable for navigation during the day, the Dutch Government will be much obliged if the Belgian Government will in the case of setting up war beacons withdraw the said ships in view of facilitating the maintenance of Dutch neutrality.

No. 30

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

The General Staff has been informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemminich.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 31

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the German Minister at Brussels, Herr Below.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that to-day the Government of the King no longer recognizes your diplomatic character and ceases to have official relations. Your Excellency will find herewith your passports, which will render necessary your departure and that of your legation.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 32

Letter from Herr Below, the German Minister at Brussels, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's letter of the 4th, and to inform you that I have put the care of the Imperial Legation at Brussels into the hands of my colleague of the United States.

(Signed) VON BELOW.

NO. 33

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister in Madrid.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

Will you ask the Spanish Government if it will take charge of protection of Belgian interests in Germany, and in this case to give the necessary instructions to the Ambassador in Berlin?

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 34

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at Berlin.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

The German Minister left the country this evening. Ask for your passports. We have asked the Government of

Madrid to authorize the Spanish Embassy to be kind enough to take charge of Belgium's interests in Germany.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 35

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BERLIN, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to submit to you the translation of the speech of the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag to-day concerning the odious violation of our territory as follows : "We find ourselves in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already penetrated to Belgium. That is a contravention of the law of nations. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she has resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her adversary respects it. But we know that France holds herself ready to invade Belgium. France can wait; we cannot. A French attack on the lower Rhine district would be fatal. Thus we are forced to pass over the justifiable protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The injustice which we have committed in this manner we will repair when our military object has been attained. To one who is menaced like we are, and who is struggling for existence, it is only possible to think of the means of getting out." It is necessary to remark that Herr Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes without any doubt that Germany has violated international law in entering Belgian territory and has committed an injustice to us.

(Signed) BARON BEYRENS.

NO. 36

Letter from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the Prime Minister has made to-day in the House of Commons a new declara-

tion relating to the European crisis. After recalling the principal points exposed by Sir Edward Grey yesterday, the Prime Minister spoke : (1) Of the telegram of Sir Francis Villiers received this morning which makes known the tenor of the second ultimatum addressed by the German Government to the Belgian Government and which you have sent this afternoon. (2) About the telegram by which you have announced the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich, of which I gave a copy to Sir Arthur Nicolson. (3) About a telegram addressed this morning by the German Government to its Ambassador in London with the object of misleading public opinion about its attitude. Here is the translation from a paper this evening : "Please dispel the mistrust which the British Government may have on the subject of our intentions by repeating in the most positive manner the formal assurance that in case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will under no pretext annex Belgian territory. The sincerity of this declaration is corroborated by the fact that Germany has solemnly given her word to Holland to respect her neutrality. It is evident that we cannot annex Belgian territory in an advantageous manner without making territorial acquisition at the expense of Holland. Please make it clear to Sir Edward Grey that it is impossible to expose the German army to an attack through Belgium. An attack from incontestable information was projected. Consequently Germany has not taken account of the neutrality of Belgium, in order to avoid what is for her a question of life and death, namely, a French attack through Belgium."

Mr. Asquith has in consequence stated in the Chamber that in answer to this Note of the German Government the British Government has renewed the proposal of last week, namely, to give the same assurance about Belgian neutrality as France gave last week to England and Belgium. The English Cabinet is awaiting an answer from Berlin.

(Signed) DE LALAING.

No. 37

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has made known to the British Ministers of Norway, Holland, and Belgium that England expects that these three kingdoms will resist the pressure of Germany and guard their neutrality. In their resistance they will be supported by England, who is ready to co-operate with France and Russia, if it is the desire of the three Governments, to offer an alliance to the said Governments to repel the use of force by Germany, and to guarantee to maintain the integrity and independence of the three kingdoms. I have remarked that Belgium is neutral in perpetuity. The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered, "That is in case neutrality is violated."

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 38

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you of the order of certain events which have marked, during these last days, the relations with Belgium with certain of the Powers guaranteeing neutrality and independence. On July 31st the Minister in England made to me a verbal communication concerning the terms which, in the case of a European war, Sir Edward Grey had demanded of the French and German Governments respectively, namely, whether each of them is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, in the event of the neutrality not being violated by another Power. In view of the existing treaties, Sir Francis Villiers is charged with bringing this *démarche* to the notice of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium is ready to maintain its neutrality, and that it expects other Powers to do the same. I have told the Belgian Minister that we appreciate highly the communication,

which answers our object, and have added that Great Britain, like the other Powers guaranteeing our independence, is fully assured of our desire to maintain our neutrality. This does not appear to be menaced by States with which we have cordial relations. The Government, I have remarked, has given a proof of its resolution in taking at the present moment such military measures as the situation demands. In his turn the French Minister, on August 1st, in a conversation, was authorized to make known to the British Government that in case of international conflict France will conform to her constant assertion and respect the neutrality of Belgium, and will only be brought to modify her attitude in case of violation by another Power. I have thanked his Excellency, and have added that we have already taken all the measures for securing respect for our frontiers. On August 2nd, in the morning, I had with Sir Francis Villiers another interview, in the course of which he handed me a part of what was telegraphically submitted on Saturday to his Government, namely, a report of our conversation of July 31st, taking care to reproduce the solemn declaration which he had made of the desire of Belgium to defend her own frontiers from whatever side she might be invaded. He added that "we know that France has given you assurances, but England has received no such response from Berlin." This last fact provokes no particular surprise, because the declaration of the German Government would appear unnecessary. On the other hand, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has affirmed, at the sitting of the Reichstag on April 29, 1914, that the neutrality of Belgium is conventionally established and that Germany has the intention of respecting this treaty. On the same day Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, presented to me at 7 a.m. a Note (see No. 20). German Government offered the Belgian Government a delay of twelve hours to make known its decision. No hesitation will be manifested on the subject of an answer which the proposal of the German Government calls for. You will find a copy herewith (see No. 22). The ultimatum expired on August 3rd at

7 a.m. Since at 10 a.m. no act of war had been committed, the Council of Ministers has decided that they will not for the moment appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. Towards the end of the day the French Minister asked me about this point, and said: "In consequence of the rapidity of events I have not yet been charged with any declaration, but I think, however, representing the intention of my Government, I can say that if the Belgian Government appeals to the French Government as a Government guaranteeing its neutrality, it would answer its call at once. If this appeal is not formulated it is probable, at least well understood, that the care of her own defences would only determine certain exceptional measures which will be expected, when Belgium makes an act of resistance." I thanked M. Klobukofsky for the eventual French offer to us, and told him that the King's Government does not make an appeal for the moment to the guaranteeing Powers, and reserves itself to appreciate ultimately what has taken place. At this moment the Council of Ministers are deliberating on the subject of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 39

Telegram from Belgian Minister in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 4, 1914.

England has summoned Germany this morning to respect the neutrality of Belgium. The ultimatum says that in view of the Note addressed to Belgium menacing the latter by force of arms if she opposes a passage of her troops, in view of the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, in view of the fact that Germany has refused to give England the same assurance which was given last week by France, England demands a satisfactory answer on the subject of respecting the neutrality of Belgium and on the treaty, which Germany has signed as well as ourselves. The ultimatum expires at midnight. In consequence of

the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposition which I have transmitted to you is annulled for the moment.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

NO. 40

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 4, 1914.

The Belgian Government regrets to announce to your Excellency that this morning forces of German troops have penetrated our territory in violation of engagements. The Belgian Government has firmly decided to resist by all means in its power. Belgium calls on England, France, and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory. Concerted measures should be taken with the object of resisting the German pressure employed against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee its integrity and independence in future. Belgium is glad to declare that she has assumed the defence of her fortified places.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 41

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

Germany having rejected the British proposals, England has declared war between the two countries at 11 o'clock.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

NO. 42

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 5, 1914.

After the violation of the Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium has made an appeal through its representatives in England, France, and Russia to co-operate as guarantors of

its territory. Belgium has assumed the defence of her fortified places.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 43

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 5, 1914.

By my dispatch of August 4th (see No. 38), I have the honour to set forth to you the course of events which have marked international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Council of Ministers examined the question to know if Belgium, whose territory was invaded since this morning, would make an appeal to her guarantors. The Council decided in favour of the affirmative when the Minister of England informed us of the proposal which he had made that the British Government was disposed to answer to our appeal of guarantee which was annulled for the moment (see No. 37). A telegram from London told me that the change of attitude was caused by the ultimatum of England, leaving to Germany ten hours for evacuating Belgian soil and respecting its neutrality (see No. 39). In the evening the King's Government, addressed through their representatives in Brussels to France, England, and Russia a Note, a copy of which you will find herewith (see No. 40). As you have remarked, Belgium made an appeal to England, France, and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of its territory and to maintain in the future its integrity and independence. She is assured of the defence of her fortified places. Up to now we do not know of the reception which has been given to our appeal.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 44

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Heads of all the Countries with which Belgium has Diplomatic Relations.

BRUSSELS, August 5, 1914.

By treaty of April 18, 1839, Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia have been declared as guarantors of

the treaty made on that day between the King of Belgium and the King of the Netherlands. This treaty holds "that Belgium shall form an independent and neutral State." Belgium has fulfilled her international obligations, she has done her duty in a loyal and impartial spirit, she has not neglected any effort to maintain the respect of her neutrality. It is also with painful emotion that the King's Government has learnt that armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing our neutrality, have penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of the engagements which they have made by treaty. It is our duty to protest with indignation against this attempt on the right of nations which no act on our part has provoked. The King's Government has firmly decided to repulse by all means in its power this attempt against its neutrality, and it recalls that in virtue of Article 10 of the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the rights and duties of Powers and neutral countries in case of war, on land it cannot consider as an hostile act the repulsion by a neutral Power of attempts on its neutrality. You should ask urgently for an audience with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and give to their Excellencies the letter of which you have left a copy. If the audience cannot be given immediately you will make a communication in writing.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 45

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Berlin to the
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

BERLIN, August 5, 1914.

I have received my passports. I will leave Berlin for Holland to-morrow.

(Signed) BARON BEYRENS.

No. 46

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister at Madrid to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 5, 1914.

The Spanish Government is charged with Belgian interests in Germany. It has given to-day telegraphic instructions to its Ambassador in Germany.

(Signed) BARON GRENIER.

No. 47

*Letter from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

PARIS, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of the notification of the state of war between France and Germany which has taken place to-day.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

ANNEX TO NO. 47

The Imperial German Government, after allowing its armed forces to violate the frontier and to commit on French territory numerous acts of death and violence, after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in spite of the stipulations in the London Convention of May 1867 and of the Hague Convention of 1907 of rights and duties of Powers and neutral countries in the case of war on land (convention signed by it and others), and after having addressed an ultimatum to the Belgian Government requiring the passage of German troops on Belgian territory in violation of the treaty of April 19, 1839, also signed by them, has declared war on France on August 4, 1914, the Government of the Republic finds itself under these conditions obliged on its part to have recourse to arms. It has, in consequence, the honour of making known to the King's Government a state of war between France and Germany from August 3rd. The Government of the Republic protests before all civilized nations, and especially before the Governments signing the Convention and the Treaties, against the violation by Germany of its international engagements. It reserves to itself the rights of reprisal in face of an enemy so little careful of its parole. The French Government, which observes the principles of the rights of nations, will conform during the hostilities and under the reserve of reprisals to the dispositions of international convention, signed by France, concerning the right of war on land and sea. The present notification, made in conformity with

Article II of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities, is sent to the British Minister in Paris on August 5, 1914.

No. 48

Communication made on August 5th by Sir Francis Villiers to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I am charged with informing the Belgian Government that the British Government considers that common action with a view to resisting Germany is justified by treaty of 1835.

(Signed) F. VILLIERS.

No. 49

Telegram addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 5, 1914.

England accepts to co-operate as guarantor in defence of our territory. The British fleet will assure a free passage of the Scheldt to revictual Antwerp.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 50

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE HAGUE, August 5, 1914.

War beacons are going to be set up.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

No. 51

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at Madrid.

BRUSSELS, August 5, 1914.

Express to the Spanish Government the thanks of the King's Government.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 52

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the Ministers of France and Russia have made this morning a *démarche* before me concerning the desire of their Governments to answer to our call and to co-operate with England in the defence of our territory.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 53

Letter from the Dutch Minister in Brussels to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

BRUSSELS, August 6, 1914.

I have the honour to enclose herewith for you a special copy of the *Staats Courant*, declaring the neutrality of Holland in a war between Belgium and Germany and between England and Germany.

(Signed) JONKHEER DE VEEDER.

ANNEX TO NO. 53

Laws and Regulations.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies are now authorized by Her Majesty to notify all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government observes in the war which has been declared between the Powers friendly with the Netherlands a strict neutrality, and in view of the observation of this neutrality the following orders have been issued :—

Article 1.—In the limits of the State territory comprising the Kingdom in Europe outside the Colonies and Possessions in other parts of the world, no kind of hostilities is permitted in their territory as may serve as a base of hostile operations.

Article 2.—The occupation of any part of the territory of the State by

a belligerent for obtaining a passage through territory by way of the land for convoys and ammunition belonging to the belligerent shall not be permitted in the territory of the Netherlands.

Article 3.—The troops of the armies belonging to the belligerent arriving on the territory of the State by way of the land are to be immediately disarmed and to be interned for the rest of the war. Battleships which belong to the belligerents and have infringed the Articles 2, 4, or 7 may not leave the territory till the end of the war.

Article 4.—The warships which belong to an enemy shall not have access to the State waters.

Article 5.—The regulation of Article 4 is not applicable to—

(1) The warships of the belligerent which, in consequence of damage or of the state of the sea, have entered any of the ports or harbours of the State. The ships must leave the above ports or harbours as soon as the circumstances have been removed for which they sought refuge.

(2) The ships of the belligerents which have entered a port situated in the territory of the Colonies exclusive of those that wish to take in provisions or fuel; those ships which have entered for these circumstances under the condition that they do not remain in the port or harbour for more than twenty-four hours; ships of war belonging to the belligerent which are used for religious, scientific, or humanitarian missions exclusively.

Article 6.—Ships of war belonging to belligerents must not repair their damage in the port or harbour of the State unless such repair is indispensable for navigation, and must not in any way assist their fighting powers.

Article 7.—Ships of a belligerent which at the commencement of the war are within the territory of the State must leave at twenty-four hours' notice from the publication of these Articles.

Article 8.—If the ships of war or gunboats belonging to the various belligerents find themselves in a position contrary to Article 5 in the same part of the world or the territory of the State, delay of not more than twenty-four hours is allowed for the departure of such ships belonging to the belligerents. Under such circumstances the order for departure is fixed by the time of arrival. A warship or gunboat belonging to the belligerents can only quit the territory twenty-four hours after the departure of a trading vessel carrying the flag of the other belligerent.

Article 9.—Ships of war or gunboats, according to Articles 5 and 6, are not allowed to be re-victualled in those ports of the State where they are permitted in time of peace. They may only charge themselves with such fuel as is necessary to enable them, along with that which they have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country. The same ship can only re-victual afresh or take in fuel at the expiration

of a period of three months at least after the previous re-victualling in the State territory.

Article 10.—A prize can only be brought into the territory which is incapable of navigation on account of the state of the sea or for lack of fuel or food. She must leave the territory when the cause for entry ceases to exist. If she cannot do it the order shall be given for her to depart at once. In case of a refusal it shall be customary to liberate the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the crew of the belligerent which has made the prize.

Article 11.—It is forbidden in the territory of the State to form a fighting corps or to make use of the recruiting stations to the advantage of the belligerent.

Article 12.—It is forbidden in the territory of the State to take service on warships or similar boats.

Article 13.—It is forbidden in the territory of the State to arrange for the arming and equipment of the navies destined for the military purposes for the profit of the belligerent.

Article 14.—It is forbidden in the territory of the State to furnish ammunition to the ships of war of the belligerent, or to go to their assistance in any manner whatever which shall appear to assist the crew or their equipment.

Article 15.—It is forbidden in the territory of the State, without first obtaining the permission of the competent authorities, to repair any ship of war or gunboat of the belligerent, or to furnish them with provisions or fuel.

Article 16.—It is forbidden within the territories of the State to do any repairs or alterations to a prize unless it is considered necessary to make it seaworthy, or to buy up such a prize as confiscated merchandise, or to exchange it at a depot.

Article 17.—The territory of the State shall include the sea for a stretch of 3 nautical miles up to latitude 60° and shall cease below, and this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured by buoys at the departure of a right line drawn to traverse the bay as near as possible to the entrance to a point at the mouth of the bay which does not extend 10 miles from the 60th latitude.

Article 18.—Further attention is drawn to Articles 100 and 205 of the Penal Code, Indisch Staatsblad 1906, No. 62, Article 7, and Article No. 3 of the laws of the Netherlands subjects, No. 55 of the Indisch Staatsblad, and Nos. 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinanne, and Nos. 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaco. The attention of commanders of ships armoured and unarmoured is drawn to the danger and inconvenience of them if they expose themselves in not respecting the blockade of the belligerent, in transporting contraband of war or military messages for the belligerents, or for executing for them any other deed of transport. Those who violate the above Acts expose themselves to all the consequences of these Acts and cannot obtain any protection from the Government of the Netherlands.

NO. 54

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

BRUSSELS, August 6, 1914.

Please communicate to your Government the following note: "The Dutch Government has notified the establishment of war beacons on the Scheldt, and assures maintenance of navigation. It is convenient that the navigation shall begin thirty minutes before sunrise and shall cease thirty minutes after sunset, and that a change of pilots shall be made at Bath. If desired that it should be necessary to answer to the *démarche* of the Dutch Government, the Belgian Government thinks that there is reason on this part of the coast to maintain the lightships at Vielingen and Vandelaar, and also the buoys in the Vielingen Channel."

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 55

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

THE HAGUE, August 6, 1914.

The navigation of the Scheldt shall be made by signals when it is clear. The buoys of the Vielingen shall be re-established. The taking of pilots at Hanswert is very easy and better organized. Do you insist on Bath?

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

NO. 56

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

BRUSSELS, August 7, 1914.

Please express to the Government of the Netherlands the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures which have been taken to secure the navigation of the Scheldt. The Belgian Government is in accord with the Dutch Government on the subject of the duration of

the navigation. I had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert, because this point seems useful for the change of pilots.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 57

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Paris and London.

BRUSSELS, August 7, 1914.

The Belgian Government hopes that the war will not extend to Central Africa. The Government of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to observe an attitude of strict defensive. The Belgian Government therefore asks if the French Government (English Government) will notify its intention to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo (British Colonies in the Congo Basin) in conformity with the eleventh article of the Berlin Treaty. Information from Boma comes to hand that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in Ubangi.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 58

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Paris and London.

BRUSSELS, August 7, 1914.

In addition to my telegram of this morning I have the honour to request you to convey to the knowledge of the French Government (British Government), the following information: "The Governor-General of the Congo has been instructed to take all measures of defence for the frontiers of the Belgian Congo; the Belgian Government invites the high functionaries to abstain from any offensive action against the Colonies. In view of the civilizing mission of the colonizing nations, the Belgian Government desires in the cause of humanity not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. It does not intend to take the initiative in inflicting a similar trial on civilization in these regions, and the military forces shall not enter into any

action unless they have to repel a direct attack against our African possessions. I shall attach value to the assurance that the Government of the Republic (Great Britain) share this point of view, and that it is their intention, should actual conflict arise, to adhere to Article 2 of the Act of Berlin by placing under active neutrality those of its Colonies which comprise the conventional basin of the Congo. I have sent an identical note to your colleague in London (Paris).

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 59

Letter from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

PARIS, August 8, 1914.

I have had the honour to-day to speak with the President of the Republic on the subject of your telegram. I received it in the evening and I immediately communicated it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He asked for time to reply. M. Poincaré promised me to speak to-day on this matter to the Minister of the Colonies. At present not being at actual war, it seems premature to proclaim the neutrality of the Congo. But he reserved his reply. He thinks that war has already broken out at Ubangi. He profited by the circumstances to record that the protection which she (France) accorded to us would extend to our colonies, and he said we had nothing to fear.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

NO. 60

Telegram from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

THE HAGUE, August 9, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked me to send you the following information, since the American Minister at Brussels has refused to do so. "The fortress of Liège has been taken after a courageous defence. The German Government regrets profoundly that owing to the Belgian attitude towards Germany it has had to resort to these

sanguinary measures. Germany does not wish to make an enemy of Belgium, and it is only by sheer necessity that in connection with the military operations in France she has seriously determined to enter Belgium and occupy Liège in order to have a base for later military operations. After the Belgian army has maintained the honour of its arms by offering a most valiant resistance against this superior force, the German Government entreats the King and the Belgian Government to avoid the horror of further warfare in Belgium. The Government would come to an agreement with Belgium over these matters, as is consistent with its conflict with France. [In original text "agreement," but see Nos. 64 and 70.] Germany assures most solemnly that she has no intention to appropriate Belgian territory. Germany is always prepared to evacuate Belgium as soon as a state of war will permit her to do so. The Ambassador of the United States has asked his colleague to mediate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has accepted, but without enthusiasm.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

NO. 61

*Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Paris to the
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

PARIS, August 9, 1914.

The French Government is disposed to maintain the neutrality of its possessions in the Congo Basin, and asks Spain to propose it to Berlin.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

NO. 62

*Letter from the Belgian Minister at The Hague to the
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

THE HAGUE, August 10, 1914.

Answering to the telephonic call yesterday at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister told me that my German colleague had handed him a document which the representative of the United States at Brussels had refused to transmit. The American

diplomat on being approached by the German Legation has excused himself on the ground that he has not received special orders from Washington to intervene with the Belgian Government in the interests of Germany. The American Minister has in consequence telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague to inform the German representative of the refusal of Mr. Whitlock. The first *démarche* was made by the German Government before the United States Ambassador in Berlin. His Excellency has read out to me the German text of the document. I cannot hide my astonishment at the attempt at mediation and its feeble chance of success, but nevertheless, since it was agreeable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, I promised to telephone to you immediately. This I did yesterday. You will find enclosed the German document in its original text together with the translation.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

ANNEX (SEE NO. 60)

"The fortress of Liège . . . as soon as the state of war will permit her to do so."

No. 63

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

BRUSSELS, August 10, 1914.

The Belgian Government has received the proposals that the German Government has made through the mediation of the Dutch Government. It will shortly hand you its answer.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 64

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

BRUSSELS, August 10, 1914.

There is a doubt about the meaning of the word "Auseinandersetzung," which you translate as "arrange-

ments." Please inform us if in view of the German Government it is a matter of the arrangements we have taken with France, or of the difference between France and Germany.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 65

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 10, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, on the request of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, has handed the following proposal to us. (See No. 60 and No. 62.)

The following is the answer which the Belgian Government proposes to make : "The proposal which the German Government has made to us repeats its proposal to us of August the 2nd. Faithful to its international obligations, Belgium can only repeat the answer to that ultimatum, all the more so since its neutrality has been violated, a terrible war carried into its land, and since the guaranteeing Powers have responded loyally to its appeal."

The Belgian Government thinks that the guaranteeing Powers should know about these documents.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 66

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

BRUSSELS, August 10, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances concerning the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxembourg. The General commanding the German troops caused on August 8th the German Minister in this town to insist on the departure of the Belgian Minister in the Grand Duchy. M. von Buch addressed to M. Eyschen a letter as follows:—

LUXEMBURG, August 8, 1914.

In consequence of the hostile attitude of Belgium the military authorities insist on the departure of the Belgian

Minister from here. His Excellency the Commander asks Count Van der Steen de Jahay to arrange for his departure within twenty-four hours and to enter into an arrangement at Coblenz with General de Ploetz on the matter of his further journey. Departure is only possible via Treves and Coblenz.

(Signed) VON BUCH.

M. Eyschen handed this letter the same day to Count Van der Steen de Jahay.

LUXEMBURG, *August 8, 1914.*

I have with great regret to inform you that the German military authorities demand your departure. You will find the conditions attached. M. de Buch tells me that the military authorities consider it best for you to travel by railway, for the journey by motor-car may expose you to frequent arrest. The German Minister has come to take your answer. I cannot adequately tell you how much I regret this necessity. I shall never forget the amicable relationships between us.

(Signed) EYSCHEN.

The Belgian Government thinks that the Government of the Grand Duchy had no choice to adopt but to ask the Belgian Minister in the Grand Duchy to leave for Belgium.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 67

BRUSSELS, *August 10, 1914.*

The Legation has received to-day from Washington a dispatch stating that the Government of the United States consented to the claim of international courtesy to accept the protection of German subjects in Belgium. In view of the instructions which accompany this dispatch we will concern ourselves with the protection of German subjects. The pleasant reports which we have up till now received on this subject give us an assurance that we shall with

mutual sentiments follow out these objects. I offer you my highest consideration.

(Signed) WHITLOCK.

No. 68

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the British Minister in Belgium.

BRUSSELS, August 11, 1914.

I have telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey the German communication and its answer. I have had the order to express to Your Excellency the approval of the British Government. The latter can only express agreement with the terms of the answer that the Belgian Government proposed to make to the proposal to sow discord between the countries after violating the treaty.

(Signed) FRANCIS VILLIERS.

No. 69

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the French Minister in Belgium.

BRUSSELS, August 11, 1914.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the French Government has given its entire adhesion to the answer of the Belgian Government to the German Government's new ultimatum. This answer could only be expected from a country which has so heroically defended its land. France will still continue to fulfil her duties as guarantor of Belgian neutrality.

(Signed) KLOBUKOFFSKY.

No. 70

Telegram to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

THE HAGUE, August 12, 1914.

The German text contains a mistake. Before "Auseinandersetzung" one must read "ihre," and then translate "Son conflit avec France."

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

No. 71

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

BRUSSELS, August 12, 1914.

Please forward this telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. (See answer to German Government in No. 65.)

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

No. 72

Telegram to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Russian Foreign Minister.

ST. PETERSBURG, August 13, 1914.

Please thank the Belgian Government for its communication, and express the pleasure of the Imperial Government at its firm and dignified attitude, which greatly pleases the Russian Government.

(Signed) SAZONOF.

No. 73

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

THE HAGUE, August 13, 1914.

I had the honour to receive your telegram yesterday and to send the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the second German proposal. His Excellency has promised to hand the communication to the German Minister at once.

(Signed) BARON FALLON.

No. 74

Letter to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Belgian Minister in Paris.

PARIS, August 16, 1914.

In the course of a conversation with M. de Marjerie this morning I referred to the conversation on Colonial affairs and to the proposal which you had made by your telegram and dispatch of August 7th. He said that the French Government had approached the Spanish Government, who would not give an answer to its question without the advice of England. It appears that she still is unable

to give an answer. M. de Marjerie thinks that under the present circumstances it is necessary to beat the German Government, wherever possible. He thinks that this is also the opinion of England, who will have certain claims to make. France desires to take back a part of the Congo which was ceded at the time of the Agadir crisis. A success, he said, would not be hard to attain.

(Signed) BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 75

Letter from the Belgian Minister in London to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

LONDON, August 17, 1914.

In answer to the dispatch of August 7th I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot support the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality of the possessions of the belligerent Powers in the Congo Basin. German troops in East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Protectorate in Central Africa, and British troops have already attacked the German station of Dar-es-Salam, where they have destroyed the telegraph station. Under these circumstances, in spite of the fact that the British Government is persuaded of the political and strategical value of the Belgian Government's proposal, it cannot accept it. The British Government thinks that the force which it is sending to Africa will overcome all opposition. It will take all precautions to look after the native population. France has given the same reply as England in view of the German activity near Boma and Ekododo.

(Signed) COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 76

Telegram from the Vice-Governor of Kutango to the Belgian Minister of the Colonies.

ELIZABETHVILLE, August 26, 1914.

The German force attacked on August 22nd, on Lake Tanganyika, the port of Tukugu. There are two dead and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

(Signed) TOMBEUR.

No. 77

Telegram from the Belgian Minister in Austro-Hungary to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

THE HAGUE, August 28, 1914.

By the order of my Government I have the honour to notify to Your Excellency as follows :—

Seeing that Belgium after refusing to accept the proposals which have been addressed by Germany has prepared for co-operation with France and Great Britain, who have declared war on Austria-Hungary, and in view of the fact that subjects of Austria-Hungary in Belgium, under the eye of the King, have been subjected to treatment contrary to the principles of humanity, and usual only for the subjects of an enemy, Austria-Hungary feels it necessary to break off diplomatic relations with Belgium and considers herself in a state of war. I leave the country with the staff of the Legation and confide my affairs to the care of the United States Minister. The Imperial and Royal Government has handed me my passports.

(Signed) KLARY.

No. 78

Telegram from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister at The Hague.

ANTWERP, August 29, 1914.

Please accept receipt of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Belgium and add the following :—

Belgium has always entertained relations of amity with its neighbours. She has scrupulously fulfilled her obligations as a neutral. If she could not accept the German proposals it was because they violated the engagements she had assumed in the face of all Europe, engagements which have been the conditions of the Belgian kingdom. It felt that no people could give up its duties and obligations in face of force. The Government waited not only after the ultimatum but also after the violation of Belgium by German troops before appealing to France and England,

who with Germany and Austria-Hungary guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. In repelling the invasion she has not done any act contrary to the Hague Convention, Article 10, for neutral countries. Germany has recognized herself that her invasion of Belgium is a violation of the laws of nations and cannot be justified by strategical necessity. Belgium makes a formal protest against the allegation that Austro-Hungarian subjects are treated with indignity within her territory. The Belgian Government has given orders to safeguard the persons and property of Austro-Hungarian subjects.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

NO. 79

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Legations abroad.

ANTWERP, August 29, 1914.

Under the date of August 17th I have addressed to the Belgian Minister in London a letter which I think ought to dispel certain allegations of the German Government mentioned in the Blue Book published by the British Government. I have the honour to set before you a copy of the letter and its annexes. Please bring them to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX NO. I

Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Minister in London.

BRUSSELS, August 17, 1914.

The Blue Book recently published by the British Government reproduces in No. 65 the text of a telegram from Berlin on July 31st, by Goschen to Grey, with the following passage: "It appears from what he says that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this he alleged that a consignment of German corn had been placed under an embargo." The fact to which the German Secretary of State refers is undoubtedly the application of the Royal

decrees prohibiting the export of corn. As you state, the act has no character like that which Germany attributes to it. The Royal decrees of July 30th, published in the *Moniteur Belge*, prohibited by provisional order the export by land or sea of certain products, notably cereals. Under the date of July 31st the German Minister at Brussels notified that the Customs at Antwerp had retained cargoes of corn destined for Germany. Herr Below demanded a free exit of boats carrying these cargoes. The same day as the German Minister's complaint was received, my department informed the Minister of Finance, and two days after, August 2nd, the latter announced that he had given instructions to the Belgian Customs to give full satisfaction to Germany. I can only place before you a copy of the correspondence that has passed between Herr Below and the Belgian Government. You will see that nothing in our attitude could bear witness to hostile intention against Germany. Our action has only been that of simple right for all nations situated like we are, in exceptional circumstances. It would be well to explain to England.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX NO. 2.

*Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to
Herr Below, the German Minister in Brussels.*

August 3, 1914.

Following the letter you have addressed to me I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has brought to the knowledge of the Customs that the prohibition by Royal decree on July 30th last month only applies to goods which are for export and are intended for regular merchandise in process of transportation. When the goods are declared to be destined for transport they are allowed free entry on declaration. If such goods arrive without restriction, and are destined to remain in the country, the Customs will permit entry when they have paid duty. I can add that the transport of corn to which you refer in your letter was authorized on August 3rd.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX NO. 3.

*Letter from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to
Herr Below, the German Minister in Brussels.*

BRUSSELS, August 3, 1914.

In answer to your letter of July 31st, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal decree of July 30th only refers to export and not to goods in transit. I have taken care to make known your communication to the Minister of Finance and to ask him to give the department's instructions in order to prevent the application of the decree wrongly.

(Signed) DAVIGNON.

ANNEX NO. 4.

*Letter from Herr Below, German Minister in Brussels, to
the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

BRUSSELS, July 31, 1914.

They have informed me that the Customs has refused to allow the departure of ships loaded with grain for Germany. Since this only concerns transit and not export, I ask that you will allow the German boats to depart. At the same time I should be glad if you would inform me if the Port of Antwerp is closed for this sort of merchandise. I should be glad if you will let me know as soon as possible.

(Signed) VON BELOW.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS,
TREATIES, SPEECHES,
AND MANIFESTOES

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

COMMUNICATIONS AND TELEGRAMS NOT IN THE
WHITE PAPER, DENKSCHRIFT, ORANGE BOOK,
OR GREY BOOK

(a)

JULY 30

Bethmann-Hollweg to German Ambassador in Vienna.

(From "Westminster Gazette" for August 1st.)

BERLIN, July 30, 1914.

THE report of Count Pourtalès does not harmonize with the account which Your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I beg you to clear up.

We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Servia, with which she is in a state of war.

The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake.

We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty.

As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice.

Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.

(Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

(b)

JULY 30

Telegram from Prince Heinrich to King George.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

William is very troubled and is doing his utmost to carry out the Tsar's request of working to preserve peace.

He is in continuous telegraphic correspondence with Tsar Nicholas, who has confirmed to-day the news that he has taken military measures which are equivalent to mobilization, and that these measures were initiated five days ago. We have in addition received the information that France is also taking military measures while we have as yet taken none. We may, however, be compelled to take them at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would mean a European war. If you are really and earnestly anxious to prevent this cruel calamity, *may I suggest that you should, by your influence, try to secure the neutrality of France and Russia?* That would, I believe, be of the greatest possible use.

I think this is a certain and perhaps the only chance of preserving peace. I should like to add that Germany and England ought to support each other more now than ever in order to avoid the terrible catastrophe which otherwise appears inevitable. Believe me that William is filled with the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. The military preparations of his neighbours, however, may compel him at last to follow their example in order to assure the safety of his country, which otherwise will remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and hope you will take my communication in the same friendly spirit which has prompted it.

(Signed) HENRY.

(c)

JULY 30

Telegram from King George to Prince Heinrich.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

Thank you for your telegram. I am happy to learn of the efforts that are being made by William to agree with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I ardently desire to spare Europe the irreparable calamity of such a war. My Government is doing all that is possible to induce Russia and France to stop their military preparations, if Austria would content herself with occupying Belgrade and the adjacent portions of Servian territory as a pledge for the

conclusion of an agreement satisfying her claims, while at the same time other countries stop their preparations for war. I count upon the great influence of the Emperor to obtain from Austria the acceptance of this proposal. He will thereby prove that Germany and England are working together for the prevention of an international calamity. Please assure William that I am doing all and will continue to do all that lies in my power in order to preserve the peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

(d)

JULY 31

Telegram from the Kaiser to King George.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals agree with my ideas and with the information which I have received to-night from Vienna and which I send on to London. I have just learned through the Imperial Chancellor that he has received the information that the Tsar has ordered this evening the mobilization of all his army and navy. He has not even waited for the result of the intervention on which I have been engaged and has left me entirely without information. I am going to Berlin in order to take measures for the safeguarding of my eastern frontiers, where numerous Russian troops have already assembled.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

(e)

AUGUST 1

Telegram from King George to the Kaiser.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have expressed my willingness to do everything that lies in my power in order to help on the resumption of negotiations between the States concerned.

(Signed) GEORGE.

(f)

*Telegram from King George to the Tsar.**(From "Daily News" for August 5th.)**August 1st, 3.30 a.m.*

My Government has received the following statement from the German Government :—

"On July 29th the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action, Russia mobilized against Austria. By telegraph, the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Government continued its mediation in Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the furthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany.

"The proposals made by the German Government in Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them in Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration in Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were concluded, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg reported the mobilization of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia, the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany ; that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian Emperor.

"We were bound to reply with serious counter-measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the

Russian mobilization on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that, unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measures against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilize, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war."

I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world.

(Signed) GEORGE.

(g)

Telegram from the Tsar to King George.

(From "Daily News" for August 5th.)

August 1st.

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a Note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire.

Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a

general mobilization, owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia.

I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I had given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

(h)

Telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

August 1st, 11.0 a.m.

Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and asked whether I thought I could say that in the event of France remaining neutral in a Russo-German war we should not attack the French. I told him I thought I could accept the responsibility for this.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

(i)

Telegram from the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if England guarantees with its forces the absolute neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. Germany's mobilization has taken place to-day as the result of the Russian challenge, before the English proposals reached here. For this reason it is also no longer possible to alter our march towards the French frontier. But we guarantee that the French frontier shall not be crossed by our troops

until Monday, August 3rd, at seven o'clock in the evening, in the case of England's consent being given up to that time.

(Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

(j)

AUGUST 1

Telegram from the Kaiser to King George.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

I have just received the communication from your Government in which it offers French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. This offer was accompanied by a question whether in these circumstances Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilization on two fronts—to east and west—which I ordered this afternoon must proceed. It is impossible to give a counter-order, as your telegram unfortunately came too late. But if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will of course cease to consider an attack on France, and use my troops in another direction. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are being held back by telegram and telephone from passing the French frontier.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

(k)

AUGUST 1

Telegram from King George to the Kaiser.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

In answer to your telegram which has just come in, I think there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a suggestion which was made in the course of a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how actual hostilities between the German and French armies could be avoided as long as the possibility remains that an agreement will be reached between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning in order to discover if the misunderstanding lies on his side.

(Signed) GEORGE.

(1)

AUGUST 1

*Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor.**(Published in the "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for September 5th.)*

Time, 1.15 p.m.

Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just called to tell me that the Minister wished to make proposals to me for the neutrality of Great Britain, even in the event of our being at war with France as well as with Russia. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, and will report immediately.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

(m)

AUGUST 1

*Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor.**(Published in the "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for September 5th.)*

Time, 5.30 p.m.

Sir Edward Grey has just read me the following statement, which was agreed to unanimously by the Cabinet: "The reply of the German Government in respect of the neutrality of Belgium is extremely to be regretted, because the neutrality of Belgium affects this country. If Germany could see her way to make a positive declaration similar to that which France has made, it would contribute very considerably towards removing the anxiety and tension here, whereas, on the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public opinion in this country if one of the belligerents should violate the neutrality of Belgium, while the other respected it."

In reply to my inquiry whether, on condition that we observed the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite statement as to England's neutrality, the Minister said that he could not do so, but that the question would play an important rôle with public opinion in this country. If we violated the neutrality of Belgium in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public feeling, which would render it difficult for the present Government to assume a friendly neutrality. For the present there was

not the slightest intention of taking hostile proceedings against us, and it was desired to prevent such an attitude being adopted. It was, however, difficult to draw a line to which we might go without any action being taken on the part of this country. He always returned to the Belgian neutrality, and expressed the opinion that this question would in any case play a great rôle. He said that he had asked himself whether it were not possible that, in the event of a Russian war, we and France could stand opposed to each other, armed, but without attacking each other. I asked him if he were in a position to state that France would agree to such a pact. As we wished neither to ruin France nor to conquer any of her territory, it seemed to me possible that we would acquiesce in such an arrangement, seeing that it ensured us Great Britain's neutrality. The Minister said he would endeavour to obtain further information, and he did not fail to appreciate the difficulties in the way of holding back the military on both sides in inactivity.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

(n)

AUGUST 1

Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor.

(Published in the "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for September 5th.)

Time, 8.30 p.m.

My report of this morning is cancelled by my report of this evening. As no positive English proposals have been submitted, further steps in connection with the instructions given me are superfluous.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

(o)

QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING TELEGRAMS OF
AUGUST 1

*Sir Edward Grey's Reply in the House of Commons on
August 28th to Lord Robert Cecil.*

(Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 123.)

LORD ROBERT CECIL asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether his attention has been called to the

publication by the German Government of certain proposals which are alleged to have been made to secure French and English neutrality during the war ; and whether the publication was complete and accurate.

Sir E. GREY : I have seen an incomplete publication. The circumstances were as follows : It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published. This second telegram does not seem to have been published.

(p)

QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING TELEGRAMS ON
AUGUST 1

Sir Edward Grey's Reply to Mr. Keir Hardie on August 27th.

(*Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 121*).

Mr. KEIR HARDIE (Merthyr Tydvil, Lab.) asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, item No. 123), together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet ; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected.

Sir E. GREY (Northumberland, Berwick) : These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August 1st, and without authority to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85 in the White Paper—Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914).

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is, Sunday, August 2nd—the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. ("Hear, hear.") The German Chancellor had already been told on July 30th that we could not bargain that way.

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House accordingly. I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and therefore it does not appear in the White Paper ; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition (loud cheers) without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153 in the White Paper about the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper.

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd. If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality I must have referred to No. 85, the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made

the case against the German Government much stronger than I did make it in my speech. ("Hear, hear.") I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace ; but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. KEIR HARDIE : May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany on the basis of suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador ?

Sir E. GREY : The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and those conditions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambassador.

Mr. KEIR HARDIE (who was received with cries of "Oh !" from all parts of the House) : May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated the suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all (renewed cries of "Oh !" and "Order") was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put before them by their own Ambassador ?

Mr. T. HEALY (Cork, N.E., Ind. Nat.) : Before the right hon. gentleman answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists in the Reichstag are asking any questions like this ? (Loud and prolonged cheering.)

Sir E. GREY : The German Ambassador (Opposition cries of "Don't answer")—I would like to have no misunderstanding (cheers)—the German Ambassador did not make to us suggestions different from those which his Government had made. The suggestions that his Government made were those set forth in No. 85 of the White Paper. The German Ambassador never suggested to us that Germany would be able to agree to the condition of

the neutrality of Belgium ; on the contrary, he did suggest to me that we should not put that condition forward because he was afraid that his Government would not be able to accept it. (Cheers.)

(q)

AUGUST 1

German Official Communiqué.

(Published in the "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 1st.)

After His Majesty the Kaiser has declared the state of war (*Kriegszustand*) for the Empire, the time has come to present in brief the events that have led to this decision. A more detailed documentary exposition is reserved for later.

For years Austria-Hungary has had to fight against movements which, with criminal means, and both permitted and forwarded by the Servian Government, have aimed at the revolutionizing and the tearing away of the south-eastern parts of Austria-Hungary. The winning of this area is the undisguised aim of Servian policy. Servia believed in this that it could reckon on the support of Russia, with the idea that it is Russia's duty to lend its protection to the South Slav peoples. Support has been given to this idea through Russia's efforts to create an alliance of the Balkan States. The greater Servia propaganda has finally been shown up in a clear light through the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy determined to make an end to this criminal agitation, which was directed against its existence as a Great Power. Through this it was bound to come out whether Russia was determined actually to carry through its rôle of protector to the South Slavs in their campaign of destruction against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this case a vital interest of Germany came in question: the unweakened existence of our allied Monarchy, which we, between opponents on the east and west, needed for the preservation of our own position as a Great Power.

Germany has from the beginning placed itself on the standpoint that the quarrel with Servia was an affair which concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia alone. While preserving this standpoint, we have with the greatest activity taken part in all efforts directed to the preservation of European peace. Austria-Hungary gave its hand to this by repeatedly declaring to the Powers that it aimed at no conquest and would not violate the territorial integrity of Servia. These declarations were given with emphasis, especially in St. Petersburg. We have advised our allies to show the utmost conciliation consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. We have especially lent a helpful hand to all English steps directed towards mediation between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Already on the 26th reliable reports had come in of Russian mobilization. They caused the German Government to declare on the same day, under renewed assurance, that Austria-Hungary would not violate the territorial integrity of Servia : preparatory military measures of Russia must force us to retaliatory measures. These must be the mobilization of the army. But mobilization means war. We could not presume that Russia desires to unfetter a European war. On the next day the Russian Minister of War assured our Military Attaché that no mobilization orders had yet been issued, that no horse or reservist had been called up. Nothing more than preparatory measures had been taken. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts towards Austria-Hungary would be mobilized, but under no circumstances those towards the German front. *Nevertheless, in the days immediately following, reliable information left no doubt that Russia's military preparations were also in full progress on the German frontier.* Reports on this subject became more numerous. Nevertheless, soothing declarations were again made by the Chief of the Russian General Staff to our Military Attaché, which characterized the information of the Minister of War as still holding good to the full.

On July 29th came a telegram from the Tsar to the Kaiser, which expressed the earnest request that the Kaiser

should help him at this so serious moment. He asked him, in order to ward off the calamity of a European war, to do all in his power in order to keep his ally from going too far. On the same day the Kaiser replied, in a lengthy telegram, that, on the appeal to his friendship and help, he had undertaken the task of mediator. In accordance with this, diplomatic action was at once undertaken in Vienna. While this was in progress came the official information that Russia had mobilized against Austria-Hungary. At once the Kaiser pointed out to the Tsar in a further telegram that, through the Russian mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which he had undertaken at the request of the Tsar was endangered if not made impossible. Nevertheless, the action commenced in Vienna was continued, and the proposals made by England in a similar direction warmly supported by the German Government.

Over the proposals of mediation a decision was to have been reached in Vienna to-day ; but, before this was taken, the German Government received the official information that the mobilization orders had been issued for the whole Russian army and fleet. On this the Kaiser directed a last telegram to the Tsar, in which he pointed out that his responsibility for the safety of the Empire forced him to take defensive measures. He had gone in his efforts for the preservation of the world's peace to the farthest limits of possibility. It was not he who bore the responsibility for the calamity which now threatened the world. He had always been true to his friendship to the Tsar and the Russian Empire. The peace of Europe could still be preserved if Russia would cease to threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Thus, while the German Government was mediating at the request of Russia, Russia was mobilizing its whole forces, and with that was threatening the safety of the German Empire, in which up to the present hour no extraordinary military measures had been taken.

In this way, not at the call of Germany, but much more, as Germany has shown by its action, against its will, the moment

has come which has summoned the armed forces of Germany on the scene.

(r)

AUGUST 2

Telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to the German Chancellor.

(From "Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" for August 20th.)

Sir Edward Grey's suggestions, which arose from the desire to create the possibility of a lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without previous consultation with France, and without knowledge of mobilization, and have meanwhile been abandoned as being absolutely without any prospect of success.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

(s)

AUGUST 2

German Ultimatum to Belgium.

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse by Givet and Namur ; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France to march on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot prevent the fear that Belgium, despite its best intentions, will not be able to repel, without help, a French advance in so great force.

In this case there is sufficient certainty of a menace directed against Germany : it is an imperious duty of self-preservation for Germany to prevent this hostile attack.

The German Government would very much regret that Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against her the fact that the measures of Germany's enemies should oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. In order to dispel all misunderstanding the German Government declares the following:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium, if Belgium consents in the war which is about to commence to take up an attitude of benevolent neutrality

towards Germany. The German Government on its side engages at the moment of peace to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their full extent ;

2. Germany engages under the above conditions to evacuate Belgian territory immediately at the conclusion of peace ;

3. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is ready, in accordance with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to purchase, *contre argent comptant*, all that is necessary for its troops and to indemnify it for damage caused in Belgium ;

4. If Belgium conducts itself in a hostile fashion against the German troops and in particular opposes its advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of roads, railways, bridges, or other works, Germany will be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will undertake no engagement towards the kingdom, but will leave the final arrangement of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

The German Government has the justifiable hope that this eventuality will not take place, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take appropriate measures for preventing this event.

In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighbouring nations will become closer and more durable.

(t)

AUGUST 3

Belgian Reply to German Ultimatum.

Through its Note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known that, according to reliable information, the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, despite its goodwill, is not in a position to repel without help the advance of the French troops.

The German Government considers that it is obliged to ward off this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under

these conditions Germany proposes to the Government of the King to take with regard to it a friendly attitude, and it engages at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of all its possessions in all their extent.

The Note adds that if Belgium puts difficulties in the way of the advance of the German troops Germany will be obliged to consider it as an enemy, and to leave the later arrangement of the relations of the two States to the decision of arms.

This Note has caused to the Government of the King a profound and sad astonishment. The intentions which it attributes to France are in contradiction to the formal declarations that have been made to us, on the 1st of August, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Besides, if, contrary to our attempt, a violation of the neutrality of Belgium was committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all its international duties, and its army would oppose the invader with the most vigorous resistance. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, consecrate the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of H.M. the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to its international obligations; it has accomplished its duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; it has neglected no effort to maintain its neutrality and to make it respected. The attempt on its independence with which the German Government menaces it constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.

No strategic interest justifies the violation of law. The Belgian Government, were it to accept the propositions notified to it, would sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same time as it betrayed its trust towards Europe. Conscious of the rôle which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium could only be preserved at the price of the violation of its neutrality. If this hope was false, the Belgian Government is firmly decided to repel, by every means in its power, every attempt on its rights.

(u)

AUGUST 3

Communiqué of German Embassy in London.

Baron Kuhlmann, Councillor of the German Embassy in London, made the following statement :—

“The maintenance of British neutrality would in no way injure France ; on the contrary, it might be argued that, by remaining neutral, Great Britain could give France exactly as much strategic assistance and a good deal more effective diplomatic help, as, according to all reliable information, there is no intention of sending British troops to the Continent ; and as a few British divisions, considering the enormous numbers engaged, could hardly alter the balance of power, all England can do for France is to protect her North Sea coast from invasion, and to prevent the neutral ports of Belgium and Holland being used as bases of armed aggression against France.

“Germany would be disposed to give an undertaking that she will not attack France by sea in the north, or make any warlike use of the sea coast of Belgium or Holland, if it appeared that Great Britain would make this undertaking on condition of her neutrality for the time being. Thus England, without going to war herself, could render to France the maximum of assistance she could give by going to war. That England, as a neutral Power, maintaining an armed neutrality, would diplomatically be a greater asset for France for the termination of hostilities at an early moment than if herself involved in war is self-evident.”

TREATIES

TEXTS OF TREATIES RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

(a)

NOVEMBER 15, 1831

Neutrality of Belgium.

(Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. II, p. 858, No. 153.)

TREATY between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Belgium, relative to the separation of Belgium from Holland. Signed at London, November 15, 1831.

Article VII

Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

(b)

APRIL 19, 1839

Neutrality of Belgium.

(Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. II, p. 979, No. 183.)

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and the Netherlands on the other. Signed at London, April 19, 1839.

Article VII

Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

(c)

MAY 11, 1867

*Treaty of London: guaranteeing integrity of Luxemburg.**(Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. III, p. 1801, No. 405.)*

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia, relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Duchy of Limburg. Signed at London, May 11, 1867.

Article II

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State.

It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Act.

That principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaties, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

(d)

AUGUST 9, 1870

*Neutrality of Belgium.**(Hertslet, "Map of Europe by Treaty," Vol. III, p. 1886, No. 427.)*

Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia relative to the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium. Signed at London, August 9, 1870.

Article I

His Majesty the King of Prussia, having declared that notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the Neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such a manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her Naval and Military forces to ensure its

observance, and to maintain in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the War, now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

Article II

His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part in the event provided for in the foregoing Article to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his Naval and Military forces aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the Neutrality and Independence of Belgium.

Article III

This treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the Ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties: and on the expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of April 19, 1839.

(e)

AUGUST 9, 1870

Neutrality of Belgium.

(Hertslet, "*Map of Europe by Treaty*," Vol. III, p. 1889, No. 428.)

Treaty between Great Britain and France, relative to the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium. Signed at London, August 11, 1870.

Article I

His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with the North German Confederation and its Allies, it is his fixed determination to respect the Neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by the North German Confederation and its Allies, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of the North German Confederation and its Allies should violate that neutrality she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the

defence of the same in such manner as may mutually be agreed upon, employing for that purpose her Naval and Military forces to ensure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Imperial Majesty, then and thereafter, the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

Article II

His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees on his part in the event provided for in the foregoing article to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his Naval and Military forces for the aforesaid purpose; and in the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the Neutrality and Independence of Belgium.

Article III

This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its Allies, and for twelve months after the Ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties; and on the expiration of that time the Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the Quintuple Treaty of April 19th.

(f)

OCTOBER, 1879

Austro-German Alliance.

The Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany was concluded in October 1879, but was not published till February 3, 1888, when it was made public simultaneously at Berlin and Vienna. Its text is as follows :—

Clause I.—Should, contrary to the hope and against the sincere wish of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to stand by each other with the whole of the armed forces of the Empires and, in consequence thereof, only to conclude peace jointly and in agreement.

Clause II.—Should one of the High Contracting Parties be attacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party hereby binds itself,

not only not to stand by the aggressor of its High Ally, but to observe at least an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards its High Co-contractor.

If, however, in such a case the attacking Power should be supported by Russia, either in the form of active co-operation or by military measures menacing to the party attacked, the obligation defined in Clause I of reciprocal help with the entire armed strength comes immediately into force in this case also, and the war will then also be waged jointly by the two High Contracting Parties until the joint conclusion of peace.

Clause III—concerning the secrecy of the Treaty—lost its validity on publication.

(g)

APRIL 8, 1904

Anglo-French Convention.

APPENDIX III

Public Declaration between the United Kingdom and France
respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904.

Article I

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country, by asking them that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present arrangement, containing the guarantee considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers signatory of the Convention of London, 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French savant.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

Article II

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are continuous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights

which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

Article III

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

Article IV

The two Governments being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment of transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

Article V

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

Article VI

In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

Article VII

In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised

between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

Article VIII

The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Article IX

The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

In witness whereof His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorized for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

APPENDIX IV

Secret Articles attached to the Public Declaration of April 8, 1904, published for the first time, in part, by *Le Temps*, in November, 1911.

Article I

In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI, and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date would remain intact.

Article II

His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to

entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Article III

The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other "presides" should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast, from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou, shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

Article IV

If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

Article V

Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article I of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified debts after the 15th July, 1910.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

(h)

AUGUST 31, 1907

Anglo-Russian Convention.

Convention signed on August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Russia, containing arrangements on the subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit :—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias ;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of His Court Alexander Isvolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following :—

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country, and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations ;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand ; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia ;

Have agreed on the following terms :—

I

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kahhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea, and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question, and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

CONVENTION CONCERNING AFGHANISTAN

The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention :—

Article I

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

Article II

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March, 1905, that they recognize the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Ameer Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan, or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Ameer fulfils the engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

Article III

The Russian and Afghan authorities, especially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character.

Article IV

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for commercial agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Ameer's sovereign rights.

Article V

The present arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Ameer to the terms stipulated above.

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING THIBET

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in

the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement :—

Article I

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

Article II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British commercial agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China on the 27th April, 1906 ; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet ; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

Article III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

Article V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

ANNEX TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND
RUSSIA CONCERNING THIBET

Great Britain reaffirms the Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September, 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,000,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II

of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th (31st) August, 1907.

(L.S.) A. NICOLSON.

(L.S.) ISVOLSKY.

(i)

Questions in House of Commons re British Foreign Obligations.

MARCH 10, 1913

Debate on the Address.

LORD HUGH CECIL: "There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. This is the general belief."

THE PRIME MINISTER: "I ought to say that is not true."

LORD HUGH CECIL: "I am very glad to have elicited that explanation."

(j)

MARCH 24, 1913

SIR WILLIAM BYLES asked the Prime Minister whether he will say if this country is under any, and if so what, obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies to operate in Europe; and, if so, what are the terms of our agreements, whether by assurance or by treaty with the French nation?

MR. KING also asked the Prime Minister (1) whether the foreign policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements, or obligations under which British military forces would in certain eventualities be called upon to land upon the Continent and join there in military operations; and (2) whether in 1905, 1908, and 1911 this country spontaneously offered to France the assistance of the British Army to be landed on the Continent to support France in the event of European hostilities.

The PRIME MINISTER : " As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval or military forces if the Government or Parliament decided to take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which public statements can be made beforehand."

(k)

JUNE 11, 1914

Mr. KING asked whether any naval agreement had been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain, and whether any negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken place, or are now pending, between Russia and Great Britain.

Sir EDWARD GREY : " The Hon. Member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces. The Prime Minister then replied that if war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought in my opinion to be, and I suppose would be, laid before Parliament."



PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES

PUBLIC UTTERANCES AND STATEMENTS IN THE
PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA,
BELGIUM, AND GERMANY, NOT ELSEWHERE
REPRINTED

(a)

Speech of M. Viviani in the French Chamber.

(*"Le Temps," August 3rd.*)

GENTLEMEN,—The German Ambassador has left Paris after informing us of the state of war. The Government gives to Parliament a true account of the events which in the last ten days have caused the European war, and has obliged France, peaceful and strong, to defend her frontiers against aggression. This aggression, which nothing excuses, took place before any declaration of war, and is notified to us as the last act of a plan which I set forth before our people and before the opinion of the whole civilized world.

After the abominable crime which cost the Archduke of Austria and his wife their lives, difficulties were raised between the Cabinets at Vienna and Belgrade. Most of the Powers were only officially informed up to Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Ambassador of Austria issued his circular which has been communicated to the Press. This circular had for its object the explanation and justification of the ultimatum addressed to the Servian Government by the Austrian Minister in Belgrade. The ultimatum, while affirming the complicity of a number of subjects and societies of Servia in the Serajevo crime, insinuated that the Servian authorities themselves had been no strangers to the plot. It demanded an answer by 6 o'clock in the evening.

The satisfaction demanded aimed an undoubted blow at Servian sovereignty. In spite of its uncompromising character, Servia on the 25th of July declared that she would submit to nearly all the demands. To this submission, which meant a success for Austria and a guarantee of European peace, the Councils of France, Russia, and Great Britain from the very first were parties. Thus the Councils of the Chancelleries of the Triple Entente showed as much wisdom on their part as the demands of Austria showed intrigue. Albeit, the Austrian Government during the previous three weeks had given on many occasions the assurance that their demands would be extremely moderate. The Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg, and London, however, learnt that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after an examination, declared that the Servian answer was unacceptable and had broken off relations. Thus astonishment was aggravated by the fact that since Friday the 25th the German Ambassador wrote to the French Foreign Minister a verbal note, stating that the Austro-Servian dispute ought to be made localized without the intervention of a third Power, in default of which the consequences would be incalculable. A similar *démarche* was made on the 26th at London and St. Petersburg. Is it necessary, gentlemen, to detail to you the menacing language used by the German Ambassador in Paris, contrasted with the conciliatory sentiments of which the Powers of the Triple Entente showed proof by the counsels of submission which they gave to Servia? Nevertheless, without considering the abnormal character of the German *démarche*, we have, in company with our allies and friends, immediately engaged in conciliatory action, and have invited Germany to be associated with it. We have had from the first to realize with regret that our efforts found no corresponding echo in Berlin. Not only has Germany not been disposed to give conciliatory advice to Austria, but from that moment, and still more in the following days, she interposed between the Cabinet of Vienna and the proposals which emanated from the other Powers. On July 28th Austria declared war on Servia. This declaration, aggravating the state of affairs created by the rupture

of diplomatic relations, made one believe that there was a desire to precipitate war and a systematic programme for the subjugation of Servia. It contained a challenge not only to the independence of a valiant people, but also to the equilibrium of the Balkans inscribed in the Treaty of Bucharest, and consecrated by the moral adhesion of all the Great Powers. So at the suggestion of the British Government, always attached in the firmest manner to the interests of European peace, negotiations followed, or more exactly, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to pursue them. From this common desire came the proposal for mediation à quatre between England, France, Germany, and Italy, designed, while assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to save a conflict. On the 29th the Russian Government, after persistent defeat of these attempts, and in the presence of the declaration of war and the mobilization of Austria, and fearing the destruction of Servian military power, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilize the troops of four military areas, that is, of the units along the Austrian frontier. In so doing they took good care to inform the German Government that this measure was not offensive in nature to Austria and in no way directed against Germany. In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made no difficulty about understanding this point. On the other hand, all that Great Britain, with the addition of France and Russia, did to establish contact between Austria and Servia under the moral patronage of Europe met with a negative response at Berlin, of which the diplomatic documents furnish ample proof. This was the unfortunate situation which rendered probable the existence at Berlin of certain *arrière-pensées*. Some hours after, these beliefs and suspicions were transformed into certain facts.

In fact, the negative action of Germany gave place some thirty-six hours later to alarming action. On the 31st, Germany, in proclaiming martial law, cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and gave full liberty of action against France in the absolute secrecy of

military preparations which nothing that you have seen hitherto would justify. Already for several days, and under conditions difficult to explain, Germany had prepared the passage of her army from a peace to a war footing. Since July 25th, that is before the expiration of the time limit to Servia, she had strengthened the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had put on a war footing the forts near the frontier. On the 26th she put the railways in preparation for concentration. On the 27th she made requisitions and put the covering troops in position. On the 28th the calling-up of reservists commenced. Did not all these measures on the part of Germany leave no doubt as to her intentions? Such was the situation when on July 31st, evening, the German Government, which since the 24th had not taken part in any acts with the assistance of the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed to the Russian Government an ultimatum. It pretended that the Russian Government had ordered a general mobilization of its army, and it demanded demobilization within twelve hours. This demand was all the more wounding in form, since a few hours before the Emperor Nicholas, in a spirit of confidence, had asked the German Emperor for mediation, so pronounced at a time when at the demand of England, and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government accepted a formula for a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute with simultaneous arrest of military preparations. On the same day this unfriendly *démarche* in regard to Russia was doubled by acts hostile to France; e.g. a break-off of communication by road, railway, telegraph, and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of explosives on the railway, which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier. From that moment it was no longer possible for us to believe in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the representatives of Germany continued to send us. We knew that at the announcement of a state of martial law Germany was mobilizing against us. We knew that six classes of reservists had been called up and that the transports of the army corps were stationed

at a little distance from the frontier. As these events developed, the Government, attentive and watchful, took from day to day and from hour to hour measures for safeguarding against what the situation imposed upon them, and the general mobilization of our army and navy was ordered. The same evening, at 7.30 o'clock, Germany, without regard for the acceptance by the St. Petersburg Government of the English proposal to which I referred above, declared war on Russia. On August 2nd, without regard to the extreme conciliation of France, and in contradiction to the pacific declaration of the German Ambassador in Paris, and in defiance of international law, German troops crossed the frontier at three points. At the same time, the violation of the treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, and the invasion of the Grand Duchy caused a protest from the Luxemburg Government. At last the neutrality of Belgium was menaced. The German Minister handed on August 2nd, evening, to the Belgian Government an ultimatum, inviting her to facilitate in Belgium military operations against France, under pretext of preserving the neutrality of Belgium, which they said was menaced by us. The Belgian Government refused, declaring that it was resolved to defend its neutrality, which was expected from it by France and Russia.

Since then, gentlemen, the aggression has been renewed, multiplied and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots were fired at our soldiers and customs officers, and there were dead and wounded. Yesterday a German aviator threw three bombs at Luneville. The German Ambassador, to whom we communicated these facts, as well as to all the other Powers, did not express his regrets. On the contrary, he came yesterday and demanded his passports, and notified us of a state of war, speaking all the while contrary to facts about acts of hostility committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eiffel region, and on the railway between Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. This is the letter which he sent us on the subject :—

“The German Administration and the military authorities

have set forth a number of hostile acts committed in German territory by French aviators. Most of the latter are manifestly violations of the neutrality of Belgium. One tried to destroy the construction near Wesel, another was seen in the neighbourhood of Eiffel, the other threw bombs on the railway between Karlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am charged, and have the honour of making known to Your Excellency, that in the presence of this aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France. I have at the same time the honour of making known to Your Excellency that the French authorities should withdraw their mercantile marine from German ports within forty-eight hours. My diplomatic mission having come to an end, it remains for me to pray Your Excellency to hand me my passports and to take fit measures to assure the return to Germany of myself and my suite, the Bavarian Legation, and the General Consulate. Please agree to the expression of my highest consideration.

“BARON VON SCHOEN.”

Have I any need to insist on the absurdity of these pretexts, gentlemen? At no moment has any French aviator penetrated Belgium. No French aviator has done anything in Bavaria or any other part of Germany. Against this attack, which violates all the laws of equity and public right, we have taken all the necessary precautions. Its execution has been carried out with rigour, and the mobilization of the Russian army continues with remarkable energy and enthusiasm. Belgium has mobilized 250,000 men, and proposes to defend with magnificent courage her neutrality and independence. The British fleet is mobilized, and the order is given to mobilize the army. In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has spoken of France with the applause of all parties in high terms, and his language is already profoundly reciprocated from all French hearts. In the name of the Government and the Republic, I thank the British Government for the cordiality of its words, and the French people reciprocate the sentiments. The Secretary of State has made a notable pronouncement as follows:—

"In the case of the descent of the German fleet to attack the coasts of France or the French navy, the British navy will intervene and give the French navy all the help in its power."

From this moment England and Germany are at war. So now the British fleet covers our flank on the north and west against German aggression. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe in the circumstances they justify the Government's action. I wish to give a true sense of the aggression of which France has been a victim. The victors of 1870 have had a desire to redouble the blow which they have dealt us. In 1875, the war destined to see France conquered, and she was only saved by the intervention of two Powers, to whom we ought to unite all the more the ties of alliance and friendship, namely, by the intervention of Russia and Great Britain. Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements, has liberated itself from the same yoke which Bismarck weighted on Europe. She has established European equilibrium and guaranteed the liberty and independence of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am wrong, but it appears to me that this work of peaceful restoration of the enfranchisement of liberty was definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907, with the approval of King Edward of England, and it is this which the German Empire wishes to destroy by this audacious act of force. Germany has nothing to reproach us with. We have made for peace sacrifices without precedent, and have borne silently for half a century an open wound in our side (Alsace-Lorraine). We have submitted since 1904 to systematic provocation, whether in March 1905, 1908, or 1911. Russia has given proof of great moderation in the events of 1908 and in the actual crisis. She has helped to preserve peace and the Triple Entente, when in the actual crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated in Servia and Greece certain demands. Useless sacrifices, sterile transactions, vain efforts, since to-day in acts of conciliation we and our allies are attacked by surprise. No one can say in good faith that we are the aggressors.

Italy, with the clear conscience of a Latin genius, has notified to us that she intends to remain neutral. This decision is met in all France with an echo of sincere joy. I have interpreted this to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, in letting him know how I congratulate our Italian sister, who has the same origin and ideals as ourselves.

We declare, gentlemen, that our independence, dignity, and security, which the Triple Entente has regained in the equilibrium for the service of peace, is now attacked. The liberties of Europe, of which France and her allies are the defenders, are attacked. These liberties we are going to defend, for they are the cause and all the rest are the products. France, unjustly provoked, has not wished for war ; she has always tried to prevent it. Since it is imposed upon her she will defend herself against Germany and any other Power which takes her part. A free people and strong, who hold century-old ideals, are united to guard their existence. The democracy bears military discipline as an effort, but has not flinched from responding to the weight of neighbouring armaments. A nation armed for its rights and the independence of Europe—this is the sight. We are without reproach ; we are without fear.

France has often proved under conditions less favourable that she is a more formidable adversary when she strikes, as is the case to-day, for liberty and right. In submitting these acts to you, gentlemen, who are my judges, we have to bear the weight and the heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience, and the satisfaction of our accomplished obligations.

(b)

AUGUST 4

Speech of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag.

(From "North German Gazette," August 5th.)

A tremendous crisis has broken in upon Europe. Since we won for ourselves the German Empire and respect before the world we have lived in peace for forty-four years and have kept safe the peace of Europe. In peaceful

labour we have become strong and mighty, and for that reason we are envied. In dogged patience we have watched how, under the excuse that Germany was anxious for war, enmity has been nourished in the East and West, and fetters have been forged against us. The wind that was sown there rises now in storm. We desired to live on in peaceful labour, and from the Kaiser to the youngest soldier went the unspoken oath: only in defence of a righteous cause shall our sword be drawn from its sheath. (Energetic applause.) The day on which we have to draw it has come upon us against our will, against our strenuous efforts. Russia has set the torch to the house. (Stormy shouts of "Quite right!") We stand in the midst of a war which has been forced upon us by France and Russia.

Gentlemen, a collection of documents, put together under the pressure of this rush of events, has been placed before you. Let me point to the facts that characterize our attitude. From the moment of the Austro-Servian crisis we declared that the dispute must be localized to Austria and Servia, and we worked for that end. Every Cabinet, especially that of England, represented the same standpoint. Russia alone declared that its word must be heard in the settlement of this conflict. With this the danger of European complications raised its threatening head. As soon as the first certain information of military preparations in Russia came to our hands we declared in St. Petersburg, in a friendly but emphatic way, that warlike measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally (stormy applause), and that military preparations against ourselves would make necessary similar measures on our side. (Renewed energetic applause.) But mobilization is very near to war. Russia assured us in a solemn manner of its wish for peace (stormy cries of "Hear, hear") and that it was making no military preparations against us. (Excitement.) In the meantime England made an attempt to mediate between St. Petersburg and Vienna, in which it was warmly supported by us. ("Hear, hear" and "Bravo!") On the 28th the Kaiser begged the Tsar by telegram to remember that Austria-Hungary had the right and duty to

defend itself against the Greater Servian agitation which was threatening to undermine its existence. ("Quite right!" on the right and among the National Liberals.) The Kaiser drew the attention of the Tsar to the solidarity of monarchical interests as threatened by the crime of Serajevo. He begged him to give him his personal support in clearing away the differences between St. Petersburg and Vienna. About the same time, and before the receipt of this telegram, the Tsar on his side begged the Kaiser for his help, and asked him to advise moderation in Vienna. The Kaiser undertook the rôle of mediator. But scarcely had the action ordered by him been started, when Russia mobilized all its forces directed against Austria-Hungary. (Loud cries of "Hear, hear," "Disgraceful!" "Pfui!") Austria-Hungary had only mobilized its army corps directed immediately against Serbia. Against the north were only two army corps, and these were far from the Russian frontier. ("Hear, hear" from the right.) The Kaiser at once pointed out to the Tsar that through this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria, the rôle of mediator, which he had undertaken at the request of the Tsar, had been made more difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, we continued our mediation in Vienna, which went to the farthest point compatible with our position as ally. ("Hear, hear" on right and in centre.) During this time Russia spontaneously renewed its assurances that it was making no military preparations against us. ("Hear, hear," "Pfui!") Then comes the 31st of July. In Vienna the decision was to be taken. We had already through our representations reached so much, that Vienna again took up the discussion with St. Petersburg through direct conversations, which for some time had been dropped. ("Hear, hear" on right and in centre.) But before the last decision had been taken in Vienna came the news that Russia had mobilized its whole military forces against us as well. ("Hear, hear" on right and in centre.) The Russian Government, which knew from our repeated representations what mobilization on our frontier meant, did not notify us of this mobilization, nor did it give us any explanation of it. ("Hear, hear.")

First, on the afternoon of the 31st came a telegram from the Tsar to the Kaiser, in which he guaranteed that his army would take up no provocative attitude against us. ("Hear, hear" and amusement.) But mobilization on our frontier was already in full progress since the night between the 30th and the 31st of July. While we, at the request of Russia, were mediating in Vienna, the Russian forces drew up along our long and almost completely open frontier. France did not yet mobilize, but made, as it confesses, military preparations.

And we—we from set purpose had called up no single reservist, for the sake of European peace. (Energetic applause.) Were we still to wait on patiently until the Powers between whom we were wedged in chose the time to strike their blow? (Many cries of "No, no!") Therefore, still on the 31st, we demanded from Russia demobilization as the only measure which could still preserve European peace. ("Quite right!") The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg further received the order to declare to the Russian Government that in case of a refusal of our demand we should consider a state of war to have come about.

The Imperial Ambassador carried out this order. What the reply of Russia was to this demand for demobilization we still do not know even to this day. (Energetic cries of "Hear, hear.") No telegraphic communication over it has reached us ("Hear, hear"), although the telegraphic cable has still brought many less important messages. (Renewed energetic cries of "Hear, hear.")

For this reason, when the time limit had been passed, the Kaiser, on August 1st, at five o'clock in the afternoon, saw himself forced to order a general mobilization of our forces. (Energetic applause.)

At the same time we had to assure ourselves as to France's attitude. To our definite question as to whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German war, France replied that it would do what its interests demanded. (Laughter.) This was an evasive answer to our question, if not a refusal. ("Quite true.")

Nevertheless, the Kaiser gave the order most scrupu-

lously to respect the French frontier. This order was carefully carried out, with one single exception. France, which mobilized at the same time as ourselves, said that it would respect a zone of 10 kilometres from the frontier. ("Hear, hear" on the right.) And what happened in reality? Aviators throwing bombs, cavalry patrols, French companies breaking into our Alsace-Lorraine territory! ("Hear, hear.") With this France had broken peace, although it was not yet in a state of war with us (many cries of "Quite right!"), and had made an actual attack upon us.

As to the exception I mentioned I have the following report upon it from the Chief of the General Staff :—

"Of the French complaints over the infringement of the frontier from our side only one can be admitted. Against express command a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on the 2nd of August. It was apparently shot down, as only one man has returned. But long before this single case of frontier infringement took place French aviators penetrated into Southern Germany and threw down bombs on our railways (energetic cries: "Hear, hear"), while in the Pass of the Vosges [*Schlucht*pass] French forces have attacked our frontier troops. Up to now our troops, according to order, have acted on the strict defensive."

So far the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a position of necessity (energetic assent); and necessity knows no law [*Not kennt kein Gebot*]. (Energetic applause.) Our troops have occupied Luxemburg (energetic "Bravo!"); perhaps they have already entered Belgian territory. (Energetic applause.) Gentlemen, this is in contradiction to the rules of international law. The French Government has declared in Brussels that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that France stood prepared for an inroad. ("Hear, hear" from right.) France could wait, but we not. A French inroad on our flank on the Lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. (Energetic assent.) So we were forced to set aside the

just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. ("Quite right!") The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong that we now do we will try to make good again as soon as our military ends have been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way out. (Long, stormy applause and clapping from all sides of the House.)

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. As to England's attitude, the declarations which Sir Edward Grey made yesterday in the House of Commons make the standpoint clear which the English Government adopts. We have given the English Government the declaration that so long as England remains neutral our fleet will not attack the north coast of France, and that we will not touch the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. This declaration I repeat now before the whole world. ("Hear, hear!") And I can add that so long as England remains neutral we should also be ready, if equivalent assurances were given, not to take hostile measures against French merchant vessels. ("Bravo!")

Gentlemen, this is what has happened. I repeat the word of the Kaiser: "Germany goes into the fight with a clear conscience." We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful labours, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future. The fifty years are not yet gone by in which Moltke said that we should have to stand armed, ready to defend the inheritance and conquests of 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But we meet it with clear confidence. (Stormy applause.) Our army stands in the field, our fleet is ready for battle—behind them is the whole German people. (Long, enthusiastic applause and clapping of hands from all sides of the House and from the Government benches—all the Members stand up.) The whole German people to the last man! (Repeated stormy applause.)

You, gentlemen, know your duty in all its greatness. The Bills before you need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them as soon as possible. (Stormy applause.)

Speech of Herr Haase, the Leader of the Social Democrats.

I have been commissioned to make the following statement on behalf of my party. We are standing before an hour of Fate, the result of Imperialist policy, in consequence of which an era of armament competition has been created and the differences between nations have been accentuated. Now it has burst at last over Europe like a flood. The responsibility for this falls on those who have conducted this policy. We refuse to accept it. Social Democracy has fought this fateful development with all its power, and until the last moment it has worked for the preservation of peace through impressive demonstrations in all countries, and especially for a close understanding with our French brothers. (Social Democrat applause.) This struggle has been in vain. We stand now before the iron fact of war. The horrors of hostile invasions threaten us. We have not now to decide for or against war, but upon a question concerning the necessary supplies for the defence of the country. We have now to think of the millions of our fellow-countrymen who without their fault have been plunged into this catastrophe. They will be the hardest hit from the ravages of war. Without difference of party our innermost good wishes accompany those of our brothers who have been called to the flag. We think also of the mothers who must give up their sons, of the wives and children who have been robbed of their supporters, and of those who, in addition to the anxiety for their dear ones, are threatened with the horrors of hunger. To these there will soon be added the thousands of wounded and crippled soldiers. To stand by them all, to lighten the lot and help their immeasurable need, is felt by us to be our compelling duty. (Applause.) For our people and for its freedom in the future much, if not all, is at stake. Should victory come to Russian despotism, which has stained itself in the blood of the best of its own people? (Stormy applause.) We must ward off this danger and secure the *Kultur* and independence of our own country. By doing so we prove what we have always said, "In the hour of danger we shall

not leave our Fatherland in the lurch." (Great applause.) We feel that in this we are at one with the "International," which recognizes the right of every nation at all times to national independence and self-defence, just as, in accordance with it, it condemns any war of conquest. We demand that this war, as soon as the end of ensuring our safety is reached, and the enemy is inclined to peace, shall bring us to a peace which makes friendship with our neighbouring nations possible. We demand this, not only in the interests of international solidarity for which we have always fought, but also in the interests of the German people. We hope that the terrible school of war will make a new hatred of war, and that it will win men to the idea of international Socialism and peace among nations. Led by these principles, we agree to the credits which have been demanded. (Energetic applause.)

(c)

AUGUST 4

Speech of King Albert to the Belgian Parliament.

Never since 1830 has a more grave hour sounded for Belgium. The force of our right and the necessity for Europe of our autonomous existence make us still hope that the events we fear will not take place; but if it is necessary to resist the invasion of our soil, duty will find us armed and decided upon the greatest sacrifices!

From now our youth has risen up to defend our fatherland against the danger. A single duty is imposed on our wills: a determined resistance, courage, and unity.

Our enthusiasm is shown by our irreproachable mobilization and by the multitude of volunteers.

The moment for action is here. I have called you together to allow the Chambers to associate themselves in the enthusiasm of the country. You will know how to pass all these measures at once. You are all decided to preserve intact the sacred patrimony of our ancestors. No one will fail in his duty.

The army is equal to its task. The Government and

myself have full confidence. The Government understands its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger violates our territory, he will find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath.

I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us.

(d)

AUGUST 8

At the Winter Palace.

(Translated from the Special Edition of the Orange Book.)

SPEECH OF THE EMPEROR

"I greet you in these significant and troubled times which Russia is experiencing. Germany, and after her Austria, has declared war on Russia. Such an uplifting of patriotic feeling, love for our homes, and devotion to the Throne, which has swept over our land like a hurricane, serves in my eyes, and I think in yours, as a guarantee that our Great Mother Russia will by the help of our Lord God bring the war to a successful conclusion. In this united outburst of affection and readiness for all sacrifices, even that of life itself, I feel the possibility of upholding our strength, and quietly and with confidence look forward to the future.

"We are not only protecting our honour and our dignity within the limits of our land, but also that of our brother Slavs, who are of one blood and faith with us. At this time I observe with joy that the feeling of unity among the Slavs has been brought into strong prominence throughout all Russia. I believe that you, each and all, in your place can sustain this Heaven-sent trial and that we all, beginning with myself, will fulfil our duty to the end. Great is the God of our Russian land!"

Long cries of "Hurrah!" sounded in the Great Hall.

After the speech of the Emperor the first man who had the good fortune to answer was the President of the Imperial Council, M. Golubef.

SPEECH OF M. GOLUBEF

"Your Imperial Majesty ! The Imperial Council expresses to You, our Great Sovereign, the innermost feelings of Your subjects in unbounded love and universal thanks for Your grant of legislative institutions which allow us to take part in the consideration of the measures made necessary by the situation which, despite the peaceful efforts of Your Majesty, has been produced by the declaration of war against Russia by two neighbouring monarchies.

"The unity of feeling between our Beloved Master and the people of his Empire redoubles her strength. We are prepared for all sacrifices to guard our honour and dignity and to keep the Russian Empire undivided. With heartfelt prayers to the King of kings and Lord of lords for the preservation of our country under the sacred protection of the Almighty, we quietly and confidently look forward to the future. The valiant Russian army by its victories over the enemy will crown with glory the Mighty Leader of All the Russias. May there be long life to His Imperial Majesty, our Lord Emperor, Nicholas Alexandrovitch, in the welfare and happiness of our Fatherland !"

Again there rose from the Hall shouts of "Hurrah !" and echoes of the National Hymn. After M. Golubef, the President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, turned to His Majesty with the following words :—

SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE DUMA

"Your Imperial Majesty ! With a deep feeling of happiness and enthusiasm all Russia has heard the words of the Russian Tsar calling on His people to unite with Him in the heavy trial which has fallen on our land. Your Majesty ! Russia knows that Your wish and thought is directed to the preservation of this land in a state of peace and rest, and that Your loving heart is bent on the maintenance of

peace, for the protection of your subjects who are so dear to You.

"But a terrible hour has struck. Great and small, all have understood the meaning and depth of these historical events. The welfare and integrity of our Empire is threatened. Our national honour has been attacked, and our national honour is dearer to us than life. The time has come to show all the world how terrible the Russian people is to its enemies; how it will surround by an indestructible wall its crown-bearing Ruler, believing ever in heavenly providence. The time has come for stubborn strife in the name of preserving the Imperial dignity, strife for the integrity and inviolability of our Russian land, and not in one of us is there doubt or hesitation. Called to Imperial life by the will of Your Majesty, the representative Government now stands before you. The Imperial Duma, reflecting the unanimous feeling of all the provinces of Russia, and united in one prevailing idea, has commissioned me to say to You that Your people are ready to fight for the honour and glory of the Fatherland. Without differences of opinion, view, or conviction, the Imperial Duma, brought together from the length and breadth of the land, quietly and firmly speaks to its Tsar: Trust, O Emperor, the Russian people; firmly confiding in the grace of God, it will not flinch from any sacrifice until the enemy is defeated and the dignity of the country assured."

The speech of the President of the Duma, M. Rodzianko, was received with cries of "Hurrah!" followed by the singing of "God save the Tsar!" When the hymn was over the Emperor graciously turned to the assembled members of the legislative Chambers and addressed to them the following words:—

REPLY OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR

"From my heart I thank you, gentlemen, for the declaration of your sincere patriotism, of which I had no doubt. But I am glad at such a moment as this to see such a demonstration.

"From all my heart I wish you success. God is with us!"

JULY 26/AUGUST 8, 1914

*Historic Day in the Imperial Duma**(Translated from the Special Edition of the Orange Book.)*

SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT

"Members of the Duma, gentlemen! To our Lord the Emperor in His trust in His people it was pleasing in these dark days through which our country is passing to summon the Imperial Duma in the name of the solidarity of the Russian Tsar with His devoted people. The Imperial Duma has already answered His Majesty's call in to-day's reception. We all well know that Russia did not want war and that the Russian people have no aggressive tendencies. But fate has dragged us into war. The die is cast, and we are faced in all its momentousness with the question of the integrity and unity of the Empire. In these rapid events, unprecedented as yet in the history of the world, it is comforting to see the stately calm which permeates all without exception, and clearly and without further words emphasizes before the world the strength and greatness of the Russian spirit. (Stormy demonstration : Cries of 'Hurrah !' from all sides interrupted the speech of the President.)

"Quietly and without violence we can say to all who attack us, 'Hands off !' (Renewed cheers.) 'Do not dare to touch our Holy Russia. Our people is peace-loving and gentle, but powerful and terrible when called upon to defend itself.' We can say, 'Look! you thought that internal strife disunited us, and yet all the races inhabiting the immense land of Russia are united in one brotherly family when misfortune threatens our common Fatherland.' The Russian warrior does not hang his head in gloom, whatever trials he may have to undergo. His powerful shoulders will support any load. The enemy will be repulsed and peace will shine again, uniting in happiness and good fortune an undivided land in all the splendour of its unbroken greatness.

"Gentlemen of the Duma ! In this hour our thoughts and wishes are on our frontiers, where the battle is now raging.

Our brave army, our glorious fleet! (Loud applause.) Our thoughts are there, where our children and brothers are defending our great heritage with their inherent valour. May the Almighty God give them aid! May he strengthen and protect them! Our ardent desire for their success and glory will always be with our heroes. We who stay at home accept our duty. We will put our hands to the work of supporting the families of those who have gone forth. Let them in our army know we assist them in their need not in words only but in deeds, and that we will let them know no want."

Here the wave of enthusiasm reached its height. All the Deputies stood up in their places and the Hall resounded with the singing of the hymn and long-echoing "Hurrahs!" When the singing had ceased, M. Rodzianko read some telegrams of greeting received by the Duma from the Servian and Montenegrin Shuptchinas. The Imperial Duma answered these addresses by an ovation to the Ambassadors of the friendly Powers, who were in the diplomatic box. Especially loud applause arose when the President cried, "Long life to the courageous Belgian people!"

SPEECH OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

When the demonstration was over, the President of the Council of Ministers, M. Goremykin, mounted on the rostrum.

"Gentlemen of the Duma," he began, "on July 20/August 1 there came the Imperial Ukas summoning you to renew the labours which had been broken off a month before in the midst, as it appeared, of profound peace. During this month, events of great historical importance have taken place. One after the other, like claps of thunder, they have broken over the life of Russia and of Europe. These events had been long prepared by the invisible course of history, but for all that they came unexpectedly. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will take my place in presenting

to you an account of the events which preceded the European war. Russia did not wish for war. The Government has conscientiously sought a peaceful issue out of the complication, not leaving untried even the weakest hope of warding off the approach of a bloody conflict.

"But there is a limit to Russia's love of peace. Knowing to the full the heavy responsibility that lay on us, the Imperial Government could not withdraw ignominiously before the challenge thrown down to us. That would have meant to deny to Russia the status of a Great Power. That would have been a fatal mistake. That would have humbled us, but it would not have altered the course of events for which we are not responsible. The war has begun, and now it remains for us only to repeat the words which must resound through all the world: 'We will pursue this war, whatever it may be, to the end.' (Stormy applause.) In all Russia's many centuries of history perhaps only one war, only that of 1812, equals in importance the present events. Believe me, the Government has not done this in blind self-confidence: it clearly takes account of the fact that this war will need the greatest efforts of strength, much self-sacrifice, and manly preparation for the heavy strokes of Fate. But the Government in no way doubts the final success, and it fully believes in the great historic mission of Russia. (Applause.) On the declaration of war against us, the Government was faced by the question of providing for the means of carrying on the campaign. The war finds us in a financial state which does not suggest danger to the Government. The Minister of Finance will communicate to you the measures taken in the first instance. The necessity of those measures was one reason for the calling together of the legislative assembly. But this was not the most important cause. The summoning of the Imperial Council and the Imperial Duma was caused by a deeper thought, clearly revealed by the words of the Imperial Ukas: 'In view of the heavy trials sent to our land, and desirous of being in full unity with the people, we consider it well to summon the Imperial Council and

the Imperial Duma.' (Loud applause.) The legislative assemblies should know that henceforth they will be summoned at once if through exceptional circumstances it is considered necessary. (Applause.) On us falls the great and responsible task of expressing the thoughts and feelings of the people. The Government has fulfilled and will fulfil its duty to the end. Now, gentlemen of the Imperial Duma, it is your turn. In this solemn historical moment, I, in the name of the Government, summon you all, without difference of faction or party, to become imbued with the sentiments of the Imperial manifesto: 'Let internal strife be forgotten (applause), and let us be united under one banner, on which are written the words equally great for all, 'THE EMPEROR AND RUSSIA.'''

Loud applause, rising to an ovation, drowned the last words of the President of the Council of Ministers.

SPEECH OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(M. SASONOF)

"Gentlemen of the Duma," he said, "at fatal moments when responsible decisions must be taken, the Government feels itself strengthened by the knowledge of its full unity with the popular conscience. When the time comes for the impartial judgment of History to be given, I firmly believe that her decision will be no other than that by which we have been guided. Russia could not refuse the challenge of her enemies. She could not abandon the greatest traditions of her history. She could not cease to be Great Russia. (Exclamations on the right, and loud cheers.) Our enemies attempt to place upon us the responsibility for the disaster into which they have plunged Europe, but their calumnies cannot mislead any one who has conscientiously followed the policy of Russia during recent years and during these last few days. Recognizing the great problems bound up with her internal development and prosperity, Russia has for a long time given numerous proofs of her sincere love of peace. It was only through this love of peace that a conflagration, on the point of breaking out in

Europe in 1912-13, when trouble arose in the Balkans, was avoided. Not from her, not from Russian policy came the threat to European peace. The dignity of mighty Russia did not need the ostentatious rattle of the sword, attacks on the self-love of others, or neglect of the rights of the weak. (Cheers, and cries of 'Bravo!') Calm and peace-loving Russia has not been left in peace by her enemies.

"Is it necessary to remind you of all the attempts of Austria-Hungary to undermine the historical position of Russia in the Balkans? The time has come when I do not hesitate to say that, by her intrigues, she [Austria] has succeeded in sowing fratricidal strife between Bulgaria and her allies. (Prolonged sensation in the Chamber.) But in spite of heavy trials, the unity of our brother Slavs cannot, thank God, be destroyed. Torn by internal strife, Austria-Hungary decided to take a step which would at the same time create an impression of strength and humble Russia. In this object she chose out Serbia, with whom we are linked by ties of history, origin, and faith. The circumstances under which the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia are known to you. If Serbia had given way she would have become the vassal of Austria. It was clear that if we drew back it would be the beginning, not only of the abnegation of Russia's historical rôle as the protector of the Balkan people, but the recognition that the will of Austria, and behind her that of Germany, is law in Europe. (Cries of 'Bravo!' from all sides.) We could not agree to that, neither we, nor France, nor England. No less than us, our brave allies have done all in their power to preserve the peace of Europe. Our enemies were deceived, taking these efforts for a sign of weakness. After the challenge thrown down by Austria, Russia did not renounce its attempt to bring the conflict to a peaceful solution. In this aim all our efforts and those of our allies were exerted up to the end. You will be convinced of this by the documents which are to be published, and which present the course of the negotiations. We stood firmly by one condition. Ready to accept any possible compromise which could be agreed to by Austria, without loss of

dignity, we refused anything which could encroach on the integrity and independence of Servia.

"From the beginning we did not hide our point of view from Germany. Undoubtedly at one time, if the Berlin Cabinet had wished, it could by firm words have held its ally back, as it did at the time of the Balkan crisis. ('Bravo !')

"But Germany, who to the end did not cease to express her readiness to influence Vienna, refused one after the other the proposals which were made, and from her side gave only empty assurances. Time passed. The negotiations did not advance. Austria bombarded Belgrade. It was an organized Government massacre. It was a natural continuation of the massacre of the defenceless Servian population of Serajevo after the famous murder of June 15/28. The clear object of all this was to gain time, in order to place before us and Europe as a *fait accompli* the humiliation and extinction of Servia. Under such circumstances we could not but take natural measures of precaution, all the more as Austria had already mobilized half her army. When the mobilization of the army and navy was declared in Russia, our Lord the Emperor was graciously pleased to inform the German Emperor that Russia would not proceed to forceful measures as long as there was hope for a peaceful solution to the negotiations which were being carried out with the moderation I have mentioned. His voice was not listened to.

"Germany declared war on us and then on our ally. Losing all self-control, she persisted in trampling on the rights of neutral States guaranteed by her own signature, together with that of other States. (During the references of M. Sazonof to the heroism of the Belgian people, struggling against the mighty German army, all the Deputies gave an enthusiastic ovation to the representatives of Belgium in the diplomatic box.)

"The manner in which Germany has proceeded," continued M. Sazonof, "has provoked the deepest indignation of the whole civilized world, and especially of noble France, which, together with us, has stood for the protection of

right and justice. (Demonstrations from all sides and continued cries of 'Long live France!' The Deputies stood up in their places, and, turning to the diplomatic box, gave a prolonged ovation to the French Ambassador, M. Paléologue.)

"Is it necessary to say," continued the Minister, "that the same sentiments inspired the English people, who, like one man, have united in a common resolve to resist the effort of Germany to lay on Europe the heavy hand of her hegemony? (Stormy applause from all benches, while the Deputies stood up and cheered the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan.)

"But now events leading to this war are obscured by the significance which it has acquired for all of us and for our allies. Germany declared war on us on July 19th/August 1st, and five days after Austria did the same, stating as her motive our interference in her quarrel with Servia and the fact that we had opened hostilities against Germany. This would also appear to be the *casus belli* of the latter against us. Hostile troops invaded our territory.

"We are fighting for the defence of our country, we are fighting for our dignity and status as a Great Power. ('Bravo!') We cannot allow Europe to be dominated by Germany and her allies. ('Bravo!') That, too, is what our own allies have felt. We have shown no empty pride. We know that perhaps we shall be submitted to heavy trials. Our enemies have calculated on this. Not knowing Russia and its history, they have counted on the possibility of national apathy. But God will not desert Russia in the darkest hour of her history, and will not forsake our children united round their Tsar in common feelings of love and self-sacrifice. (Loud demonstrations from all sides and cries of 'True!') In the humble hope of God's help, in their unshaken faith in Russia, the Government turn to you, the representatives of the people, confident that in you is reflected the spirit of our great country, which our enemies shall find no laughing matter."

The last words of the Minister were drowned by enthu-

siastic demonstrations from all sides. The Deputies stood up in their places and gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs an ovation which lasted for several minutes.

DECLARATION OF THE LABOUR PARTY

The first speech was made by M. Koronsky, who made the following statement on behalf of the Labour party:—

“A heavy trial has fallen on the country and a great sorrow on the land. Thousands and thousands of young lives are doomed to inhuman suffering; misery and want come to lay waste the orphaned homes of the working masses of the population. We steadfastly believe that the great primæval force of Russian democracy will join with other forces in giving decisive resistance to the enemy (applause), and in protecting the land of our birth and our civilization, created by the sweat and blood of generations. We believe that on the field of battle and amidst suffering the brotherhood of all the races of Russia will be strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible internal troubles. The responsibility of those European Governments who in the interests of the ruling classes have plunged their peoples into a fratricidal war is incalculable.

“The Socialists of all these belligerent countries—France, England, Belgium, and Germany—have tried to protest against this war which has burst upon us. We, the Russian democracy, were not able, even at the last, to raise our voice freely against the impending war. But, deeply believing in the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our fraternal greetings to all who protested against these preparations for this fratricidal conflict of peoples. Russian citizens, remember that we have no enemies among the working classes of the fighting countries. Protect to the end your country from attacks by Governments hostile to us, Germany and Austria, but remember that there would not have been this terrible war had the great ideals of democracy—freedom, equality, and brotherhood—been directing those who control the destinies of Russia and all other countries. As it is, our rulers even in this

terrible hour show no desire to forget internal strife, give no amnesty for those who are struggling for the freedom and welfare of the land, show no desire for reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire, who have forgiven all and are fighting by our side and for our common Fatherland, and instead of lightening the position of the working classes, the Government is laying on them the greatest weight of the military expenses, increasing the burden of indirect taxation. Peasants and workmen, all who wish for the happiness of Russia, strengthen your souls in these great trials, summon up all your strength when you have protected your country, and free it. Brotherly greetings to you and to our brothers who are shedding their blood for their country."

The stormy applause of the whole Duma drowned the speech of the orator, which was delivered with striking and inspiring enthusiasm.

After this Baron Felkersan, in the name of the Germans of the Baltic Provinces, spoke as follows :—

"Of old the faithful German colonists of the Baltic Provinces have stood ready to protect their Fatherland. We are not only ready to vote for all the proposals of military credit, but, following the example of our ancestors, we are ready to sacrifice our lives and property for the unity and greatness of Russia." ("Bravo!" and cheers.)

DECLARATION OF THE POLES

"In this historic moment," declared the Deputy M. Yarensky in the name of the Poles, "when the Slav and Teuton world directed by our eternal enemies, the Prussians, are meeting in fateful conflict, the condition of the Polish people, deprived of its independence and the possibility of declaring its free will, becomes tragic. The tragedy is redoubled not only because our country is the theatre of war with all its horrors, but because, divided into three parts, the Polish people sees its sons one against the other in the enemies' ranks. But, disunited territorially, we in our feelings and sympathies are one with the Slavs.

(Cheers and 'Bravo!') This attitude is dictated to us, not only by the righteousness of the cause which Russia is defending, but by political considerations. The world-wide significance of the times in which we are living must put the settlement of all internal questions in the background. (Cheers and 'Bravo!') May God grant that the Slavs, under the leadership of Russia, will show such a resistance as, five centuries ago, the Poles and Letts showed to their enemies. (Cheers and 'Bravo!') Let the pouring out of our blood and the horrors of fratricide in this war create for us a union of the Polish races, now divided into three parts." (Stormy cheers and "Bravo!")

DECLARATION OF THE LITHUANIANS AND LETTS

After the President of the Polish party, the President of the Lithuanians, the Deputy M. Goldman, declared that among the Lithuanians and Esthonians there was not one man who did not recognize that all they had achieved had been obtained under the protection of the Russian Eagle.

"Therefore," said the Deputy M. Goldman, "you can find among us such a spirit of enthusiasm as cannot be described. Into the sea of blood in which the tyrant of Europe sitting in Berlin wishes to bathe (applause), into this sea the Lithuanians and Esthonians will pour their last drop of blood, in order that the man who threatens the peace of the world and whispers always evil counsels to his neighbours shall not only bathe in this sea, but shall drown in it. In these great days we will show that we are capable not only of patriotic outbursts, but of the maintenance of internal order, an indispensable security for success in arms on the field of battle. In the present sacred and righteous conflict we shall go with the Russian people to the end. Not only our sons, brothers, and fathers will fight in the ranks of the army, but in each of our homes, in every hut, the enemy will find his fiercest foe, whose head he may indeed cut off, but from whom even on the point of death he will hear only one cry—'Long live Russia!'" (Loud applause from all benches.)

The Deputy M. Ichas, the leader of the Letts, mounted the rostrum.

"In this historic moment," he observed, "I must declare in the name of the Letts that the fate of our people is always bound up with that of the Slavs. The Lettish people, on whose land the fighting began, forced to fight in the foremost ranks, go into this war as a holy war. They forget all injuries, hoping to see Russia free and happy after the war. They hope that the Letts, now divided, will be united under one Russian ensign."

DECLARATION OF THE JEWS

The Deputy M. Friedman mounted the rostrum.

"On me," he said, "has fallen the high honour of expressing the feelings which at the present historic moment inspire the Jewish people. In the great storm of enthusiasm which has uplifted all the races and peoples of Russia the Jews will go shoulder to shoulder with all the rest. Despite the exceptionally severe political conditions under which we have lived and are living, we Jews have always felt ourselves Russian citizens and have always been true sons of the Fatherland. No power will tear us from our country Russia, or from the soil to which we are bound by century-long ties. In the protection of our country from foreign invasion we take our part not only from a sense of duty, but with deep affection. In the present hour of trial, in answer to the appeal from the Throne, we Russian Jews will arise as one man under the Russian flag and will use all our strength to defeat the enemy. (Applause from all benches.) The Jewish people will fulfil their obligations to the end."

The speaker concluded amidst the stormy applause of all the Duma. Even the Extreme Right applauded.

DECLARATION OF THE CADETS

On behalf of the Party of the Freedom of the People M. Milyokof said :—

"The Party of the Freedom of the People has more than once spoken in the Imperial Duma on those questions referred to by the first two speakers from the rostrum. The party's opinion on those questions is well known to all, and of course no circumstances can alter this opinion. When the time comes the party will refer to these matters again, and will point out the only possible road towards the internal reform of Russia. We hope that in passing through the heavy trials which are before us the country will come nearer to her cherished aims. But at this moment we are too deeply occupied by other questions. Other problems, terrible and great, stand before us and require a speedy decision. We need all our strength to protect ourselves from the external enemy, who has sought conflict with us on his way to world-power. Our cause is just. We go into this conflict to free our country from the attack of the foreigner, and the Slav people from the German domination of the world; to free Europe from the insufferable pressure of the burden of armaments, which nullify peaceful endeavours and lead again and again to armed conflict. In this conflict we are all at one; we do not make conditions or demands; we simply put into the scale our firm resolve to overcome the tyrant. (Applause from all benches and 'Bravo!') That is why the Central Committee of our party, guided by these considerations, has turned to its supporters with a declaration in which the party whole-heartedly unites, and which we feel it our duty to declare from this high rostrum."

DECLARATION OF THE GERMAN COLONISTS

The Deputy M. Liutz, in the name of the German colonists, said:—

"The hour has come when the Germans living in Russia, true subjects of His Majesty, will show themselves able to co-operate for the protection of the dignity and honour of this great Empire, and to refute the insulting suggestion that the German-Russian subjects could change their Fatherland, the honour and dignity of which they have

never forgotten and will never forget. The near future will show that they know how to justify the trust which was shown them in former times." (Applause on the right and centre.)

DECLARATION OF THE NATIONALISTS

The leader of the Nationalist party, the Deputy M. Dalashof, made the following declaration :—

"The clock of history has struck a great hour. In these dark but famous times Russia is called upon to rectify some of her historical mistakes, mistakes of the eighteenth century, mistakes of 1815, 1848, and 1870. On all sides, in all its immeasurable extent, has arisen that wave, that spiritual impulse, that invincible psychic force which is the true security for the final victory of right and justice. Let us swear to forget everything but the one great aim, to stand firm at this hour until the eternal menace to righteousness, justice and peace, this armed aggression, this German militarism, is broken and finally extinguished. (Cheers.) In perfect unity with our ruler we will overcome all our difficulties, and will reach our great and sacred goal."

DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL GROUPS

In the name of the Central Groups, M. Nussen-Puschin said :—

"Gentlemen of the Duma and brothers elected from the land of Russia, there are moments in the life of a people when all thought and feeling, all waves of popular enthusiasm, ought to be expressed in one general manifestation. Let that manifestation be, 'God, the Tsar, the People, and victory over our enemies!'" (Applause.)

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHT

The leader of the Extreme Right, M. Markoff, made the following speech :—

"Gentlemen, you have just heard with fervour the patriotic voices of the races populating Russia. We have only not heard the representatives of the Russian people, and in this there is no cause for wonder, for when Russia is

at war it is, of course, unnecessary for the Russian people to explain its attitude. I have not risen as the representative of the Russian people. You are all representatives of the Russian people. (Cheers.) I have risen to tell you how in Kursk part of the Russian people said good-bye to its army. There were more than 20,000 people, amongst whom I think there was not one who had not sent a brother, a son, or a husband to the army. I was amongst them several hours. The people blessed the soldiers with ikons, and I did not hear one reproach concerning the cause of the war, although in the crowd there were many workmen and mechanics, many of what is called the proletariat. All thought only of one thing: 'O Lord, give us victory!' In all the length and breadth of Great Mother Russia the Russian people is thinking only of victory. We representatives of the Russian people in full unison shall obey the cry of our souls and fulfil our sacred duty if we turn to the highest representatives of our brave Russian army and our brave Russian fleet, to the Ministers of War and Marine, and ask them to transmit to our soldiers and sailors the expression of that feeling which we all share. Gentlemen, I shout hurrah for our great army and navy!" (Stormy applause from all the Duma ended the speech from the leader of the Extreme Right.)

DECLARATION OF THE TARTARS, CHOVASHES, AND CHEREMEKS

M. Godnof declared that he came forward on this occasion not as a Russian, but as the representative of the non-Russian peoples of the Kazan Province, of which in the Duma there was no other representative but himself.

"The Kazan Principality," he said, "composed of Mohamedans and Tartars, not having here its own representatives, cannot express its own feelings. Allow me, as a representative elected by them, by the Chovashes and Cheremeks of the Kazan Province, to declare that, having lived among them for ten years, I can voice their feelings and say that they as one man will resist, like the Russians, the aggression which is being made against Russia at the present time.

Accept through me from them the assurance that they whole-heartedly wish complete success to the Russian arms, and that they will sacrifice their lives for Russia like the Russians."

The next speaker was the representative of the Octobrists, M. Protopopov.

"At the present time," he said, "when all Russia is united round our sacred covenant to protect the land of their birth, words are useless. All the world is witness to our unity, which, with God's help, will lead to victory. My political friends have sent me to the rostrum at this historic moment, not to express their feelings, for they are certain and without doubt. They have sent me to express their firm conviction and unshaken faith that in the face of a terrible aggression we shall all stand together. We are all ready with our fortunes and lives, without measure or limit, to resist the attempts of the enemy to break down by violence a free people. We believe that the Lord will lift up His sword against the wrong, and that Russia in this historic conflict, just as in former trials, will unite round the Tsar, and will come out of this trial whole, undivided, morally strengthened and reformed."

RESOLUTION

"Having heard the statements of the Government, and being convinced that all means of keeping the peace consistent with the dignity of Russia as a Great Power have been exhausted, the Imperial Duma expresses its unshaken confidence that during these dark hours of trial, and faced by the operations of war, all the Russian people, united in one common feeling of love for their country, and firmly believing in the righteousness of its cause, are ready to stand at the call of the Emperor to defend the land of their birth, its honour and its dignity. Recognizing this, the Duma expresses its firm faith in the invincible strength and the sacred future of Russia. While expressing its full readiness to co-operate in the protection of the country and in guaranteeing the support of their families at home, the Imperial Duma sends its brotherly greeting to

the brave ones protecting the country, who are unselfishly carrying out their heroic duty."

DECLARATION OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

This declaration, which is omitted in the official Orange Book as published by the Russian Government, is translated from the verbatim report published in the Russian newspaper *Rech*, of July 27/August 9, 1914.

In the name of the Social Democratic party M. Khaustoff made the following declaration :—

"A terrible, unprecedented evil has fallen upon the people of the whole world. Millions of workmen are torn away from their peaceful labour and ruined; they are being hurled into a bloody whirlpool, while millions of families are condemned to starvation. When the Governments of Europe were getting ready for war, the European proletariat, including the German, entered a common protest against this war which was being prepared by the ruling classes. Various circumstances prevented the Russian workmen from openly making the same protest. But at the time of the enormous demonstration against the war on the part of the European proletariat the hearts of the Russian workers beat in unison with those of their comrades. The present war, the result of a policy of greed, is a war the responsibility for which will be borne by the ruling classes of all the countries now fighting. The proletariat, the constant defender of freedom and the interests of the people, will always protect the welfare of the people against all attacks, from whatever quarter they may come. The workers of the fighting countries were unable to prevent the outbreak of the war and that orgy of barbarism which it carries with it. But we are deeply convinced that it is in the international unity of all the working masses of the whole world that the proletariat will find the means of bringing the war to the quickest possible termination. And let the terms of peace be dictated not by diplomats but by the people itself. At the same time we express the deep conviction that this war will, once and for all, open

the eyes of the European masses to the true source of the persecution and oppression under which they are suffering, and that the present outbreak of barbarism will be at the same time the last outbreak." (Applause from the left, hisses on the right.)

The Deputies gave cheers for the Emperor and sang the National Anthem. At 7.30 in the evening this historic sitting of the Duma closed. The Deputies gave M. Rodzianko an ovation, and left the Chamber.

(e)

STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT BY MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND SPEECHES BY PARTY LEADERS ON THE EUROPEAN CRISIS¹

JULY 27.

*Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons.**(Hansard, Vol. 66, No. 121.)*

AUSTRIA AND SERBIA.

MR. BONAR LAW: I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a question of which I have given him notice: whether he would communicate any information to the House as to the situation which exists between Austria and Servia?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. Grey): The House will, of course, be aware through the public Press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at this moment. I think that it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which His Majesty's Government have so far taken up.

Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, which has appeared in the Press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Servia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone, I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that, if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe: a matter that concerned us all.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that, if rela-

¹ Sir Edward Grey's and Mr. Asquith's speeches for August 3rd and 4th are quoted in the English White Paper (see Contents).

tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain—who were not directly interested in the Servian question should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four Powers endeavoured to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia, I made by telegraph yesterday afternoon the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed :—

I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a Conference to be held in London immediately to endeavour to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorize their representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed Conference, and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the Conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is, of course, a proposal in which the co-operation of all four Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the Press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of Powers, including Powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Servia and becomes one in which another Great Power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow: no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable.

Mr. HARRY LAWSON: May I ask the right hon. gentleman whether it is true that this morning the German Emperor accepted the principle of mediation which he has proposed?

Sir E. GREY: I understand that the German Government are favourable to the idea of mediation in principle as between Austria-

Hungary and Russia, but that as to the particular proposal of applying that principle by means of a Conference which I have described to the House, the reply of the German Government has not yet been received.

JULY 29.

(*Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 109.*)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SERBIA.

Mr. JOYNSON-HICKS : I beg to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer a question of which I have given him private notice, namely :—Whether he has communicated with the Bank of England with the view to their convening a meeting of bankers to take steps to deal with the present financial position ; and, if not, whether he will consider the advisability of so doing without further delay ?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE : I have been in consultation with the Bank of England, and I am advised that there is nothing in the financial situation at the present moment which would make such a suggestion necessary or advisable.

Mr. BONAR LAW : May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any information in regard to the European situation to give to the House ?

The PRIME MINISTER : As the House is aware, a formal Declaration of War was issued yesterday by Austria against Serbia. The situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity. I can only say—usefully say—that His Majesty's Government are not relaxing their efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of possible conflict.

Mr. WALTER GUINNESS : May I ask the right hon. gentleman whether he has received any information as to the alleged revolutionary outbreak in Russian Poland ?

The PRIME MINISTER : No, sir.

JULY 30

Statement of Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons.

(*Hansard, Vol. 65, p. 1568.*)

Mr. BONAR LAW : May I ask the Foreign Secretary if he has any information which he can communicate to the House ?

Sir E. GREY : There is very little that I can say. I regret I cannot say that the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are the same. Austria has begun war against Serbia, and Russia has ordered a partial mobilization, which has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other Powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object, to preserve European peace, and for this purpose are keeping in close touch with other Powers. In thus keeping in touch, we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far, though it has not been possible for the Powers to unite in joint diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.

JULY 31

Statement by Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons.

(*Hansard, Vol. 65, p. 1781.*)

The PRIME MINISTER : We have just heard (not from St. Petersburg, but from Germany) that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and that in consequence of this, martial law was to be proclaimed for Germany. We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with. In the circumstances, I should prefer not to answer any questions till Monday next.

AUGUST 3

Speeches of the party leaders after Sir Edward Grey.

(*Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 112.*)

Mr. BONAR LAW : The right hon. gentleman has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say, in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single member of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further, I would like to say. The right hon. gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot on the political horizon. Everything he has said I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot, and that every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This only I shall add : the Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition.

Mr. JOHN REDMOND : I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part, in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled, if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times when this Empire had been engaged in these terrible enterprises, it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in the centuries of history,

has been estranged from this country. Allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topic. But this I may be allowed to say, that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history has, I think, altered the views of the democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and to-day I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. There is a possibility, at any rate, of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American War, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish Volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah, how sad the reading of the history of those days is!—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of Volunteers, and yet, from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it towards the arming of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled as brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? I ought to apologize for having intervened, but while Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the North, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I should, had circumstances permitted, have preferred to remain silent this afternoon. But circumstances do not permit of that. I shall model what I have to say on the two speeches we have listened to, and I shall be brief. The right hon. gentleman, to a House which in a great majority is with him, has delivered a speech the echoes of which will go down in history. The speech has been impressive, but however much we may resist the conclusion to which he has come, we have not been able to resist the moving character of his appeal. I think he is wrong. I think the Government which he represents and for

which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong. We shall see. The effect of the right hon. gentleman's speech in this House is not to be its final effect. There may be opportunities, or there may not be opportunities, for us to go into details, but I want to say to this House, and to say it without equivocation, if the right hon. gentleman had come here to-day and told us that our country is in danger, I do not care what party he appealed to, or to what class he appealed, we would be with him and behind him. If this is so, we will vote him what money he wants. Yes, and we will go farther. We will offer him ourselves if the country is in danger. But he has not persuaded me that it is. He has not persuaded my hon. friends who co-operate with me that it is, and I am perfectly certain, when his speech gets into cold print to-morrow, he will not persuade a large section of the country. If the nation's honour were in danger we would be with him. There has been no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour. We fought the Crimean War because of our honour. We rushed to South Africa because of our honour. The right hon. gentleman is appealing to us to-day because of our honour. There is a third point. If the right hon. gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him. What is the use of talking about coming to the aid of Belgium, when, as a matter of fact, you are engaging in a whole European war which is not going to leave the map of Europe in the position it is in now? The right hon. gentleman said nothing about Russia. We want to know about that. We want to try to find out what is going to happen, when it is all over, to the power of Russia in Europe, and we are not going to go blindly into this conflict without having some sort of a rough idea as to what is going to happen. Finally, so far as France is concerned, we say solemnly and definitely that no such friendship as the right hon. gentleman describes between one nation and another could ever justify one of those nations entering into war on behalf of the other. If France is really in danger, if, as the result of this, we are going to have the power, civilization, and genius of France removed from European history, then let him say so. But it is an absolutely impossible conception which we are talking about to endeavour to justify that which the right hon. gentleman has foreshadowed. I not only know but I feel that the feeling of the House is against us. I have been through this before, and 1906 came as part recompense. It will come again. We are going to go through it all. We will go through it all. So far as we are concerned, whatever may happen, whatever may be said about us, whatever attacks may be made upon us, we will take the action that we will take of saying that this country ought to have remained neutral, because in the deepest parts of our hearts we believe that that was right and that that alone was consistent with the honour of the country and the traditions of the party that is now in office.

MANIFESTOES

(a)

AUGUST 4

Message of the President of the Republic addressed to the Chambers.

(Read to the Chamber and the Senate on August 4th.)

GENTLEMEN,—France has just been the object of a brutal and premeditated aggression, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before a declaration of war had yet been addressed to us, even before the Ambassador of Germany had handed in his passports, our territory had been violated. The German Empire has only this evening given the real name to a state of fact which it had already created. For more than forty years the French, in their sincere love of peace, had repressed in their breasts their desire for legitimate reparation. They had given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely rehabilitated from its defeat by goodwill, patience, and industry, has used its renewed and rejuvenated energy only in the interests of progress and for the good of humanity. When the Austrian ultimatum opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France decided to follow and to recommend to all a policy of prudence, of wisdom, and of moderation. No one can impute to her any act, any gesture, any word which was not pacific and conciliatory. At the moment of the first encounters she has the right solemnly to make this claim for herself—that she made up to the last moment the strongest efforts to avert the war which has just broken out and of which the German Empire will have to take the crushing responsibility throughout history.

On the morrow of the day in which our allies and ourselves expressed publicly the hope of seeing the negotiations begun under the auspices of the Cabinet of London peacefully carried on, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia. She has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation, our neighbour and our friend, and she has endeavoured treacherously to surprise us in the midst of diplomatic conversations. But France was watching, as alert as pacific. She was prepared, and our enemies will meet on their path our brave covering troops who are at their posts,

and under whose shelter the mobilization of all our national forces will be methodically completed. Our fine and brave army, which France to-day accompanies with motherly thought, has arisen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country.

The President of the Republic, who voices the unanimity of the country, expresses to our troops who will fight by land and sea the admiration and confidence of all Frenchmen. Closely united in one feeling the nation will maintain the *sang froid* of the possession of which she has given daily proof since the beginning of the crisis. France will, as ever, combine the most generous impulses and the most enthusiastic spirit with that self-command which betokens lasting energy and the best guarantee of victory. In the war upon which she is entering France will have on her side that right which no peoples, any more than individuals, may despise with impunity—the eternal moral power. She will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose sacred union in face of the enemy nothing can destroy, and who to-day are fraternally bound together by the same indignation against the aggressor, and by the same patriotic faith. She is faithfully supported by Russia, her ally, she is upheld by the loyal friendship of England, and already from all parts of the civilized world come to her sympathy and good wishes, for she represents once more to-day before the world, Liberty, Justice, and Reason. *Haut les cœurs, et vive la France!!!*

(b)

AUGUST 2

Manifesto of the Tsar.

By the Grace of God, we, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., to all our faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs has been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force these last few days, when Austria-Hungary knowingly addressed to Servia claims unacceptable for an independent State.

Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the Servian Government, and having rejected the benevolent intervention of Russia, Austria made haste to proceed to an armed attack and began to bombard Belgrade, an open place. Forced by the situation thus created to take the necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the army and navy to be put on a war footing, while using every endeavour to obtain a peaceful solution of the *pourparlers* begun, for the blood and property of our subjects are dear to us.

Amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally Austria, contrary to our hopes in our good neighbourly relations of long date and

disregarding our assurances that the measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her, Germany began to demand their immediate cessation. Having been rebuffed in this demand, she suddenly declared war on Russia. To-day it is not only the protection of the country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be carried out, but we must also safeguard the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and her position among the Great Powers.

We believe unshakably that all our faithful subjects will rise with unanimity and devotion for the defence of Russian soil, that internal discord will be forgotten in this threatening hour, that the unity of the Tsar with his people will become still more close, and that Russia, rising like one man, will repulse the insolent attack of the enemy with profound faith in the justice of our work and with humble hope in omnipotent Providence. In prayer we call God's blessing on Holy Russia and her valiant troops.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

(c)

AUGUST 3

Announcement of Declaration of War by Germany against France.

BERLIN, August 3, 7.42 p.m.

Up till now German troops, according to the order issued to them, have not crossed the French frontier. On the other hand, since yesterday French troops, without a declaration of war, have been attacking our frontier posts. They have, although a few days ago the French Government had agreed to keep within an unoccupied zone of 10 kilometres, crossed the German frontier at different points. Since last night French companies have occupied German villages. Aviators throwing bombs have come since yesterday to Baden and Bavaria, and under an infringement of Belgian neutrality over Belgian territory into the Rhine Province, and have tried to destroy our railways. With this France has opened the attack upon us and has brought about a state of war. The safety of the Empire compels us to resist. His Majesty has given the necessary orders. The German Ambassador in Paris has been ordered to demand his passports.

(d)

AUGUST 6

Manifesto of the German Emperor to the German Army and Navy.

After forty-three years of peace, I call upon all Germans capable of bearing arms. We have to defend our most sacred possessions—the Fatherland and the home—against the reckless assault of enemies on all sides of us. That means hard fighting. Great sacrifices await us. I

am confident that the ancient and warlike spirit still lives in the German people—that powerful warlike spirit which attacks the enemy wherever it finds them, regardless of the cost, and which already in the past has been the dread and terror of our enemies.

I have confidence in you, German soldiers, in each and all of you. The ardent and indomitable will for victory is living in each and all of you, and I know that if it is needed each and all of you will die like a hero. Remember our great and glorious past. You are Germans. God help us !

(Signed) WILLIAM.

PRESS CORRESPONDENCE

(i)

AUSTRIAN COMPLICITY IN THE SERAJEVO MURDER

Le Temps leading article for July 24th says :—

The Austro-Hungarian authorities are not the people to lay suspicion on the Servian authorities. Who singled out Cabrinovich, one of the authors of the Servian assassination, as a dangerous man? It was the Servian Government. Who called for the expulsion of this dangerous Austrian subject? It was the Servian Government. Who opposed this precautionary measure? It was the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Belgrade. And whose opinion did he invoke? The Austrian authority at Serajevo, who are the guarantors of the man who some days after threw the bomb at the Archduke. If justice does not condemn Austrian pretensions, this suffices to discredit them, and to put the question whether the crime of June 28th is not after all a tragic pretext for a political move. Russia has shown the utmost forbearance since 1908. The Triple Entente has constantly sacrificed its more important interests to the peace of Europe. Has Austria been counting upon certain circumstances which are favourable to her, such as the assembling of the Italian Reservists, the death of M. Hartvig, the absence of his French colleague at Belgrade, Greco-Turkish difficulties, the troubles in Ulster, the absence of M. Poincaré and M. Viviani? It is possible. But that is all the more reason why the Powers of the Triple Entente should prove by their decisions that these contingencies will not affect their energies.

(ii)

Times.

ATTITUDE OF GERMANY ON THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, July 24th.

The severity of the Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia has caused surprise here, but Austria-Hungary has the full support of the Government and of the greater part of public opinion, because she cannot now go back. Until yesterday I understand that the *German Government* was not aware of the details or of the tone of the Note, although it had received confidential information as to its "scope." At an earlier stage Austria-Hungary secured from Germany a general promise that she

would receive her support. *The extent of the demands to be made to Serbia was, however, left entirely to the discretion of Vienna*, and advice was neither asked for nor offered officially. The German Government is fully aware of the delicacy of her relations with her ally, and would do nothing to limit her freedom. *Far less has she encouraged Austria-Hungary to go to extreme lengths. The Note has therefore caused surprise, and the Chauvinists, of all people, are indignant that Berlin was not asked for advice and was not given full details of the Austrian demands.*

At the same time it may safely be said that European complications are at present not thought probable. This seems to be the opinion of the Foreign Office, and it is the opinion of most newspapers. The Foreign Office bases its view upon the belief that Serbia is morally isolated, and that although the Austrian demands are hard, the evidence of Servian complicity in the Serajevo crime is convincing.

(iii)

Daily Telegraph.

GERMANY ON THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, Sunday night, July 26th.

It has been suggested that Germany is in part responsible for the contents and tone of the Austrian Note. She has even been accused of occasioning or at least inspiring that document. This imputation she absolutely repudiates. The actual degree of her complicity in the Austrian action was stated to me this morning by an authoritative official to be as follows:—

The result of the investigation of the Serajevo murders was communicated to the German Government by her ally. All the depositions and other material pointing to the guilt of official persons in Serbia were submitted for examination. It was represented that the evidence clearly proved the existence of a state of things in Serbia which Austria could not continue to tolerate without forfeiting, not merely her dignity and self-respect, but her national security as well. Austria announced that she had determined to exact drastic reparation for the wrong which she conceived had been done her, and to adopt such measures as should effectively prevent the Pan-Serb movement from again becoming a danger to her.

She asked whether she could depend upon the support of her ally in taking these steps, and the German Government, having weighed the proofs submitted in substantiation of the Austrian indictment, and satisfied itself of their validity, replied in the affirmative. That, so it is stated, is the full extent of Germany's complicity in the Austrian Note. From the time of the handing in of her answer she had no further cognizance of the matter till the document came to the knowledge of all the Governments of Europe. Reports to the contrary having become current both in this country and abroad, she has circularized her diplomatic representatives, instructing them to deny these rumours to the Governments to which they are accredited. They are to state that Germany had no earlier

information as to the terms of the Note and no more influence upon its formulation than any other country. *At the same time, they are to point out that, Austria having decided on her own initiative what her course was to be, Germany could not, consistently with her general treaty obligations and her specific promise of support, do or say anything calculated to embarrass her ally or detract from the effectiveness of the latter's action.*

Such, in brief, is the account given by authoritative lips of Germany's share in bringing about the present crisis.

(iv)

ALLEGED GERMAN THREAT TO FRANCE

(*Reuter.*)

BERLIN, Sunday, July 26th.

In regard to reports published by the Paris newspapers regarding the conversation which took place between the German Ambassador and the French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is semi-officially declared that the German Government has not used language in Paris different from that employed towards other Cabinets, especially those of St. Petersburg and London. The German Government has in every case made it known that it regards the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia as the concern of those two States alone, and that it must, therefore, be localized. The endeavours of Germany are directed towards inducing other Powers to accept this standpoint, so that the peace of Europe may be preserved.

(v)

Daily Telegraph.

GERMANY AS INSTIGATOR

ST. PETERSBURG, July 26th.

The idea is strong here that Russia is being aimed at through Servia, and that the labour troubles here are not only regarded as indicating a favourable moment for attack, but that these troubles have been actually fomented by German emissaries for the express purpose of creating the necessary conjuncture in connection with the paralysed condition of England under the influence of the crisis in Ireland.

(vi)

Rheinisch-Westphälische Zeitung.

GERMANY ON THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, July 26th.

Austria would be right in acting thus if she had given proofs of the justice of her accusations. Up to now nothing has been proved. No impartial tribunal has established that the Servians have prepared at

Belgrade the murder of the Archduke or that any Servian agent has stolen bombs or revolvers to arm the assassins.

The Pan-Servian propaganda in Bosnia has no need of being favoured by Belgrade; it has been kept up and fed by the Hapsburg dynasty.

It is really ridiculous for the people of Vienna and Budapest to imagine that Europe and our whole planet have given them the sacred mandate to avenge the dead Archduke.

Unluckily, it would be the German army that would be charged with this task. It is scandalous that our Government should not have demanded to be minutely informed of the details of the Austrian *démarche* before it was made.

We ought to declare to-day that we are not obliged to aid Austria in its policy of conquests. We have nothing to gain in a war against Russia.

(vii)

Die Post.

GERMANY ON THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, July 25th.

Every sentence is a blow of the fist in the face of the Servian Government. We fully understand and appreciate the deep indignation and the incurable pain which dictated these sentences. We are also completely convinced of the bona fides of the Austro-Hungarian Government that the murder of Serajevo is to be traced to the Servian intrigues. But we must still ask ourselves once more: on what does the Austro-Hungarian Government really base these serious accusations? Even if the assertion that a Servian major was concerned in the plot and that also Servian frontier officials had been bribed and were concerned in this terrible action, it is nevertheless going very far to accuse a whole people or the Government as the representative of the people of the murder. For that is done quite clearly and unmistakably in the Note. We are glad that the Austro-Hungarian Government at the moment when it handed the Note in at Belgrade has made it known to the whole world. By this act it has got rid of much foolish and useless conjecture. But why has it kept back the proofs that it must have in its hands? Why does it not come out before the whole world with the clear, unmistakable evidence that its accusations can be upheld, that they are in no way influenced by excitement and by the need for revenge, but that they are naked, unmistakable facts which prove the greater Servian plot against the Monarchy? The short statement which it makes is doubtless very compromising for Servia, but one must also hear the Servian Government in this affair. . . . Servia cannot agree to everything, if it is not to make itself despicable before the whole of Europe. Austria, on the other hand, is clever and experienced enough to know that it is asking the impossible from Servia. Why is it, then, forcing the situation to a crisis?

(viii)

Times.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

*(Berlin Correspondent.)**July 27th.*

The situation is regarded here to-day with really remarkable optimism. It is believed that the peril of great international complications is about to disappear, and it is even believed that notwithstanding the Austro-Hungarian mobilization and other preparations, an armed conflict with Servia is not absolutely inevitable. As regards the Austro-Servian issue the situation is extraordinary. It was given out that the Servian reply was unsatisfactory, and that is all.

Until this morning, nobody in Berlin knew what the reply was, and it has not yet been published here. Even the German Foreign Secretary, and more extraordinary still, even the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors here were unaware of the contents until the Servian Chargé d'Affaires, whose telegram had taken more than twenty-four hours to transmit, communicated it to the Foreign Office to-day. Notwithstanding the contemptuous comment issued to-day by the Austrian semi-official telegraph agency, it will ultimately have to be admitted that the reply is extremely conciliatory. The German authorities who have been examining the reply to-day may well have considered whether, if Vienna insisted upon maintaining her present course, it would be possible for Germany to maintain her attitude that she supports Austria-Hungary through thick and thin, although refusing to interfere with, or in any way to prejudice, the actions which her ally sees fit to take. If there is still hope as regards the Austro-Servian issue, there is confidence about the European issue. There is reason to suppose that the British Government has, with the necessary tact, made it plain enough that there can be no European war with England left out. *There is also reason to suppose that Germany has, with the necessary tact, made it plain enough that Germany would give at least as good advice in Vienna as France might give in St. Petersburg. Germany is certainly and no doubt sincerely working for peace.* The only remark that one need make about the prevailing optimism is that the pendulum has swung back so fast and so far that it is not unlikely to swing forward again before the crisis reaches the solution for which everybody hopes.

(ix)

Daily News.

FOUR POWER MEDIATION

St. PETERSBURG, Monday, July 27th.

The breathing-space secured by the friends of peace, headed by England and Germany, has perceptibly relieved the situation. It is understood that these Powers, co-operating with Russia, will draw up a formula to safeguard the sovereign rights of Servia on condition that

she insists on a thorough cleansing of all quarters associated with the Serajevo assassination, which, it is understood, the Tsar again described as an abominable crime.

(x)

Manchester Guardian.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, *Monday, July 27th.*

Despite innumerable rumours and an absence of authentic news, Berlin shows a decided tendency this evening to see the crisis in a calmer light. As before, all is felt to rest with Russia, but it is hoped that the moderating influence of both England and France will prevent intervention.

Special satisfaction is shown at the understanding between Berlin and Paris, and over the good offices which England and Italy are said to be exercising in Vienna and Belgrade. The combined action of these two Entente and Alliance Powers is thought to be the most likely means of securing Austrian moderation and Servian submission.

Clearly, Germany was unaware of the text of the Austrian Note before it was presented. I am assured on reliable authority that the Government disapproves the excessive sharpness of the tone employed. Openly, Germany must support Austria, but, according to my further information, the Government is not only striving to localize the conflict, but is also urging Austria to display the greatest possible moderation.

(xi)

Daily Chronicle.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, *July 27th.*

There is no doubt that the German Government ardently wishes that the conflict may be localized, but, on the other hand, it has stated with unmistakable distinctness that, if Russia comes to the help of Servia in any material form, it will fulfil to the very utmost the duties devolving on it.

Germany is bound by the terms of her alliance with Austria to support the latter Power with the whole force at her disposal if Austria is attacked by Russia, and she declares that help given by Russia to Servia in the present circumstances is an attack on Austria.

Germany undoubtedly wants peace, but her view of the situation is that Austria cannot now withdraw a step before she has obtained full satisfaction from Servia. Any attempts towards securing peace that leave this point out of the question will be cordially supported by the German Empire.

The general feeling in Berlin official circles is, however, optimistic rather than pessimistic.

(xii)

Times.

GERMAN ATTITUDE TO FOUR POWER PROPOSAL

BERLIN, July 28th.

As you will already be aware, Germany has refused Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a Four Power Conference. England's good intentions are recognized, but it is indicated that a "conference" is too formal a business for the present situation, and that it will be better to continue "negotiations" between Government and Government. *The whole crux of the matter is whether Germany is privately exercising a sufficient influence in Vienna. I can give no adequate assurances on this point. Although the conversations held at the Foreign Office yesterday and to-day are not in themselves satisfactory, it is reasonable to hope that Germany is doing more than she can afford to admit.*

(xiii)

Times.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

PARIS, July 28th.

The declaration of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia does not necessarily or immediately involve a general European war. *I have reason to believe that Germany has given more proofs of her desire for peace than have yet become known to the French.*

(xiv)¹*Daily Telegraph.*

GERMANY AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

PARIS, July 28th.

The one certain thing is that, if Austria goes beyond a certain point in her attack upon Serbia, Russia must and will intervene. That means an invasion of Galicia by Russia, with Roumania almost probably attacking next door. That means Germany compelled, not only by treaty but in self-defence, to take up arms for Austria. The first stroke in the defence of Austria by Germany must, of course, be an attack upon France. The German plan is a violent and sudden attack upon France, after which, it being assumed that the attack is overwhelmingly successful, Germany will just be in time to turn round upon Russia, always slow in her mobilization.

Finally, all this means the British fleet making a swift dash to annihilate the German. In short, the conflagration once lit, no one knows where it will stop.

(xv)

Times.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, July 29th.

The political atmosphere is very oppressive here to-day, and the prolonged anxiety and unrelieved uncertainty are telling on all but the strongest nerves. Judging by the tone in very well informed quarters this evening, there is little to show for the incessant diplomatic conversations. The German official attitude is still that the Austro-Servian issue is past interference, that the Austro-Russian issue, in so far as there is one, can best be settled by Vienna and St. Petersburg, and that the progress of the Russian mobilization is a grave peril. Austria's assurances to Russia that she has no territorial ambitions have their counterpart in Russia's assurances that her military movements are not offensive.

Although, however, the German official attitude remains fairly tranquil as regards the Russian mobilization, the development of military opinion which is now making itself felt may be difficult to control.

I have received the most explicit assurances of Germany's desire for peace, even in terms such as "War would be terrible for us." Unfortunately, it cannot at present be said that Germany shows a disposition to take any more definite action herself than in counselling Vienna, as she has repeatedly done, to settle matters directly with St. Petersburg.

There is no diminution of the stiffness of the German attitude with regard to Austria's "punishment" of Servia. Germany has not endorsed Sir Edward Grey's view that the Servian reply to the Austrian Note should at least provide a basis for a settlement, and Germany still appears to conceive that her hands are tied so far that no Servian concessions or submissions would find support here unless they had first been accepted by Vienna.

(xvi)

Westminster Gazette.

GERMANY AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE

BERLIN, July 29th.

The belief expressed in some English newspapers that Germany and Austria planned the crisis with Servia in order to bring on a "preventive war" with the Dual Alliance is ridiculed. The crisis is directly traced to the Serajevo assassinations, without which Austria would probably have nursed her other grievances with Servia for years.

The statement made by me that Germany did see the ultimatum in advance is correct; the belief that Germany denied this is due to loose reading of a very different German denial. The denial, as made to the Exchange Telegraph Agency, was that Germany was consulted in the drafting of the ultimatum. This is true and obvious. The *Berliner Tageblatt* statement that "Wilhelmstrasse" saw the ultimatum only "at the last minute" is taken as correct.

(xvii)

Daily Telegraph.

AUSTRIA REFUSES NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

ST. PETERSBURG, *Wednesday night, July 29th.*

We are given to understand on authority that Russia has done everything in her power to preserve peace, but that the Austrian Government has refused to continue negotiations any longer on the subject direct with St. Petersburg, so that the only remaining hope now rests on the mediation of the four disinterested Powers.

England and Germany are supposed to be still working in this direction, and attention is turned towards the news from Paris, according to which Austria pledges herself not to go beyond punishing Servia, and suggests an opportunity for the success of mediation after the first bout of hostilities, if Russia will meanwhile refrain from interference.

No explanation is yet forthcoming of the rupture of direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

(xviii)

Times.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN ATTITUDE TO RUSSIA

ST. PETERSBURG, *July 29th.*

The prolonged conversations between M. Sazonof and the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary and Germany to-day remained friendly in tone, but void of any practical results. Count Szapary and Count Pourtalès, the Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors, are alike permeated by a theory that the Austro-Servian conflict is no concern of Russia, a theory discredited by the consensus of opinion among the other Powers and by the logic of facts. The persistent unanimity of the bland responses made by Austria-Hungary and Germany to Russia's despairing appeal for a hearing compels the unwilling conclusion that *all this diplomatic effort has been merely by-play to gain time.*

(xix)

Times.

GERMANY'S DEMAND FOR PEACE

BERLIN, *July 30th.*

With the exception of the military journals, which are beginning to clamour for German measures, and of the Clerical Press, which is purely Austrian in tone, *there is a fairly strong demand for real activity on behalf of peace.*

(xx)

GERMAN SOCIALISTS ON RUSSIA

(Reuter.)

BERLIN, Thursday, July 30th.

In a leading article to-day the Socialist *Vorwärts* says :—

"We have at all times been undisguised opponents in principle of the Monarchy, and we have frequently waged an embittered fight against the impetuous wearer of the Crown, yet we must unreservedly admit to-day, and not for the first time, that William the Second, especially in late years, has shown himself the firm friend of the peace of the peoples."

(Central News.)

BERLIN, July 31st.

In the event of the negotiations at present in progress between Germany and Russia falling through, it is expected that meetings of the Bundesrat (Federal Council) and the Reichstag will be called, as the Imperial Chancellor is anxious to acquaint the German and European public with the efforts made by Germany to prevent the outbreak of a world-war.

The tone of the Berlin Press is extremely grave, but composed, although the hope is expressed that war will at the last moment be averted.

The attitude of the Socialist organ *Vorwärts* is well worthy of remark. It says that the fearful political crisis has become so acute that the next few hours can bring about war. Russia is to blame, and a general war will be provoked if Russia comes to Servia's aid, as that will mean the participation of Germany. It is necessary to demand from Austria-Hungary a clear basis for negotiations, her attitude towards Servia, and especially guarantees for the maintenance of Servia's independence. Germany must raise a warning voice against her ally, but the warning is not only for Germany and Austria, but also and mainly for Russia, who, by mobilizing, has brought about a situation which may result in the most fearful national murder, but which also may mean the end of Tsardom. France must bring her whole influence to bear on Russia, in order that France shall not be drawn into the horrors of a European war.

(xxi)

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TO WAR

Reuter's Agency in London circulated on July 30th the following from a well-informed source :—

Despite any idea to the contrary, Germany is doing her best to prevent a European outbreak. Her position must, however, be taken into account. She cannot, as is supposed in some quarters, bring pressure to bear upon her ally to stop all action, but she has been giving, and continues to give, good advice to Vienna.

It would be useless to disguise the fact that the partial mobilization of Russia has made the situation as regards Germany, and particularly Austria, more difficult.

Notwithstanding this, there is, in the German view, hope that a peaceful settlement can be reached if—simultaneously with the steps now being taken by Berlin—advice of moderation and calm is also tendered to Russia by France and Great Britain.

Germany has no desire whatever that anything but a peaceful issue shall come about of the present situation, and she will join in any effort possible to bring about a solution satisfactory to all parties.

(xxii)

Westminster Gazette.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TO WAR

BERLIN, July 31st.

The Imperial Government and the Emperor do not want war, and here they are backed by the nation, which shows no sign of chauvinist ardour.

But two considerations will compel a speedy settlement. *One is the tremendous military advantage reaped by Russia from her ambiguous policy. The other is financial and economic pressure, which threaten ruin to Europe, and worse ruin to Germany, whose business system is built on credit, and whose banks, as regards liquidity, are in a doubtful position.*

(xxiii)

RUSSIAN MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND ENGLAND'S ATTITUDE

(Reuter Foreign Special.)

ST. PETERSBURG, Wednesday, July 29th.

In Russian eyes the die is cast, and only a political miracle can avert war.

A partial mobilization has already been ordered, and there is every indication that the whole of the vast military machinery will soon be set in motion.

An Imperial manifesto is awaited to-night.

Confident of England's support, about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war.

(xxiv)

BRITISH ACTION AND EFFECT ON RUSSIAN OPINION

(Reuter.)

ST. PETERSBURG, July 30th.

The sailing of the British fleet from Portland has created an immense impression, and, coupled with Japan's pacific assurance, has more than confirmed Russia's determination to stand to her guns.

(xxv)

Times.

BRITISH ACTION AND EFFECT ON RUSSIAN OPINION

ST. PETERSBURG, August 2nd.

Truth compels me to say that Russians, high and low, are waiting with the intensest anxiety to learn Great Britain's decision. *The articles of the Times have done much to inspire hope, but if, contrary to reasonable expectation, the British Parliament insists on neutrality, there will be a terrible revulsion of feeling here.*

(xxvi)

RUSSO-BRITISH AMITY

(Reuter.)

ST. PETERSBURG, August 3rd.

Crowds of thousands of people made demonstrations to-day before the British Embassy here. Sir George Buchanan, the Ambassador, appeared at the window and addressed the crowd. *Amid frantic cheering he declared England's perfect sympathy with Russia.* The Secretary of the Embassy, standing beside the Ambassador, then raised cheers for Russia.



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GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

EUROPEAN CRISIS.

CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.



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INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

(1.)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manœuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

(2.)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were sign-

that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Serbian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Serbia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French—and also of the German—Governments was that the Serbian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Serbian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Serbian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Serbian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Serbian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Serbian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Serbian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Serbia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia

was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburg, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3.)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Serbian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Serbian Government was to publish on the front page of the "Official Journal" a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Serbian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Serbia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Serbia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice"—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

(4.)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Serbia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He

confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Serbia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired; and after all Serbia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power—Germany not excepted—had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

(5.)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe—how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Serbia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of

violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Serbia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Serbia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Serbia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said she was ready to stand aside; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

(6.)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Serbia and Austria; the only fear of further war had lain in the

relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburg. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past, her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Serbia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace.

(7.)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers

with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe.

Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914.

* See Part II.



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NOTE.

(1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467].

(2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445].

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596].

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123	To Sir E. Goschen...	Aug. 1	Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any promise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused	65
124	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	July 31	German ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government	66
125	" " ... (Telegraphic)	31	Neutrality of Belgium (see No. 114). French Government are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at the hands of another Power	66
126	" " ... (Telegraphic)	Aug. 1	German Ambassador has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for German communication respecting attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117). German Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening	67
127	Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic)	1	Mobilisation of Austrian army and fleet	67
128	Sir F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic)	1	Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium expects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power	67
129	Luxemburg Minister of State	2	German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act, but are only to insure against attack from France	67
130	To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic)	1	British merchant ships have been detained at Hamburg. To request immediate release. Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if detention continued	68
131	" " ... (Telegraphic)	1	Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No. 97). Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension	68
132	" " ... (Telegraphic)	1	Russia consents to British formula for basis of mediation (see No. 103)	68
133	" " ... (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with participation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them	69
134	Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President justifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobilising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Government do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war	69

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136	Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic)	1	General mobilisation in France ordered owing to German military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier	70
137	To Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic)	1	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Serbia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia	70
138	Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic)	1	Conversation with German Secretary of State. German Government have ordered mobilisation. Absence of reply to German ultimatum must be regarded as creating a state of war. Russian Government will be so informed	71
139	Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic)	1	Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Austrian domination of Serbia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Government and German preparations have forced Russian Government to order mobilisation, and mobilisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonov would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans	71
140	Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic)	1	French Minister for War has impressed on British military attaché that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minister of War maintains that France has, by withdrawing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act	72
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147	Luxemburg Minister of State (Telegraphic)	2	Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representatives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State	74
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LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS.

GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paul Cambon.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Benckendorff.
		Monsieur de Etter (<i>Counsellor of Embassy</i>).
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	...	Count Lalaing.
<i>Servian Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Boschkovitch.

FRANCE.

<i>President of the Republic</i>	...	Monsieur Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Viviani.
<i>Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Isvolsky.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austrian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Scézszen.

RUSSIA.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Monsieur Sazonof.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Count Pourtales.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szápáry.

GERMANY.

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	...	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under Secretary of State</i>	...	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Edward Goschen.
		Sir Horace Rumbold (<i>Counsellor of Embassy</i>).
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Sverbeiev.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Jules Cambon.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	...	Count Szogyény.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Baron Macchio.
		Count Forgach.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	...	Monsieur Schebeko.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	...	Herr von Tschirschky.

ITALY.

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	...	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	...	Sir Rennell Rodd.

BELGIUM.

<i>British Minister</i>	...	Sir Francis Villiers.
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SERVIA.

<i>Prime Minister</i>	...	Monsieur Pashitch.
<i>British Minister</i>	...	Mr. des Graz.
		Mr. Crackanthorpe (<i>First Secretary</i>).
<i>Austro-Hungarian Minister</i>	...	Baron Giesl.

PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE
PARLIAMENT.

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Serbia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Serbia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 2.

*Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 22, 1914.

LAST night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian *démarche* at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Serbia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.

No. 3.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1911.

COUNT MENSENDORFF* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Serbia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Serbia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Serbia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards; that if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Serbia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Serbia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Serbia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburg had not been very favourable recently.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4.

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie à Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal la déclaration suivante:—

"La Serbie reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas été atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine et qu'elle se conformera par conséquent à telle décision que les Puissances prendront par rapport à l'article 25 du Traité de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage dès à présent à abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observée à l'égard de l'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, à changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers l'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre désormais avec cette dernière sur le pied d'un bon voisinage."

"Or, l'histoire des dernières années, et notamment les événements douloureux du 28 juin, ont démontré l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrivé à se manifester au delà du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une série d'attentats et par des meurtres.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la déclaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a toléré l'activité criminelle des différentes sociétés et affiliations dirigées contre la Monarchie, le langage offencé de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse-

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

"Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter."

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of

ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, toléré enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe à la haine de la Monarchie et au mépris de ses institutions.

"Cette tolérance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cessé au moment où les événements du 28 juin dernier en ont démontré au monde entier les conséquences funestes.

"Il résulte des dépositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a été tramé à Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient être munis leur ont été donnés par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la 'Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a été organisé et effectué par des chefs du service-frontière serbe.

"Les résultats mentionnés de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimité expectative qu'il avait observée pendant des années vis-à-vis des agissements concentrés à Belgrade et propagés de là sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces résultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin à des menées qui forment une menace perpétuelle pour la tranquillité de la Monarchie.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se voit obligé de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'énonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigée contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage à supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractère solennel à cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier à la première page du 'Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante:—

"'Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore

outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration:—

"'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the

sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

“Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909.

“Le Gouvernement Royal, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.”

“Cette énonciation sera portée simultanément à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesté le Roi et sera publiée dans le ‘Bulletin officiel’ de l'armée.

“Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre :

“1° à supprimer toute publication qui excite à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance générale est dirigée contre son intégrité territoriale;

“2° à dissoudre immédiatement la société dite ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ à confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et à procéder de la même manière contre les autres sociétés et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent à la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesures nécessaires pour que les sociétés dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activité sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme;

“3° à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie;

“4° à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en général tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement impérial et Royal se réserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal;

fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.”

“This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army.

“The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

“1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

“2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

“3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

“4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"5° à accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirigé contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie;

"6° à ouvrir une enquête judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

"des organes, délégués par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives;

"7° à procéder d'urgence à l'arrestation du Commandant Voïja Tankosić et du nommé Milan Čiganović, employé de l'État serbe, compromis par les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo;

"8° à empêcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorités serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière;

"à licencier et punir sévèrement les fonctionnaires du service-frontière de Schabatz et de Ložnica coupables d'avoir aidé les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontière;

"9° à donner au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, qui, malgré leur position officielle, n'ont pas hésité après l'attentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une manière hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal attend la réponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, à 6 heures du soir.

"Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à cette note."

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory: delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voïja Tankosić and of the individual named Milan Čiganović, a Serbian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo;

"8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the

subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinées à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'État et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la dernière crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-là occupées en Macédoine sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

En présence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposé depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal espérait que le

Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members, generals and diplomats, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government

royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie, lorsque, après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'État voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du royaume, qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées, qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix européenne fût continuellement troublée, par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

ANNEXE.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavril Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicité y relative—crime com-

hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Sarajevo against Gavril Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination com-

mis par eux le 28 juin dernier—a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes:

1^o. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son séjour à Sarajevo, de l'Archiduc François-Ferdinand fut formé à Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović le nommé Milan Čiganović et Trifko Grabež, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosić.

2^o. Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livrés à Belgrade à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež par le nommé Milan Čiganović et le commandant Voija Tankosić.

3^o. Les bombes sont des grenades à la main provenant du dépôt d'armes de l'armée serbe à Kragujevac.

4^o. Pour assurer la réussite de l'attentat, Čiganović enseigna à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež la manière de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un forêt près du champ de tir à Topschider, des leçons de tir avec pistolets Browning à Princip et Grabež.

5^o. Pour rendre possible à Princip, Čabrinović et Grabež de passer la frontière de Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un système de transport secret fut organisé par Čiganović.

D'après cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzégovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut opérée par les capitaines-frontières de Chabač (Rade Popović) et de Ložnica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbić de Ložnica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

mitted by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Sarajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabač (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

NOTE addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.*

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Serbia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Serbia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Serbia's part.

I said that if Serbia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

No. 7.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

BEFORE departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia could not leave Russia indifferent.

Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power.

No. 8.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

AUSTRIAN demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

THE publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubt,

that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburg. I would say to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept

* French Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Serbia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburg, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Serbia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands *in toto*. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Serbia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria.

* German Ambassador in London.

No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

SERBIA ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at

Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador. July 25.

(Translation.)

M. SAZONOV télégraphie au Chargé d'Affaires de Russie à Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914:

"La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la présentation de l'ultimatum à Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un délai tout à fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour l'aplanissement des complications surgies.

"Pour prévenir les conséquences incalculables et également néfastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous paraît indispensable qu'avant tout le délai donné à la Serbie pour répondre soit prolongé. L'Autriche-Hongrie, se déclarant disposée à informer les Puissances des données de l'enquête sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner également le temps de s'en rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fondé de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en conséquence.

"Un refus de prolonger le terme de l'ultimatum priverait de toute portée la démarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois auprès des Puissances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases même des relations internationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Cabinet de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espère que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ad-

M. SAZONOV telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th July, 1914.

"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna."

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to

hétera au point de vue exposé, et il exprime l'espoir que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien munir l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Vienne d'instructions conformes.

the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a *démarche* with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburg), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government contained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.†

* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

No. 16.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 25, 1914.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.†

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa-

* See No. 14.

† See No. 12.

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold† is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburg. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He

* See No. 11.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

No. 19.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 25, 1914.

I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

No. 20.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

LANGUAGE of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 P.M. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21.

Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:—

The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the "Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. Crakanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in

now of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

No. 23.

*Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina^{*} will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

The Servian Parliament.

No. 24.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at
St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

* See No. 6.

No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation

* German Ambassador in London.

between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"The delay given to Serbia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Serbia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

* See No. 21.

No. 28.

[Nil.]

No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.
THE Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.
The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cracanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.
THE Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson* on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo—an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy—disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch† his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Servian Minister in London.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

SERVIAN reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent.

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

ACCORDING to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister

for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

EMPEROR returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

UNDER-SECRETARY of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.*

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

* See No. 21.

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 26, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war.

No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

WOULD Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

BERLIN telegram of 25th July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary.

* See No. 18.

No. 38.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)*

Sir,

Rome, July 23, 1914.

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionments which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

No. 39.

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gêner les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,* and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'État, protestations qui furent coupées court par les déclarations du Gouvernement serbe, faites le 18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renou-

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupchtina† and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th* March, 1909—have not been renewed

* Old style.

† The Servian Parliament.

velées vis-à-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédé que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de choses politique et juridique créé en Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifique et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balkanique, et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractère privé, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent, en règle générale, au contrôle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi, de cette façon, à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo; il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime, et il était prêt, pour prouver son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, est disposé à remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang, pour la complicité duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spécialement, il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du "Journal officiel" en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'énonciation suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie

on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Failing in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Serbia

condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Impérial, à la propagande susmentionnée, et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars, 1909,* qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer."

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'armée Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince héritier Alexandre, et sera publié dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina† une disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge, lors de la révision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la société

condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupchtina† a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna

* New style.

† The Servian Parliament.

"Narodna Odbrana" et autres sociétés similaires aient commis, jusqu'à ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal et dissoudra la société "Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délais de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fomentier la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui communique ultérieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, éventuellement, auraient été mêlés au complot du 15^e juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant à la participation à cette enquête des agents ou autorités austro-hongrois qui seraient délégués, à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction

Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications

en question pourraient être données aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder, dès le soir même de la remise de la note, à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant à Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15^e juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être arrêté.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prié de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumée, faire connaître le plus tôt possible, les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'enquête à Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière. Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitzza qui ont manqué à leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger, ont eu après l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie, dès que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal lui aura communiqué les passages en question de ces propos, et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont, en effet, été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une en-

as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th^{*} June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitzza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by refer-

tente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) mars, 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914.

ring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 40.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken.

* See No. 26.

† See No. 36.

No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

* Nos. 36 and 37.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoff to exchange views with Count Berchtold.† He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

* See No. 36.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Serbian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Serbian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict.

* See No. 6.

In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,* I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

- See No. 44.

No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will

* See No. 46.

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

COUNT MENSENDORFF⁴ told me by instruction to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the co-operation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension,

⁴ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, the Marquis di San Giuliano† would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

Sir,

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

POUR mettre fin aux menées subversives partant de Belgrade et dirigées contre l'intégrité territoriale de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a fait parvenir à la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie une note dans laquelle se trouvait formulée une série de demandes pour l'acceptation desquelles un délai de quarante-huit heures a été accordé au Gouvernement Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu à cette note d'une manière satisfaisante, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes.

L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient

IN order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Servian Government a note, dated July 23, 1914, in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just ad-

d'adresser à la Serbie une déclaration formelle conformément à l'article 1^{er} de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative à l'ouverture des hostilités, se considère dès lors en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de l'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de déclarer que l'Autriche-Hongrie se conformera au cours des hostilités, sous la réserve d'un procédé analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'à celles de la Déclaration de Londres du 26 février, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priée de vouloir bien communiquer, d'urgence, la présente notification à son Gouvernement.

dressed to Servia a formal declaration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as possible to the British Government.

No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

Sir,

Paris, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

(Translation.)

PAR une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaître au Gouvernement de la République que, d'après Sir Edward Grey, la seule manière d'assurer, si c'était possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas où les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une démarche commune à Vienne et à Saint-Petersbourg des représentants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à accueillir favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invité M. Jules Cambon à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et à appuyer la démarche qu'ils jugeront opportune de faire auprès du Cabinet de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la République

IN a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador informed the Government of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to welcome such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim* has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon* to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any representation which they may consider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire ex-

* French Ambassador in Berlin.

a, d'autre part, conformément au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorisé M. Paul Cambon* à prendre part à la réunion proposée par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Italie à Londres, les moyens de résoudre les difficultés actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la République est prêt également à donner aux agents français à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire active en attendant les résultats de cette conférence. Il estime toutefois que les chances de succès de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentiellement sur l'action que Berlin serait disposée à Vienne [sic]. Une démarche auprès du Gouvernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opérations militaires paraît vouée à l'échec si l'influence de l'Allemagne ne s'est pas exercée au préalable sur le Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, Président du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, saisit cette occasion de renouveler, &c.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

pressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Government of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pending the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a suspension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their influence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council *ad interim* takes the opportunity, &c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

* French Ambassador in London.

No. 52.

Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la République accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative à une intervention de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie en vue d'éviter les opérations militaires actives sur les frontières autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorisé M. P. Cambon* à prendre part aux délibérations de la réunion à quatre, qui doit se tenir à Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin a reçu pour instructions, après s'être concerté avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, d'appuyer la démarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient jugées opportunes.

M. Viviani† est prêt à envoyer aux représentants français à Vienne, Saint-

THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Serbia; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon* to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna,

* French Ambassador in London.

† French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens suggéré par le Gouvernement britannique.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 juillet, 1914.*

St. Petersburg, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the British Government.

French Embassy, July 27, 1914.

No. 53.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

*Saint-Petersbourg,
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne l'initiative de convoquer à Londres une conférence des représentants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, pour étudier une issue à la situation actuelle.

J'ai répondu à l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entamé des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que j'espère favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore reçu de réponse à la proposition que j'ai faite d'une révision de la note entre les deux Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient irréalisables, je suis prêt à accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature à résoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant écarter dès aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la réponse donnée par le Ministre de la Justice français à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de modération à donner au Cabinet Impérial.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,
July 27, 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28, 1914.)

*Saint-Petersbourg,
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

MES entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Allemagne est plutôt favorable à l'intransigeance de l'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arrêter tout le développement de la crise, paraît n'exercer aucune action sur son alliée.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la réponse de la Serbie.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,
July 15 (28), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

MY interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that the Serbian reply is insufficient.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulièrement alarmante.

Il me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir à Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement allemand à l'action nécessaire. C'est à Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic.

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

See No. 44.

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to

the guarantees which Serbia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Serbia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 27, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Serbia, but he believes that if Serbia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied, and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recorded in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace.

* See No. 46.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday* to St. Petersburg.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.

* See No. 47.

No. 60.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

* See No. 43.

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,† which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Serbia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Serbia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.

* See No. 46.

† "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

No. 63.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna.

* See No. 27.

No. 64.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you:—

In a long conversation this morning Servian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation—such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propaganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Chargé d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to
Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 28, 1914.

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration,

* See No. 43.

but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.*

* See No. 46.

No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.*

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape.

* See No. 55.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914.

(1.) *Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914.*

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2.) *Telegram to Count Benckendorff.*

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Serbia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matter to drag on and give Austria time to crush Serbia.

* Russian Ambassador in London

No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Serbia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Serbia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

* See No. 46.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received *note verbale* from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.

* See No. 4.

No. 74.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at

Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

* See No. 75.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's,

* See No. 67.

to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,* which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Serbia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Serbia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant† was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Serbia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

* See No. 57.

† See No. 69.

No. 79.

*Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Serbia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

IN your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant† from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,† but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburg fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46.

† See No. 43.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82.

Mr. Beaumont, British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Servian rule.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Nish, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburg had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations *à quatre* in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise.

It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day* to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

* See No. 77.

No. 86.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 29, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. British Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

AFTER telling M. Cambon* to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon* that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky† not

* French Ambassador in London.

† German Ambassador in London.

to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

* Russian Ambassador in London.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our

conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning, as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's† telegram of the 28th July‡ and of my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano¶ had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

* See No. 84.

† British Ambassador in Rome.

‡ See No. 64.

§ See No. 81.

¶ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum, which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Serbia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Serbia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff* said that the war with Serbia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Serbia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff* deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Bodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano* suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 93.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914.

(1.)

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonov.

Vienna,

le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.

(Translation.)

Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

J'AI entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold† dans le sens des instructions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis

(Telegraphic.)

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold† to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. I brought to his notice,

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il était désirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait à la Monarchie austro-hongroise des garanties sérieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais l'attention du Comte Berchtold* sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'entraînerait un conflit armé entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold* me répondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte du sérieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. Il me dit que d'un autre côté le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'était décidé que très mal volontiers aux mesures énergiques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro-hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold* ajouta que la crise était devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degré, que le Gouvernement, le voulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la réponse même de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sincérité de ses promesses pour l'avenir.

in the most friendly manner, how desirable it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I drew Count Berchtold's* attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold* replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold* added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible, he said, inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future.

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(2.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

*Saint-Petersbourg,
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

*St. Petersburg,
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chancelier, que l'Allemagne n'a pas cessé d'exercer à Vienne une influence modératrice et qu'elle continuera cette action même après la déclaration de guerre. Jusqu'à ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armées autrichiennes aient franchi la frontière serbe. J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai informé des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'était dirigée contre l'Allemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne préjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie,

(Telegraphic.)

THE German Ambassador informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moderating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenor of this communication. I have informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation

ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de l'armée austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se prononçant en faveur d'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je répondis que j'y étais tout disposé, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent écho à Vienne.

En même temps je signalais que nous étions tout disposés à accepter le projet d'une conférence des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entièrement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre à profit tous les moyens propres à produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action parallèle des pourparlers d'une conférence à quatre de l'Allemagne, de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, à l'instar à peu près de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier.

Je dis à l'Ambassadeur qu'après les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restées ouvertes ne serait pas très difficile à trouver, à condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonté de la part de l'Autriche et à condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation.

being the mobilisation of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explanations between the Austrian Government and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers—Germany, France, England, and Italy—and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most critical moments of last year's crisis.

* I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Serbia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to settle the other questions which remained outstanding, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.

*Saint-Petersbourg,
le 16 (29) juillet, 1914.*

(Télégraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon télégramme précédent, je n'avais pas encore reçu le télégramme du 15 (28) juillet de M. Schébéko.⁴

Le contenu de ce télégramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de procéder à un échange d'idées direct avec le Gouvernement Impérial.

Dès lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'à nous en remettre entièrement au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des démarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

*St. Petersburg,
July 16 (29), 1914.*

(Telegraphic.)

AT the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schébéko's* telegram of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable.

* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 94.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My informant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favourable spirit; if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his

interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg continuing their conversations, although he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Serbian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof* to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof* accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:—

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

SECRETARY of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's* telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of

* German Ambassador in London.

aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram* received from Prince Lichnowsky† last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

* See No. 102.

† German Ambassador in London.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 30, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Serbia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this, and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

See No. 85.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky^x that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky^x to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.[†]

German Ambassador in London

| See No. 98.

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured

to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,† and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 97.

No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan* of to-day,† and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburg.

* British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

† See No. 103.

No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit.

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c..

E. GREY.

* French Ambassador in London.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,
E. GREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey.

L'Ambassade de France,

Londres,

ce 23 novembre, 1912.

(Translation.)

French Embassy, London,

November 23, 1912.

Cher Sir Edward,

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappelé que, dans ces dernières années, les autorités militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'étaient consultées de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours été entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberté, pour chaque Gouvernement, de décider dans l'avenir s'ils se prêteraient l'un l'autre le concours de leurs forces armées; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spécialistes n'étaient et ne devaient pas être considérées comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements à agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appréhender une attaque non provoquée de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armée de l'autre.

Votre lettre répond à cette observation, et je suis autorisé à vous déclarer que, dans le cas où l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appréhender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque événement menaçant pour la paix générale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immédiatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prévenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les

Dear Sir Edward,

YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would de-

deux Gouvernements délibéreraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposés à prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitôt en considération les plans de leurs états majors et décideraient alors de la suite qui devrait être donnée à ces plans.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
PAUL CAMBON.

liberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,
PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

(Translation.)

L'ARMÉE allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-frontières, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pénétré sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite à 10 kilom. en arrière de la frontière. Les populations ainsi abandonnées à l'attaque de l'armée adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient à montrer à l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16^e Corps de Metz renforcé par une partie du 8^e venu de Trèves et de Cologne occupe la frontière de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15^e Corps d'Armée de Strasbourg a serré sur la frontière. Sous menace d'être fusillés les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexés ne peuvent pas passer la frontière; des réservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappelés en Allemagne; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation: or, nous n'avons rappelé aucun réserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, l'Allemagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concordent pour montrer que les préparatifs allemands ont commencé samedi,* le jour même de la remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces éléments, ajoutés à ceux contenus dans mon télégramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement britannique de la volonté pacifique de l'un et des intentions agressives de l'autre.

THE German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in.

These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive intentions of the other.

* Sic: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended.

No. 106.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey,—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNED from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct

exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Serbia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.

* See No. 84.

No. 108.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request.

No. 109.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday. His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document.

His Excellency agreed.

* See No. 101.

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that "Kriegsgefahr" will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr" signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

"Imminence of War."

No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irremediable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer.

No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development.

* See No. 99.

No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Serbia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Serbia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Serbia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

M. CAMBON^{*} referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson[†] this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask

^{*} French Ambassador in London.

[†] British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repenting the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.† He trusted it would meet with your approval:—

“Si l'Autriche consentira à arrêter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.”‡

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress.

M. Sazonoff said that undoubtedly there would be better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

* See No. 103.

† See No. 97.

‡ TRANSLATION.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 121.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—**(Received August 1)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.

* See No. 111.

No. 122.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—**(Received August 1)*

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very

* See No. 122.

great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysée, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.

* See No. 114.

No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:—

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

* See No. 124.

No. 126.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was informed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

* See No. 115.

No. 129.

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

Luxemburg, 2 août, 1914.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

(Telegraphic.)

MINISTRE d'État du Luxembourg
Eyschen vient de recevoir par l'inter-
médiaire du Ministre d'Allemagne à
Luxemburg, M. de Buch, un télé-
gramme du Chancelier de l'Empire

The Luxembourg Minister of State,
Eyschen, has just received through the
German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de
Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor
of the German Empire, Bethmann-

allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disent que les mesures militaires à Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont uniquement des mesures destinées à assurer contre attaque éventuelle d'une armée française. L'exploitation des voies ferrées affermées à l'Empire Luxembourg recevra complète indemnité pour dommages éventuels.

Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxembourg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxembourg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxembourg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Benckendorff† of the 31st July communicated to me to-day:—

“(Urgent.)

“Formule amendée conformément à la proposition anglaise: ‘Si Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d’une question d’intérêt européen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Russian Ambassador in London.

atteinte à ses droits d'État souverain et à son indépendance, la Russie s'engage à conserver son attitude expectante.' ”*

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

* TRANSLATION.—“Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: ‘If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.’ ”

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof,† dated the 31st July, which are as follows:—

“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.

No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of

this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government.

No. 136.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

MINISTER of War informed military attaché this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.

* "State of war."

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Serbia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg by Count Berchtold,† and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburg, to the effect that neither an infringement of Serbian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburg had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.

* See No. 131.

No. 139

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

MY telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonoff† had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonoff informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally.

* See No. 120.

† Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof* was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.

M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,† had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† See No. 120.

No. 140.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attaché this evening, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the

first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

* See No. 130.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. 145.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

MY telegram of 1st August.*

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* See No. 143.

No. 146.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

Minister of State, Luxembourg, to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.

(Télégraphique.)

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 août, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétré sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraire à la neutralité du Grand Duché garantie par le Traité de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression auprès des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères à Berlin.

Luxembourg.

(Telegraphic.) *August 2, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxembourg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxembourg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxembourg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxembourg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memorandum :—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxembourg. I told him the

* French Ambassador in London.

doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship "Sappho" at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,† I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143.

† See No. 130.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd August*: Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

* See No. 149.

No. 151.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been sent to-day:—

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take."

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication:—

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatum had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied:—

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral."

In making this communication, M. Cambout was instructed to lay stress

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† French Ambassador in London.

upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the *casus fœderis* under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—

(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This

action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158.

*Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey.—
(Received August 4.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

MILITARY attaché has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, and that Liège has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

* See No. 153.

No. 160.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir,

London, August 8, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government

* See No. 153.

would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow* at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow* expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to

* German Secretary of State.

† See No. 159.

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow† a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann‡ said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann‡ left me, a flying sheet, issued by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow† at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow† came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

† German Secretary of State.

‡ German Under-Secretary of State.

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow* and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by

* German Secretary of State.

my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I leave, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

* American Ambassador in Berlin.

No. 161.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir,

London, September 1, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Serbia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirsky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold† during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Serbia. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron Gieslt had broken off relations at Belgrade Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the

* German Ambassador at Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

‡ Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Serbia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.† On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons‡ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Serbia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Serbia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

‡ See Hansard, Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Serbia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirsky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary† with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof‡. Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko|| that Count Szapary† had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof‡ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof‡, M. Schebeko|| added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,¶ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.** M. Schebeko|| to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,§ and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,** had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko|| repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko|| had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko|| left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that

* German Ambassador in Vienna.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

‡ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

|| Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

¶ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

** See No. 137.

†† Austro-Hungarian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff,† at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo. Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff† had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

† Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of *Chargé des Archives*. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, &c.,

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.



PART II.

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

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PART II.

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
AUGUST 3, 1914.

LAST week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple *Entente*, for some years past. The Triple *Entente* was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic

support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeiras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—brought later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments:—

"My dear Ambassador,

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

Lord Charles Beresford.—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey.—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western

coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms loaded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war: and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal

way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:—

“We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty’s Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country’s honour or to the country’s interests.”

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

“There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever.”

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone’s Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:—

“The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:—

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:—

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:—

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under

the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which

the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—it we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:—

“Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.”

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received. I make no further comment upon it.

(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:—

“The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.”

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

“German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.”

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterwards—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:—

“General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle).”

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:—

“Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi-

tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law.—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us to-day?

The Prime Minister.—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:—

"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs"
—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

"a note of which the following is a literal translation:—

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

"Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory.

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places."

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:—

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000.

(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the

country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war."

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith).—In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on:—

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government"—

Let the House observe these words—

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies"—

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe—

"and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect."

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:—

"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise."

Then we come to Belgium:—

"It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

* See Part II, No. 85, page 64.

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added:—

“Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances ”——

the assurances I have read out to the House—

“might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired.”

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our pledged word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:—

“His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view ”——

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:—

“such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:—

“Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.”

He then says:—

“We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require.”

And he added, in sentences which the House will appreciate:—

“You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that

* See Part II, No. 101, page 77.

they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true—

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in those trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple-

mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family.

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

